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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses the nature of the power of transnational civil society and how it is 
exercised. It does this through a case study of transnational civil society (TNCS) re-
sponses  to  developing  countries’  debt  crisis  from  the  first protests in Peru in 1976 to the 
mass mobilisations at the 2005 G8 Summit. It asks what is the nature of the power of 
transnational civil society, and how was this power exercised in order to change interna-
tional debt policy? While the focus of the thesis is on the agency of transnational civil 
society, the concept of the internationalising state is used to provide the structural 
framework that describes the changing world order against which this agency was exer-
cised. The debt campaign is examined in terms of three periods of activity: 1976- 1990; 
1991-1996; and 1997- 2005. The power of TNCS is examined in terms of how they 
used knowledge, leveraged the national/international interface, and their modes of en-
gagement with the decision makers of the internationalising state. The nature of power 
relations within TNCS is explored through an analysis of the internal fault lines along 
the south/north interface of those campaigns. The thesis is based on an analysis of debt 
campaign documents, interviews with key informants, media sources and secondary 
sources. It finds that debt campaigning challenged international debt policy largely 
through national political processes, regardless of how campaigns were positioned with-
in world order – whether in G7 countries, other creditor countries or in debtor countries 
- and irrespective of the particular phase of world order. On the other hand, modes of 
engagement with decision makers did change with the changing world order, and how 
debt was framed was a key element in this process. South/north relations are conceptu-
alised as a continual cycle of solidarity and conflict, as debt movements sought both to 
escape the impact of the hierarchical structuring of the internationalising state, but also 
to leverage their particular power within that hierarchy. 
 vii 
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Introduction 
 
Globalisation stands for organised irresponsibility. Keeping a look out for 
someone you can contact, someone to whom you can make a complaint, 
someone you can demonstrate against is a lost cause. There is no institution, 
no telephone numbers, no email address. (Beck 2006, p.55) 
 
While it is true there is no world government or central authority overseeing globalisa-
tion, active citizens have targeted a range of international bodies that they see as respon-
sible for policies which have negative social, environmental, economic and political im-
pacts. These range from the anti-IMF and World Bank protests during the 1980s to the 
Battle of Seattle against the WTO in 1999 and the huge civil society mobilisations at the 
G7 Gleneagles Summit in 2005. Parallel to these high profile and often contentious 
demonstrations against IGOs, transnational civil society groups have run campaigns 
against specific international policies. While transnational campaigning has a long his-
tory preceding the current phase of globalisation (Keck and Sikkink 1998), the transna-
tionalisation of campaigning grew rapidly over the course of the second half of the 
twentieth century paralleling the globalisation of the world economy. 
The developing country debt crisis of the last quarter of the 20th century gave 
rise to one of the most sustained and long-running of these transnational campaigns, in-
volving people from across the six continents. The earliest records of transnational soli-
darity on this topic refer to the US/Peru solidarity group of the late 1970s in response to 
Peru’s   debt   crisis   (Donnelly 2002). Over the following thirty years transnational debt 
campaigns expanded and at their peak had groups in over sixty countries, including 
churches, NGOs, trade unions, solidarity groups, environment groups, and indigenous 
movements. In addition to its long history and broad geographic spread, debt campaign-
ing achieved high international recognition through the Jubilee 2000 campaign, which 
leveraged the symbolism of the upcoming millennium, and mobilised massive public 
support for debt cancellation.  
This study examines these movements as they waxed and waned over three dec-
ades (from 1976 to 2005) from contentious action against banks, international financial 
institution summits, and government austerity programmes in the 1980s to the mass 
mobilisation of the Jubilee 2000 campaign from the late 1990s. The thesis arose from 
my  experience  coordinating  Ireland’s campaign for cancellation of developing country 
debt (Debt and Development Coalition Ireland) from 1993-2005. The questions exam-
ined in the thesis are those which arose for me during those years: why did we as loose-
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ly linked campaign groups from across the world, think we could make a difference; 
what did we bring into play that might make the whole array of actors – G7, IMF, the 
World Bank, and governments – change course? My practitioner questions translated 
into  the  research  questions  ‘what is the power of transnational civil society, what is its 
source and how does civil society leverage this power?’  
Debt campaigning took place against the background of a dramatically changing 
economic and political world order. It developed as the neoliberal counter-revolution 
was gaining in strength in the 1980s (Toye 1993), but at this time competing world sys-
tems still existed. Following the fall of communism in 1989, neoliberal claims that there 
were no alternatives to the free market model appeared to be confirmed, leading to the 
closure of space for counter-discourses. These changes were accompanied by the devel-
opment of a hegemonic discourse of good governance, part of which was a global par-
ticipation norm (Gaynor 2010), which opened doors to civil society groups in some in-
ternational institutions, including the World Bank and the IMF. Although the consensus 
on neoliberalism remained in place, it began to gradually fracture over the course of the 
1990s due to internal strains arising from the continual cycle of financial crises (Mexico 
1994, East Asia 1997; Russia, Brazil, Ecuador 1998/9, Argentina 2001) and from exter-
nal challenges by social movements and civil society groups on issues like debt, trade, 
investment and the lack of legitimacy of global governance more generally.  
While transnational debt campaigning in this thesis is set in interaction with this 
changing world order, the main focus of the research is on the agency of civil society. 
Structure   is   ever   present   as   a   constraint   and   shaper   of   what   ‘is’,                                       
while agency operates in hope and optimism1 of what  ‘could  be’ (Holloway 2005). As a 
result, structure can operate as a fatal attraction, drawing us into its domain and so 
shrinking the space for hope and optimism. Holloway (2005, p.7) expresses this as the 
tension between the indicative (what is) against the subjunctive (what might be), and 
these two are in continual tension: “[w]e are but we exist in an arc of tension towards 
that which  we  are  not,  or  are  not  yet”. So while acknowledging the presence and signifi-
cance of structure, this study is centred on the more elusive concept of agency.  
Introducing the main actor - transnational civil society  
The central actor in this study, transnational civil society, is an aggregate of civil society 
groups from across countries and regions. Civil society is a contested concept, and the 
                                                 
1 Thanks  to  Diana  O’Dwyer  for  this  insight  – based  on  her  paper  “The  optimism  of  Agency  and  the  con-
straints  of  structure”,  Dublin City University 2008. 
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conflicting understandings can be set in the context of the particular historic moment in 
which the concept was reintroduced into public discourse. From the 1980s, ‘civil socie-
ty’ was used to describe those challenging the communist governments of Eastern Eu-
rope and the military regimes of Latin America (Cox 1999; Kaldor 2003; Germain and 
Kenny 2005). The emergence of these movements coincided with the development of 
ideas on global governance as the way in which the globalising world was to be gov-
erned in the absence of any centralised authority. While the movements in Eastern Eu-
rope and Latin America were decidedly political, in contrast global governance involved 
a depoliticisation process, integral to which was a problem solving approach that ac-
cepted current power relations as given. The move to involve civil society in policy dis-
cussions, and also an increased role for civil society in providing services that had hith-
erto fallen under the remit of the state, gave rise to a debate on the nature of civil society 
agency. One view sees civil society as an autonomous space independent of the state 
and market with the potential to play an emancipatory role– as did the movements in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America (Kaldor 2003a). An opposing view posits civil socie-
ty as integrated into - albeit not absorbed by - the process of global governance (Send-
ing and Neumann 2006). A third view argues that civil society is not a unitary body, but 
contains elements which contribute to the creation and maintenance of the consensus 
which global governance seeks to promote, while other elements seek to change it fun-
damentally (Katz 2006). A key aim of this study is to develop an understanding of civil 
society drawing on these theories and based on an analysis of how civil society debt 
campaigns engaged with national and international decision makers.  
Different terms are applied to civil society operating across a number of coun-
tries - transnational, international or global civil society. The term transnational is used 
in this study, defined as the involvement of groups from two or more countries in joint 
action to challenge international public policy. Global civil society, used by a range of 
thinkers,   contains   stronger   claims   than   does   the   term   ‘transnational’.   It   suggests   the  
emergence of a new global societal force in a post-sovereign world which can help to 
bridge the democratic deficit within globalisation and is a more contested term than 
transnational civil society (Amoore and Langley 2004; Munck 2004). The term ‘global 
civil society’ is used in this study when referring to thinkers who use this term and the 
term ‘international’ is used to refer to the formal inter-governmental realms e.g. IMF 
and World Bank, but is not applied to civil society. 
The making of transnational debt campaigns involved new relationships between 
groups across the globe with the south/north relationship of central importance, given 
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that this division corresponded to the division between debtor and creditor countries. 
The south/north civil society relationship has evolved over time from a welfare ap-
proach, with NGOs providing aid from the 1940s (de Senillosa 1998), to the solidarity 
groups that emerged from the 1960s in support of southern struggles/revolutionary gov-
ernments, and the subsequent shift to advocacy from the 1990s that focussed on specific 
problems that affected people across a range of countries (Eade and Ligteringen 2001). 
The activities of transnational civil society groups from the 1970s onwards, for exam-
ple, the first NGO forum to parallel a UN conference at the 1972 UN Conference on the 
Human Environment; the campaign to Boycott Nestlé’s   infant   formula; and the early 
years of the campaigns for debt cancellation, give the impression of transnational civil 
society as a site of solidarity, promoting ideas of justice, equality and the public good. 
Global inequalities, however, are reflected back into transnational civil society itself, 
with the south/north interface as a strong fault-line. One of the stories told in this study 
is of the south/north relationship within transnational debt campaigning as it developed 
over time driven by solidarity and conflict and how this led to a reconfiguration of pow-
er within debt campaigns. 
Transnational civil society operating in a globalising world 
An important starting point for civil society campaigning is to identify where to attrib-
ute responsibility for an identified problem. Transnational civil society faces the particu-
lar challenge in identifying responsibility for global problems in the absence of any 
form of world government. A problem is to pinpoint internationally where dominant 
power lies in a given policy area and the power relationship that exists between states, 
intergovernmental organisations, and transnational corporations. The relationship be-
tween the state and capital, between the state and the international arena, the extent to 
which sovereignty has been conceded by states were issues with which debt campaign-
ers grappled during the 1980s and continue to be subject of academic debate within in-
ternational political economy. The concept used in this study to express the infrastruc-
ture of dominance in the world order   is  Cox’s   (1987)   ‘internationalising   state’, which 
argues that the state is being internationalised into official and unofficial transnational 
networks of states, corporate representatives, IGOs, and intellectuals with the aim to 
reach a consensus in support of an open world economy, but that this does not result in 
a centralised governing structure. According to Cox (1987) the concept is based on the 
evolution of the state/capital relationship over time driven by a changing world econo-
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my resulting in the restructuring of the state towards the international arena in line with 
the globalisation of capital. This shifts the balance of state accountability away from 
domestic societies and more outward towards the consensus emerging within the inter-
nationalising state. Under these conditions, how can transnational civil society contest 
policy and power structures in the context of the internationalising state? There are dif-
ferent schools of thought on this question. One argument is that states should be reartic-
ulated towards resistance to neoliberalism (Gills 2000). Others suggest the state has ei-
ther been so weakened by economic globalisation or complicit in promoting this process 
that the state should be bypassed and the focus should be on strengthening global de-
mocracy and accountability (Evans 2008). The strategic choices made by transnational 
debt campaigns in relation to these options are discussed in this thesis.  
Thesis question  
As stated above, the question being examined is ‘what is the power of transnational civil 
society, what is its source, and how does civil society leverage this power?’ The basic 
definition of power used to analyse these questions is power as the potential to make, 
receive or resist a change (Lukes 2005, p.69). This form of power as potential is lever-
aged by civil society making common cause transnationally on the nature of the prob-
lem, possible solutions, and how to work together to press for these solutions. In terms 
of how transnational civil society seek to exercise power, a range of theoretical ap-
proaches were explored.  A largely consensual approach theorises the power of transna-
tional civil society as persuasion through promoting norms and values (Yanacopulos 
2004; Dryzek 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Other explanations focus on the adversar-
ial nature of transnational civil society – engaging in contentious politics, or anti-
systemic movements with the two approaches differing in terms of the degree of change 
sought and the level of challenge posed to the dominant understandings. Neo-
Gramscians, for example, focussing on anti-systemic challenges, posit a struggle to 
change  current   ‘common  sense’  understandings   to  a  new  ‘good  sense’  enabling  struc-
tural change, while contentious politics theorists focus on framing issues to resonate 
with current cultural understandings and therefore less fundamental change. Given the 
“organised  irresponsibility”  (Beck 2006) at global level, more conventionally expressed 
as the absence of democratic structures, the power of global civil society is seen by oth-
er theorists as arising from its potential to bridge this democratic deficit, but this poten-
tial is qualified by inequalities within global civil society and its own democratic defi-
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cits (Scholte 2002b; Edwards 2001). As this is an exploratory study, primarily con-
cerned with questions of agency, an analytical framework is developed (in chapters 2 
and 3) that enables a bottom-up approach to analysing and interpreting the data collect-
ed. Within this framework the case study material is analysed through the lenses of 
‘sources  of  power’  and  ‘exercising power’  as  follows: 
 
Source of power: power as potential is described as being actualised by civil society 
groups coming together transnationally to make common cause, on their analysis of the 
debt crisis, their proposed solutions and how they will work together for a resolution of 
the problem. 
 
Exercising Power: in this framework the exercising of power by civil society has three 
key dimensions  
- Knowledge: the (counter) discourses on debt mobilised by debt campaigns 
- Geography: how debt campaigns operated across the national/international inter-
face 
- Modes of engagement with decision makers – the degree to which these were ad-
versarial or consensual. 
 
Underlying this framework is a broader question: what was the level of chal-
lenge posed by transnational debt campaigns to the world order? As these research 
questions were those with which I grappled as a practitioner, they are likely to be of in-
terest to others involved in transnational activism in terms of developing and imple-
menting strategies. The study can also help activists and practitioners to place their ef-
forts within a broader framework including understandings of civil society and of the 
national/international interface. The questions also have significant theoretical implica-
tions. This can be demonstrated by asking the questions: why a study of the power of 
transnational civil society; and why debt movements as a case study of transnational 
civil society? 
In terms of why study the power of transnational civil society, this is relevant 
because the effects of globalisation continue to be strongly contested between those 
who argue that globalisation is decreasing poverty and inequality (World Bank 2002) 
and those who argue that globalisation is deepening the structural inequalities between 
core and periphery countries (Wade 2004). There are a range of bodies deeply en-
meshed   in   this   power   struggle   over   the   ‘common   sense’   of   globalisation– academics 
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think tanks, IGOs, business and finance representative bodies and civil society groups 
such as debt campaigns. Analysis of the power of different actors is of central im-
portance for this debate, but the issue of power has tended to be somewhat neglected in 
the literature on global governance (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Gills 2000). Further, 
some theorists bypass civil society groups, and the role of transnational civil society has 
been neglected by much of IPE, which tends to focus on elite actors (Broome 2009, 
p.59). Even Neo-Gramscians who are centrally interested in the possibility of the trans-
formation of world order pay far more attention to dominant forces than to civil socie-
ty/social movements (Drainville 2005a). In this context studies of the power of transna-
tional civil society can contribute significantly to more nuanced understandings of pow-
er in world order. 
Why choose debt campaigns as the subject of this study? The long history, broad 
geographic span and significant southern involvement make the debt campaigns a very 
interesting case. It enables a study of change in the campaign over time and differences 
in the campaign between different countries and regions. There is a growing body of 
literature on debt movements (reviewed in Chapter 1), but this is dominated by the high 
profile Jubilee Campaign. This study adds to this literature by providing a more detailed 
examination  of  debt  campaigns’  long  history  without  privileging  any  particular  phase;;  a  
wider geographic span covering campaigns in debtor countries, G7 and non-G7 creditor 
countries and has a stronger focus on southern involvement than has been provided in 
studies to date. This enables an examination of: 
- how common cause was made and sustained over such a long period, the tensions 
that emerged, in particular along the south/north interface, and the outcomes of 
these tensions  
- the diverse approaches to, and understandings of, the debt crisis by debt cam-
paigns, enabling a multi-layered understanding of transnational civil society rather 
than positing it largely as a unitary actor  
- the mechanisms through which debt campaigns engaged with decision makers and 
the implications of this for understandings of civil society relations with states and 
IGOs 
- how debt campaigns operated across the national /international interface and 
whether this varied between countries differently positioned within world order or 
over time 
- how campaigning interacted with, and impacted on, the changing world order  
 8 
Asking these questions has the potential to provide a broader understanding of 
the power of transnational civil society as manifested in debt campaigns. 
How the study was carried out 
This exploratory study uses qualitative methods, providing a rich analysis of three time 
periods. While it was not possible to cover all the individual country campaigns or re-
gional networks, material from a selection of debtor countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America and from a range of European countries and the European Network on Debt 
and Development was gathered. The thesis uses interviews with key informants, sec-
ondary sources, archival material and media coverage. The three time periods relate to 
different forms of campaigning and to different phases of the changing world order.  
 
Case Study Period 1: 1976-1990: in this period civil society groups from different parts 
of the world were developing transnational links, with adversarial action taking place in 
opposition to debtor government austerity programmes, creditor country banks and at 
international summits. The campaign took place against the background of a world or-
der in which alternative political systems were still possible;  
 
Case Study Period 2: 1991- 1996: after the fall of the Berlin Wall the campaign in-
volved close engagement with decision makers in a uni-polar economic world;  
 
Case Study Period 3: 1996 - 2005: the Jubilee 2000 campaign which leveraged the up-
coming millennium as a new symbolic opportunity to mobilise public support for debt 
cancellation emerged at a time when the neoliberal world order has begun to fracture.  
Thesis structure 
Chapter 1: This chapter, entitled ‘Debt Crisis and its Contestation’, provides an over-
view of the debt crisis and how it was contested by debt campaigns. It places debt cam-
paigning in the context of a changing world order and concludes with a review of the 
literature on debt campaigning, highlighting areas where knowledge of the power of 
transnational debt campaigning needs further development.  
 
 9 
Chapter 2: ‘Power   and Transnational Civil Society’ reviews the main theoretical ap-
proaches to transnational civil society power and concludes with a rationale for the ana-
lytical framework used in this study.  
 
Chapter 3: ‘Understanding World Order’ identifies  Cox’s  internationalising  state  as  the  
structural framework for the thesis. Following a short review of alternative explana-
tions, the development and operation of the internationalising state together with the 
weaknesses of the concept are set out. The internationalising state is then operational-
ised in relation to debt, and the implications for civil society campaigning are identified. 
The chapter concludes with an outline of how the internationalising state is to be opera-
tionalised in the case study chapters.  
 
Chapter 4: ‘Researching  Debt  Movements’ provides an overview of how the study was 
carried out, a rationale for the qualitative case study methods used, and a reflection on 
my  role  as  an  ‘insider’  researcher. It describes the research process from data collection 
through analysis and interpretation.  
 
The three case study chapters 5, 6 and 7 cover the three time periods and all have a 
similar structure based on the analytical framework. Chapter  5:  ‘The Making of Trans-
national Debt Movements 1976-1990’ covers the first time period, focussing on how 
debt campaigns made common cause over the 1980s and action taken to contest the 
debt. Chapter 6, entitled ‘Campaigning for debt cancellation in a Uni-polar economic 
world   order’, examines the first coordinated transnational debt campaign, which con-
tributed to the adoption in 1996 of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative. 
Chapter  6:  ‘Jubilee Campaign’ covers the period of debt campaigning that achieved the 
highest and broadest levels of mobilisation, but also the one in which the south/north 
tensions became most acute. 
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Chapter One: The Debt Crisis and Its Contestation  
Introduction  
Civil society campaigning for debt cancellation is one of the longest running transna-
tional campaigns. It was not a static activity, but rather a process which changed signifi-
cantly over the thirty year period covered in this research, during which time the context 
in which campaigning has taken place also changed.  Among these changes was a shift 
in the role of NGOs and in the way in which the role of civil society more generally was 
conceptualised. At the same time there were major advances in information and com-
munication technologies and in transport and dramatic changes in world order. Transna-
tional campaigning waxed and waned, targeted different decision makers, adopted dif-
ferent repertoires of action and used different discourses on debt over the decades. In 
the literature debt campaigning is highlighted as an example of a successful transnation-
al campaign, especially the Jubilee 2000 campaign set up in 1996 (Friesen 2010; 
Broome 2009; Mayo 2005; Grenier 2003). This campaign influenced both national and 
international decision makers and achieved some debt cancellation and was also notable 
for the high levels of transnational mobilisation and the strength of the south/north link-
ages within the campaign. In spite of this assessment of the importance of the debt cam-
paign and of Jubilee 2000 in particular, there is relatively little analytical literature on 
debt campaigns and this literature will be discussed in section 1.6 below. 
This chapter firstly discusses the debt crisis and the response of campaigners; it 
then outlines the changes in world order which are relevant for this study. Following 
this, given that the concept of civil society is contested, different understandings of the 
term are considered in order to discuss the basis for a working definition of civil socie-
ty. Finally, the literature on debt campaigning, produced by both academics and debt 
campaign activists and practitioners, is discussed, and the understandings of the power 
of civil society organisations that make up the debt campaign contained in that literature 
are analysed. 
The emergence of two debt crises   
The debt crisis in developing countries that exploded during the last quarter of the twen-
tieth century enveloped Latin America and Africa, with the Philippines as the main 
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country affected in Asia. As with any major historical event, pinpointing the start of the 
debt crisis depends on which crisis is being considered – a  crisis   threatening  people’s  
lives and livelihoods or one threatening the financial system. Some analysts and activ-
ists situate the Latin American debt crisis within the centuries of exploitation of its envi-
ronment and people after the arrival of the conquistadores at the end of the fifteenth 
century. The resulting massive social, economic and ecological debts owing to the peo-
ples of Latin America dwarf the amounts owed by the continent at the end of the 20th 
century (Mujica 1988; Osorio 1987). The colonial period also left its debt legacy in Af-
rica. Many African states inherited huge foreign debts contracted by colonial admin-
istrations and never managed to emerge from their indebtedness (Adedeji 1985). 
A shorter historical perspective situates the debt crises in the context of the de-
velopment of the internationalising state with the shifting relationship between state and 
finance capital (see Chapter 3) and more specifically the emergence in the 1960s of the 
virtually unregulated Eurodollar Market that facilitated the lending which led to the cri-
sis. The cost of operating in this market was lower due to lack of regulation. For exam-
ple, US banks were required to hold a certain percentage of their assets in reserve, but 
this did not apply to their off-shore branches (Lipson 1981). The Eurodollar market was 
fed by substantial dollar surpluses held by private banks and central banks outside the 
US as a result of the chronic US balance of payments deficit (Teunissen1987) due to 
stronger competition from Japan and Europe and also the costs of the Vietnam War 
(Walton 1989). The development of this market was also propelled by the huge amount 
of petrodollars that resulted from the quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC in 1973 and 
which were deposited in international banks. Banks were obviously keen to lend their 
surpluses, and they found new markets in developing countries with 40% of Euromarket 
loans going to developing countries by 1979 (Lipson 1981). As a result, public debt as a 
percentage of GNP in Latin America increased nearly four times between 1970 and 
1983 (Walton 1989, p.304), and African debt increased eight fold between 1971 and 
1982, with interest payments rising from $277 million in 1971 to over $5 billion in 1982 
(Adedeji 1985, p.56). 
There were external and internal reasons why countries borrowed on such a 
scale. External factors included the fact that money was cheap – real interest rates were 
virtually zero during the 1970s (Green 1995), and governments were encouraged to bor-
row by the IMF and the OECD (Broome 2009). Banks lent far beyond prudent levels, 
and when borrowing countries could not maintain repayments, a crisis threatened the 
entire financial system. The lending bonanza was also fuelled by cold war politics, as 
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east and west competed for allies among developing countries. Internally, states had to 
finance the enormous oil price increases in addition to needing to finance their devel-
opment programmes. According to Walton (1989, p.305), governments   “bought   some  
of  the  fruits  of  development  on  credit”, providing social mobility for the middle classes 
and profit to those linked to the international economy, while also enhancing the social 
wage by increasing subsidies on basic goods. The loans also fuelled corruption, leading 
to questions about the legitimacy of the lending, particularly in the case of Latin Ameri-
ca during the 1970s, as many of the borrowing countries were run by military regimes. 
In Africa future problems were inevitable as the loans were used for the financing of 
basic infrastructure (education, health, water, transport), which was almost entirely reli-
ant on external financing (Adedeji 1990). 
The immediate cause of the crisis was a huge rise in interest rates and a second 
oil shock in 1979 and the collapse in commodity prices as a result of the accompanying 
recession. For example, Africa’s  export  earnings  decreased  by  25%  between  1979 and 
1982 (Adedeji 1985, p.61). US policy aimed at halting the fall in the value of the dollar 
drastically increased interest rates, exacerbating the crisis, and it was the hike in interest 
rates that accounted for a large proportion of the increased debt burden in the 1980s ra-
ther than any increase in borrowing. In the case of Africa, these high interest rates are 
estimated to account for one- third of its debt (Adedeji 1990), an example of the major 
transfers of resources from indebted southern governments to northern creditors. 
While resolutions on developing country debt were passed at UNCTAD as early 
as 1978 (UNCTAD 1978), internationally the high level of debt was only perceived as a 
crisis for international finance in August l982, when Mexico, a major debtor, caused 
panic by announcing that it could not continue to service its debt. Not all the debt was 
owed to commercial banks. There were two other significant sets of creditors: rich 
country governments and multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and 
the regional development banks. While Latin American countries owed significant 
amounts to commercial banks, Sub-Saharan African countries were more indebted to 
rich country governments and multilateral institutions. This meant that Latin American 
and African countries took different approaches to their creditors, and different initia-
tives were taken by creditors to deal with the different forms of debt, as will be seen in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
The other debt crisis, the crisis for the people of indebted countries, dates from 
when governments began to experience difficulty in servicing their debt, as they could 
not generate the resources to cover the higher interest payments and increased import 
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costs and turned to the IMF for loans. A condition for receipt of new loans or debt re-
scheduling was that governments should introduce IMF austerity programmes, which 
included devaluation, leading to higher prices for imported goods and a reduction in 
public spending, including slashing subsidies on essential goods, such as food, and 
wage reductions. The impact of wage cuts and price rises on individual household 
budgets mirrored the impact of commodity price falls and increases in interest rates on 
government budgets. Among the earliest countries affected were Peru and Jamaica, 
which were both in virtual default from 1976 (Walton 1989). Popular debt protests took 
place in Peru from 1976 (Walton 1989) and sparked off transnational solidarity (Don-
nelly 2002). As Peru and Jamaica were not systemically important countries, their debt 
crises did not pose a threat to international banks and so did nor evoke the same re-
sponse  from  the  international  system  as  did  Mexico’s  crisis.  It  was  the  threat  to  the  fi-
nancial system that preoccupied creditor organisations, and therefore their focus was on 
the need to ensure that debtor countries continued to service their debts. It was, howev-
er,   the  devastating  effects  of   the   crisis  on  people’s   lives  which  sparked  off  debt   cam-
paigning. 
Debt campaigning  
The earliest evidence of transnational action on debt dates to solidarity with Peru from 
returned US missionaries in the late 1970s (Donnelly 2002). From the 1980s, national 
and transnational action on debt began to develop, starting in Latin America and the 
Philippines and then spreading to Europe and North America. Action took the form of 
national protests against the austerity programmes which were a condition for debt re-
lief, contentious mobilisations at IGO summits, and the emergence of national cam-
paigns. A significant feature was the development of transnational links covering much 
of the globe between civil society groups concerned about debt. It is significant that this 
took place in the absence of the developments in information technology and cheaper 
travels which underpinned later transnational civil society networking. While initially 
the focus of campaigning was largely on Latin American debt owed to commercial 
banks, towards the end of the 1980s campaigning moved to Sub-Saharan African debt, 
75% of which was owed to rich country governments and multilateral institutions 
(Adedeji 1990). 
In spite of the severe social and economic effects of the crisis and protests from 
both debtor governments and civil society groups, creditors held strongly to the princi-
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ple of the sanctity of contracts, and therefore that debts must be repaid. Their main re-
sponse was to provide new loans to enable countries to continue to service their debts, 
leading to a further accumulation of debt. Two debt deals adopted by the G7 in 1988 
and 1989, respectively, started the process of a series of inadequate creditor initiatives 
that contributed to the fact that the crisis dragged on for decades. In 1988 the Toronto 
Terms were adopted by the G7, with the aim of providing limited relief on the debt of 
low-income countries (Evans 1999; Adedeji 1990). The following year a further initia-
tive, the Brady Bonds, was introduced to deal with commercial debt, involving swap-
ping existing loans for low-interest bonds backed by the US Treasury Miles 1999 (Miles 
1999; Vásquez 1996). 
The second phase of debt campaigning from 1990 focussed on official debt, in 
particular of Sub-Saharan African countries. This phase of campaigning took place in 
the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the subsequent narrowing of space for 
anti-systemic approaches. There was a shift from contentious mobilisation and protests 
to lobbying national and international decision makers. This involved adopting a dis-
course which was closer to that of national and international decision makers, involving 
in particular a more technical analysis of the debt issue (Momani 2010a; Callaghy 2002; 
Bokkerink and Van Hees 1998). 
While the focus of campaigners was now on official debt, multilateral debt was 
far more onerous than debt owed to rich country governments (bilateral creditors). Alt-
hough only 30% of the long-term debt of heavily indebted low-income countries was 
owed to multilaterals, half of their debt servicing went to multilateral creditors (Bokker-
ink and van Hees 1998). This was because multilateral debt was the priority for repay-
ment, because a failure to repay carried the threat that the defaulting countries could be-
come financial pariahs, being refused loans or grants from any source. A further prob-
lem was that aid was being recycled to repay debt to multilateral institutions rather than 
being  spent  on  human  development:  “Repayments to multilateral creditors, mainly the 
IMF and the World Bank, now account for more than half of the $12bn in debt service 
payments made by African governments, forcing massive diversion of overseas aid pro-
vided by donors” (Bryer 1995). Particularly controversial was the fact that the inability 
to reschedule or reduce multilateral debt led to a reverse flow of resources from Africa 
to the IMF (Adedeji 1990, p.2).  
 Cancelling multilateral debt was particularly contentious, with the IMF and the 
World Bank strongly opposed, arguing that bilateral debt was the real problem facing 
low-income countries, that only a few countries had a multilateral debt problem, and in 
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any case multilateral debt could not be reduced due to the fact that the World Bank 
would lose its AAA credit rating, leading to an increase in the cost of its borrowing, and 
the IMF role as lender of last resort would be undermined.  A further reason for re-
sistance both by the IMF, the World Bank and other creditors was that by cancelling this 
debt, they would lose leverage over the economic policies of southern countries (Law-
rence 1995). Pressure for multilateral debt reduction came from a range of sources: civil 
society debt campaigns, some rich country governments, UN organisations and parts of 
the World Bank. This resulted in the adoption of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
(HIPC) Initiative in 1996, which, with modifications introduced in 1999, offered the 
framework for dealing with low- income countries’  debt  over  the  course  of  the  next  dec-
ade. This initiative provided some debt reduction to up to 41 designated highly indebted 
low-income countries, but they first had to complete six years of IMF and World Bank 
structural adjustment programmes. Debt campaigners were divided in their response to 
the initiative. The division was between those who saw the initiative as copper fastening 
south/north inequalities giving further leverage to northern interests over southern coun-
tries through adjustment conditionalities, and those who saw it as a stepping stone to-
wards a more just solution, providing opportunities for further lobbying (Bokkerink and 
van Hees 1998). 
At the same time as the HIPC initiative was adopted, the Jubilee 2000 campaign, 
the most high-profile debt campaign, was launched in Britain in 1996. The campaign 
was  based  on  linking  the  biblical  concept  of  a  periodic  jubilee  whereby  ‘right  relations’  
are restored, that is, debts are cancelled, land redistributed and slaves freed, with the up-
coming millennium as a new Jubilee moment. The central campaign call was for the 
cancellation of unpayable debt of the poorest countries by the year 2000, giving a debt- 
free start for a billion people (Buxton 2002). The campaign used a range of methods – 
an international petition, major mobilisations at G7 Summits, lobbying national decision 
makers and a wide range of actions at national level. This resulted in a new debt initia-
tive – the Cologne debt deal, known also as the Enhanced HIPC - which increased debt 
reduction under HIPC, releasing resources into debtor government budgets (Greenhill 
and Blackmore 2002). A further element of the Cologne debt deal was that savings in 
government budgets as a result of debt reduction had to be directed towards the imple-
mentation of Poverty Reduction Strategies (Stewart and Wang 2003; Seshamani 2005). 
As happened following adoption of HIPC 1, Jubilee 2000 campaigners were divided in 
their responses to the Cologne deal, with some northern campaigns giving it a qualified 
welcome, but others, in particular southern campaigns, rejected the deal, seeing it as 
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continuing oppressive relations between north and south and that it failed to recognise 
the illegitimacy of much of the debt owed by the south. This led to serious tensions be-
tween southern and northern groups. An autonomous Jubilee South network of southern 
groups was launched in November 1999 with a radical analysis of debt as illegitimate, 
questioning who owed what to whom, declaring that southern countries were the credi-
tors and calling for repudiation of debt. 
While Jubilee 2000 was set up as a time-limited campaign that would disband at 
the end of the year 2000, given the huge mobilisations it generated and the high interna-
tional profile it gained, campaigns continued beyond 2000, albeit at a more modest level. 
In 2004/2005 a new transnational civil society initiative was launched -Make Poverty 
History (MPH)/Global Call for Action against Poverty (GCAP). This campaign had a 
wider focus, seeking improvements on debt, aid and trade. Within this Jubilee cam-
paigns played a central role in relation to the debt issue, which was the focus of huge 
mobilisations in 2005 in relation to the G7 Summit in Gleneagles. The G7 announced 
the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MLDRI), which promised 100% cancellation of 
debt owed to the IMF, World Bank and African Development Bank for countries which 
had completed the HIPC initiative. While this was a significant step compared to the 
early 1990s, when multilateral debt cancellation was taboo, neoliberal conditionality for 
countries seeking debt cancellation remained in place (Nash 2008), and only a limited 
number of countries benefited, as the initiative was limited to countries which had com-
pleted HIPC. 
Debt campaigning in a changing world order  
The changes in world order that occurred concurrently with three decades of debt cam-
paigning consisted of a range of elements. Particularly relevant for this research are the 
shift in the power relations between southern and northern countries and the end of the 
east/west polarisation following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. With regard to 
south/north relations, following decolonisation in Asia and Africa after World War 11, 
southern countries formed significant groupings within the UN, the most important ones 
being the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and the G77. Operating through these group-
ings, countries of the global south challenged their unequal position within the world 
economy. A major proposal promoted by southern countries was for a New Internation-
al Economic Order (NIEO), consisting of a range of measures to restructure internation-
al economic relations with the aim of enabling net inflows of resources to developing 
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countries through trade and aid. The UN General Assembly adopted the proposal in 
1974, and a process of dialogue between southern and northern governments to resolve 
the issues covered by this proposal was initiated. While there was significant conflict 
within this relationship, there was also some recognition of common interests between 
south and north in the context of an increasingly interdependent world, for example, in 
the Brandt Report (Mittelman and Pasha 1997, Adams 1993). 
The 1980s saw dramatic ideological shifts and changes in world order. The dec-
ade was marked by the launch of the neoliberal counter-revolution (Toye 1993), the 
election of neoliberal governments in the UK, US and Germany, and the explosion of 
the debt crisis – all of which became entwined in strengthening neoliberalism.  Central 
to the counter-revolution was a depoliticisation of the structural inequalities within the 
international economy. These inequalities and the continued underdevelopment of some 
regions was increasingly attributed to failures by southern governments (Mawdsley and 
Rigg 2003). This was accompanied by the assertion that the same free market policies 
were appropriate for all countries, regardless of how they were integrating into the 
world economy (Martinussen 1999; Toye 1993). The debt crisis provided a lever 
whereby debtor states could be restructured in line with these policies through policy 
conditions attached to the receipt of debt relief, aid and loans. The parallel development 
of  global  governance  as  a  “broad  ordering  strategy  for  the  world  economy  that  attempts  
to construct a perfectly apolitical  civic  space”  (Drainville 2005a, p.106) further contrib-
uted to the depoliticisation process. This process was strengthened by the growing crisis 
in the Soviet Union over the 1980s, which resulted in the weakening of the idea of an 
alternative to capitalism. Further, the growing hegemony of neoliberal ideas led to the 
sidelining of the NIEO and the north/south dialogue. Some civil society groups, howev-
er, resisted the changes in world order, and in the 1980s debt movements sought to ex-
ercise power by challenging the changes arising from the strengthening of neoliberal-
ism. These groups held on to counter-discourses of the NIEO, liberation theology and 
maintained solidarity with revolutionary struggles and the governments emerging from 
those struggles such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, one of the defining radical causes 
of the 1980s. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall marked a peak moment in the process of the depoliti-
cisation of global inequalities. The pattern of cold war lending, whereby east and west 
sought to support their respective southern allies, came to an end, and the concept of 
‘governance’  became  central  to  international  discourse  as  the  framework  to  enable  fur-
ther development of the world economy. As part of the process of creating a new con-
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sensus  around  the  ‘governance’  discourse,  the  idea  of  the  participation  of  civil  society  in  
policy processes became a global norm (Gaynor 2010). This development was a key 
factor that drew debt campaigns into close engagement with international organisations 
dealing with debt. They were pushed towards this form of engagement by the fatal 
weakening of the practical possibility of alternative ideologies in the short to medium 
term and attracted to it by the opening up of participation spaces in IGOs that they be-
lieved could be used to press for short-term changes in debt policy. As will be discussed 
in  Chapter  6,   to   leverage   these   ‘invited   spaces’   debt   campaigns   aligned   their   analysis  
with the framework of the dominant understandings that informed these IGOs and at-
tempted to align their proposed solutions with the most progressive parts of the IGOs 
dealing with debt. 
As a result of internal strains and external pressure, hegemonic neoliberalism 
began to fracture during the 1990s. While the 1989 Brady Bonds restored investor con-
fidence in middle-income countries, international debt problems were exacerbated, be-
cause new investment came significantly in the form of short-term speculative capital 
(Soto 2013). This factor, together with the liberalisation of finance, contributed to a 
continual cycle of financial crises starting as early as 1994 with the Mexican crisis, fol-
lowed shortly by the Asian Tigers in 1997. In 1998 Russia defaulted on its debt, while 
Brazil tottered on the brink of crisis, and Ecuador suffered a severe financial crisis dur-
ing which the government was brought down as a result of the mobilisation led by the 
indigenous  people’s  movement,  CONAIE  (Lucero  2001).  Following  this   there  was  the  
high-profile Argentinean default in 2001 which was also accompanied by massive do-
mestic protests (Benclowicz 2011; Silva 2009). The unremitting cycle of financial crises 
dented the credibility of neoliberal policies and led to the emergence of critics from the 
heart of the internationalising state and of the key international financial institutions, 
such as the economist Joseph Stiglitz.2 These internal strains were paralleled by external 
challenges from social movements and civil society networks. In 1994 the Zapatistas 
emerged in Mexico in opposition to the signing of NAFTA and to the neoliberal poli-
cies followed by the Mexican government. The Zapatistas played a central role in reac-
tivating the tradition of solidarity with revolutionary movements from civil society or-
ganisations in northern states and also in promoting transnational resistance to neoliber-
alism. They organised an Intercontinental Encounter For Humanity against Neoliberal-
                                                 
2 A member of the US Council of Economic Advisers from 1993-95, Chief Economist and Senior Vice 
President at the World Bank 1997-2000. He won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2001. Available at: 
http://new.sipa.columbia.edu/faculty/joseph-stiglitz [Accessed 12 August 2013] 
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ism in Chiapas in 1996, which was a major counter-systemic international event (Mor-
ton 2002). In 1995 sustained strikes in France were framed   as   opposition   to   ‘global  
markets’  leading  to  the  emergence  of  ATTAC  (Association  pour  la  Taxation  des  Trans-
actions  pour  l’Aide  aux  Citoyens)  in  1998.  This  organisation  called  for  a tax on finan-
cial transactions and became a new transnational social movement that played a central 
role in the establishment of the World Social Forum in 2001 (Ancelovici 2002). The 
first major Jubilee 2000 mobilisation at the G8 Summit in Birmingham and the defeat of 
the  OECD’s  proposal  for  a  Multilateral Agreement on Investment by “network  guerril-
las, a loose coalition of NGOs”   (Jonquiere 1998), also took place in 1998. In 1999, a 
major mobilisation,  the  ‘Battle  of  Seattle’  took  place  at  the  WTO’s  Ministerial  Meeting 
which can be seen as the start of a new phase of the anti-globalisation movement. The 
1999 WTO meeting in Seattle also marked the strongest southern government opposi-
tion within an inter-governmental organisation to the international economic structures 
since the NIEO debates of the 1970s, and marked the beginning of the unravelling of 
the consensus in favour of multilateral trade rules. This form of active mobilisation con-
tinued into the new millennium with further contentious mobilisations against the IMF 
and the World Bank and with significant protests at G7 Summits in 2001 and 2005. 
The later phase of debt campaigning did not, however, emerge as a response to 
these strains in the world order, but Jubilee 2000 created a different opportunity to mo-
bilise public support for debt cancellation through leveraging the symbolism of the mil-
lennium and achieving a high international profile. As a diverse and broadly based or-
ganisation, it also operated as a complex mix of campaigning, public mobilisation and 
institutional engagement in national and international arenas. 
Positioning civil society in relation to the national and international arenas 
As can be seen from the previous section, transnational civil society campaigns emerged 
as a central actor in relation to the debt crisis from the 1980s onwards. The emergence 
of   transnational  civil   society  was  paralleled  by   the  development  of   the   idea  of   ‘global  
governance’  describing  the  decentred,  depoliticised  process  through  which  globalisation  
would be overseen in the absence of any form of world government (Roseneau 2002). 
Linkages between global governance and transnational civil society were promoted 
through the new global norm encouraging the participation of civil society in policy dis-
cussion referred to above. Given this linkage, transnational civil society is a particularly 
contested concept, giving rise to a debate in the literature as to the nature of the agency 
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of transnational civil society. It is debated whether or not transnational civil society can 
be described as an independent space, which has the potential to challenge the policies 
and legitimacy of global governance, or is it best described as being integrated into a 
depoliticised problem solving process of global governance (Drainville 2005a; Chan-
dhoke 2002). Even the name given to this form of social organisation has political over-
tones. The term ‘civil society’ was reintroduced into public discourse in the 1980s to 
describe those groups that were challenging the communist governments of Eastern Eu-
rope and the military governments of Latin America (Germain and Kenny 2005; Cox 
1999; Kaldor 2003). The term also impacted on civil society replacing an activist dis-
course  based  on  concepts  such  as  ‘the  grass  roots’,  ‘popular  movements’,  ‘the  commu-
nity’  and  more  broadly  ‘the  people’,  and  it  is  significant  that  the  use of the more depolit-
icised  term  ‘civil  society’  coincides  with  the  rise  of  global  governance  and  its  associated  
norm of civil society participation. 
In the literature there is a division between those who describe civil society as 
independent of state and market and those that position civil society historically as part 
of the development of the modern nation-state. The first approach – the liberal view – 
represents broadly speaking the common-sense understanding of civil society today 
(Cox 1999, p.10). This view is reinforced by  civil  society’s  own  strong  narrative  of  it-
self as an autonomous, normative space (Cohen and Arato 1992) representing the public 
interest, in contrast to the narrow self-interest of states and corporations. The broader 
public perception of civil society reflects this understanding (Broome 2009, Chandhoke 
2002, Risse 2000). Rather than see civil society as an independent space, however, 
Gramscian and Foucauldian perspectives both posit different forms of intermeshing of 
civil society and the state. From a Gramscian perspective civil society is a dialectical 
process within which the consensus underpinning a hegemonic order is created and 
maintained, but in which it is also contested (Katz 2006; Munck 2004; Gramsci 1971). 
From a Foucauldian perspective civil society is an element in a particular method of 
government in which civil society is engaged as a subject of as well as an object of gov-
ernment. In this case it is the very features of civil society that mark its independence – 
its ability to self-organise and to mobilise public opinion - which are harnessed by gov-
ernment (Sending and Neumann 2006; Lemke 2001; Burchill et al 1991). Unravelling 
this complex set of relationships is a key aim of this thesis. 
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Debt movements and power 
To examine this nexus of relationships and the role of civil society this study asks two 
questions: what is the nature of the power of transnational civil society, and how is that 
power exercised? While the literature on debt campaigning is limited and overly fo-
cussed on the Jubilee 2000 campaign, it poses different questions using a number of 
theoretical approaches and takes different methodological approaches including single, 
comparative and longitudinal case studies. Among country campaigns studied are the 
Philippines (Ariate et al 2009; Gersham 1997; Grageda 1994); Spain (Vivas 2008), Ec-
uador (Molina Vera 2008) and South Africa (Rustomjee 2004). A number of studies 
compare different national campaigns, for example, Jubilee Japan and Jubilee UK 
(Holmes 2006) and British, French and German Jubilee campaigns (Josselin 2007). 
Friesen   (2012)   focuses   on   both   popular   campaigning   and   on   elite   ‘civil   society’   (the 
World Economic Forum) support for debt cancellation, while Shawki compares Jubilee 
2000 with the campaign for a currency transaction tax (CTT). A longitudinal approach 
is taken by Donnelly (2002) and Friesen (2012) who cover the period from the 1980s up 
to 2000 and 2005 respectively. However, while some studies focus on national cam-
paigns, others focus on the transnational dimension of campaigning, but none integrate 
an analysis of both dimensions, and therefore cannot address the questions raised in this 
thesis holistically. 
There are a range of studies which relate to the first question on the nature of 
power. A number of studies look at how debt movements generate power by making 
common cause and developing organisational structures in order to contest the debt is-
sue. These studies also highlight the fault-lines within debt movements along which 
fractures developed weakening common cause (Reitan 2007; Tagle and Patomaki 2007; 
Mayo 2005b; Grenier 2003; Donnelly 2002). These studies primarily use social move-
ment theory to examine the nature of power, which is seen as embodied in the way that 
debt movements construct themselves as social movements. Another range of studies 
focuses on the exercise of power: that is, how the debt issue was contested (Friesen 
2012, Momani 2010a, Shawki 2010, Broome 2009, Josselin 2007, Yanacopulos 2004, 
Callaghy 2002. Evans 1999). In these studies constructivist understandings of power as 
persuasion are mainly used to examine the exercise of power in the transnational arena, 
while political opportunity structure is applied to studies of national debt campaigning. 
Finally, there are a limited number of studies which ask what shaped the debt policy of 
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G7 countries and use the impact of debt campaigning as one of a number of explanatory 
variables (Busby 2007; Helleiner and Cameron 2006; Dixon and Williams 2001).  
In addition to the academic literature referred to above, there are a range of arti-
cles produced by debt campaign practitioners that provide historic detail. Most of this 
work again relates to Jubilee 2000, with the notable exception of an article by Bokker-
ink and Van Hees (1998) which outlines the role of the European Network on Debt and 
Development (Eurodad) in the campaign for multilateral debt cancellation and provides 
useful insights into the lobbying process. Articles by Pettifor (2002, 2006) and Buxton 
(2002, 2004), both of whom worked for Jubilee 2000 UK, give accounts of how the 
campaign developed, perceived strengths and successes and tensions which arose, par-
ticularly between the south and north. Abildsnes (2007) provides an account of the 
Norwegian campaign against Norway’s   illegitimate   debt. Collins, Gariyo and Burden 
(2001) who worked for Jubilee USA, Uganda Debt Network and Oxfam UK, respec-
tively, give an overview of the operation of the campaign globally. Southern perspec-
tives are provided by Bendaña (2006), Keet (2000) and Gariyo (1999), with the latter 
two focussing on the south/north tensions which arose within the movement. Insightful 
as both the academic and practitioner literature on debt campaigns are, the literature 
does not currently provide an integrated account of the national and international di-
mensions of the debt campaign over time. Also, there is a need for studies which ex-
plore the diversity of the debt campaign and the different levels and geographic spaces 
in which it operated as a means of understanding the power and agency of civil society. 
1.6.1 Exploring the nature of the power of debt campaigns  
Civil society power in this study is seen as arising from the ability of individuals and 
groups to come together and make common cause about a particular issue. This encom-
passes a common understanding of the issue, including who is responsible, how issues 
can be resolved and the role of civil society groups in pressing decision makers towards 
the desired solution. Silva (2009, p.33) refers to this common cause forged by civil so-
ciety as  “collective power”, defined as the ability to “form horizontal linkages, to coor-
dinate action and to establish coalitions and alliances”. There are a range of studies 
which examine how this collective power was generated and sustained by debt cam-
paigns. In terms of studies which examine a broader span of debt campaigning than Ju-
bilee 2000, Donnelly (2002) tracks the ebb and flow in the generation and maintenance 
of  ‘common cause’ and the cleavages which emerged between debt groups from the late 
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1970s up to 2000 covering the US, Europe and to a lesser extent southern countries. Her 
study highlights the importance of individual activists and their inter-linkages for main-
taining common cause over time. She also gives one of the clearest outlines of the radi-
cal/reform cleavages that resulted from different attitudes to structural adjustment and 
towards debt deals which offered partial rather than total debt cancellation. This study 
builds on this work. Another major contribution from Tagle and Patomaki (2007) is to 
chart the multiplicity of frames used by debt movements: including social, economic, 
ecological, human rights, and radical southern frames which declared that people of the 
south were the creditors because of the impact of colonialism and the ongoing unequal 
south/north relations. This demonstrates the breadth and sophistication of the under-
standings of debt which underpinned debt campaigns, in contrast to the primarily moral 
arguments which can be overstated in some of the literature on debt campaigning 
(Broome 2009; Yanacopulos 2004). Tagle and Patomaki (2007) also highlight similar 
areas of disagreement between debt campaign groups to Donnelly (2002), which while 
most acute between south and north did not represent a simple south/north split.  For 
example, while there were debt campaigns in both the north and south calling for total 
cancellation without conditions, there were also campaigns in some debtor countries 
calling for some conditions to ensure that resources freed up by debt cancellation would 
be used for the benefit of the population. 
Using social movement theory Reitan (2007) outlines how debt campaigning 
was developed: through brokerage that linked previously unconnected sites through 
NGOs and churches; using a range of already established contacts including the media 
and internet to diffuse the message; and through framings of the debt problem. Reitan 
(2007) sees churches with their extensive transnational networks as central to all three 
processes. While Jubilee 2000 was successful in building a global movement and 
achieving some debt reduction, Reitan (2007) describes this   victory   as   ‘pyrrhic’, be-
cause adjustment conditions continued to be imposed, and internal tensions caused the 
campaign to fracture. Her application   of   Bennett’s (2005) theory of different genera-
tions of civil society networks to analyse the tensions within Jubilee 2000 throws more 
light on the south/north interface within civil society than do other studies. Bennett dis-
tinguishes between single issue, policy advocacy, NGO-led networks and the broader, 
more radical multiple-issue social justice activism. While there are major differences 
between these different forms of transnational activism, giving rise to significant ten-
sions, they are connected through loosely related networks. Reitan (2007) highlights 
that Jubilee 2000 contained elements of both first-generation NGO advocacy network, 
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engaging in altruistic northern NGO policy reform advocacy, and second-generation 
direct social justice activism as represented by Jubilee South. It has been argued that 
NGO advocacy networks tend to break down   when   ‘intended   beneficiaries’   become  
centrally involved (Sikkink 1998), and this was the case with Jubilee 2000 when south-
ern activists set up the autonomous second-generation network, Jubilee South, in 1999. 
As the south/north relationship is central to the creation and maintenance of common 
cause and therefore to the power of transnational civil society, Reitan (2007) and Keck 
and  Sikkink’s  (1998) analyses provide useful insights for a more layered understanding 
of this relationship, taking us beyond the simple fact of northern dominance of Jubilee 
2000 as the basis for the south/north tensions. 
In the existing literature on the nature of power of debt campaigns, a number of 
points emerge: that transnational civil society power develops over time, growing from 
existing links between groups and individuals (Reitan 2007; Donnelly 2002); that it can 
operate with a multitude of frames (Tagle and Patomaki 2007); and that while fractures 
may occur, campaigns do not have to be wholly consensual, but in practise can operate 
with a level of tension and even conflict (Grenier 2003). What is currently not dealt with 
in the literature is an understanding of how civil society agency responded to a changing 
world, and there is also a lack of focus on the nature of southern agency within transna-
tional debt campaigning. While there are studies of southern campaigns (Rustomjee 
2004; Molina Vera 2008; Ariate and Molmisa 2009), because these studies focus mainly 
on national-level action they do not specifically address the south/north relationship 
within transnational campaigning, which is a subject of this thesis. Nor has this dimen-
sion been adequately integrated into studies examining debt campaigning at a transna-
tional level (Mayo 2005; Grenier 2003), which tend to approach the issue from a north-
ern perspective. A further limitation reflects a general difficulty in studying transnation-
al movements. Faced with the diversity of any such movement - its geographic spread 
and its national and regional cultural and political diversity - there is a tendency to pro-
vide a view mainly through the lens of a dominant country, frequently the US or UK, 
for example, as in the studies by Grenier (2003), Mayo (2005), and Reitan (2007). 
Transnational campaigns are usually made up of a number of constituent parts, and the-
se separate parts continually aggregate up into a transnational campaign and simultane-
ously disaggregate back into its constituent parts. In the case of debt campaigning, the 
constituent parts largely consisted of national and regional networks. This is a difficult 
process to capture, and in particular to capture in one study. Hence the understandable 
tendency to either focus on country cases (Ariate and Molmisa 2009; Molina Vera 
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2008; Rustomjee 2004), or to present debt campaigning as a fairly unitary transnational 
actor, albeit one which fractured at times (Friesen 2012; Yanacopulos 2004). 
1.6.2 Debt campaigns exercising power 
A range of studies have examined how debt campaigns exercised power at both 
national level (Molina Vera 2008; Josselin 2007; Rustomjee 2004) and transnational 
level (Friesen 2012; Shawki 2010; Ariate et al 2009; Broome 2009; Yanacopolus 2004; 
Callaghy 2002). The mechanisms identified through which power is exercised include 
persuasion, leveraging political opportunities, and different types of civil society rela-
tions with decision makers. The mechanisms identified and the theoretical approaches 
used differ depending on whether the focus is on national or transnational action. Those 
focussing on the transnational arena have highlighted norm cycles, moral authority, the 
power of ideas and alliances between transnational civil society and international insti-
tutions dealing with debt, situating their analyses broadly within concepts of power as 
persuasion. Yanacopolus (2004), for example, situates the Jubilee 2000 campaign with-
in a norm cycle which reached its tipping point when G7 countries began to make new 
proposals on debt in early 1999 with norm internalisation following with the Cologne 
debt deal adopted at the G7 Summit in June 1999. Comparing Jubilee 2000 with the 
campaign for a currency transaction tax (CTT), Shawki (2010) argues that the Jubilee 
campaign was more successful because it used an effective justice frame, while the CTT 
had difficulty developing a frame linking a currency tax to values with wide popular 
resonance. Callaghy (2002),  posits  a  ‘triple  helix’,  a  fairly  consensual  alliance  between  
the international institutions dealing with debt, transnational civil society debt networks, 
and the broad epistemic community as the framework within which changes in debt pol-
icy   took   place.  Rather   than   present   the   ‘helix’   as   a   simple   alliance   between the three 
groups identified, Callaghy highlights the key bridging role played by the epistemic 
community, enabling a shift in ideas about debt. While ideas and norm change are cen-
tral to understandings of the power of transnational civil society within the literature on 
debt campaigning, there is little application of anti-systemic analyses to debt campaign-
ing. For example, the development of ideas and norms are not considered in relation to 
broader anti-globalisation/global justice movements of which debt campaign also are a 
part. Friesen (2012) takes a step in this direction, presenting debt campaigning as part of 
an international Polanyian counter-movement to the Washington Consensus consisting 
of both popular debt campaigning and action by the World Economic Forum, an elite 
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civil society forum. This counter-movement is described as operating through the per-
suasive power of ideas. It is arguable, however, whether World Economic Forum can be 
seen as part of a Polanyian counter-movement or whether it should be more accurately 
described as supporting on debt cancellation in order to avoid a backlash against global-
ising capital.  
Political opportunity structure is used to examine national-level debt campaign-
ing. Josselin (2007) applies the concept in her study of the reasons for the different lev-
els of mobilisation by Jubilee 2000, comparing the very large-scale mobilisation in Brit-
ain to the smaller, but still significant mobilisation in Germany and the limited mobili-
sation in France. In her study the level of mobilisation is linked to the degree of institu-
tional access enjoyed by the campaign, with the highest levels of institutional access in 
Britain and the most limited in France. Other individual country studies of debtor coun-
try campaigns (Ariate and Molmisa 2009; Molina Vera 2008; Rustomjee 2004) even 
when they apply the concept of political opportunity (Ariate and Molmisa 2009; Molina 
Vera 2008) also highlight a more complex relationship between civil society campaigns 
and governments, pointing to the need to go beyond the rather formulaic concept of po-
litical opportunity. In the cases of South Africa (Rustomjee 2004) and the Philippines 
(Ariate and Molmisa 2009) debt campaigning arose in the immediate aftermath of the 
fall of oppressive regimes (the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Marcos gov-
ernment in the Philippines), with close links between debt groups and the activists who 
would become the members of the new governments, as they had worked together in the 
struggles for liberation. The two spheres of civil society and state quickly diverged after 
new post-liberation governments were in place, however, with negative results from the 
perspective of debt campaigners, as President Aquino who led the first post-Marcos 
government promised to honour all of the Philippines debt (Grageda 1994) and the 
ANC  government  opposed   Jubilee  South  Africa’s   campaign   for cancellation of apart-
heid debt. Further links between the church members of Jubilee South Africa and the 
ANC government gave rise to opposition from within the Jubilee campaign to the adop-
tion of more radical positions where these conflicted with the wishes of the government. 
Molina Vera (2008) in her study of Jubilee Guayaquil in Ecuador highlights the linkag-
es between the debt campaign and the government of President Correa. Some members 
of the Correa government had close links with the Jubilee campaign and the president 
himself had prior links with the campaign and shared some of their understandings of 
the debt issue (Molina Vera 2008, p.90). While Molina Vera (2008) and Ariate and 
Molmisa (2009) use the concept of political opportunity structure, these national studies 
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highlight the limitation of this theory to explain the power of social movements. Rather, 
the interactive nature of the civil society/state relationship is an important factor, includ-
ing a framework that can capture how this relationship changes over time. 
The literature on why particular G7 states supported debt cancellation broadly 
reflects the emphasis on domestic embeddedness (Josselin 2007) and norms (Friesen 
2012; Shawki 2010; Broome 2009; Yanacopulos 2004; Callaghy 2002) already dis-
cussed. For example, when asking why the Bush administration became a leading sup-
porter of 100% multilateral debt cancellation in 2004, Helleiner and Cameron (2006) 
identify similar factors at play to those which operated in other policy areas for the Bush 
administration. One of those factors, the dominance of the religious right within the Re-
publican Party, enabled Jubilee USA to influence this sector because the biblical fram-
ing of debt cancellation resonated with the values of this section of the Republican Par-
ty. Likewise, Busby (2007), asking whether states and decision makers ever act for 
moral reasons, highlights the contribution that framings of the debt issue designed to 
resonate with major social values played in G7 countries decisions to cancel debts owed 
to themselves. However, Busby (2007) illustrates that it is unlikely that a single frame 
can be used across the globe, as the biblical framing of Jubilee 2000 did not resonate in 
Japan. The case for debt cancellation had to be reframed, therefore, in relation to a cen-
tral Japanese value, that of being a responsible member of the international community 
An examination of the literature on the exercise of power by debt campaigns re-
veals that a differentiation between the mechanisms used by debt campaigning at na-
tional (domestic political opportunities) and at transnational level (leveraging norms) 
points to the need to examine how transnational civil society operates across the nation-
al/transnational interface in addition to examining their operation separately in these 
different arenas. Further, as outlined above, the concept of political opportunity has lim-
itations, as it suggests that external political opportunities are key to the civil socie-
ty/state relationship emanating from the state or political society, rather than defining 
the nature of the relationship as interactive. Regarding the power of ideas, positing ideas 
as central to the exercise of power is valid, but the use of framing which links new ideas 
closely to current cultural understandings constrains the degree of change that can be 
conceptualised. It is important, therefore, to extend the application of the power of ideas 
to include theoretical approaches that examine challenges to fundamental beliefs, for 
example, those contained in Gramscian approaches. Finally, studies of debt campaign-
ing at transnational level tend to focus on a small number of major organisations such as 
Oxfam International, Eurodad, or Jubilee 2000 as a unitary actor (Broome 2009; Yana-
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copolus 2004; Callaghy 2002), providing an overly northern perspective and calling for 
a stronger focus on the southern dimension of transnational campaigning. 
Conclusion 
At an empirical level a fuller picture of the history and geography of debt campaigning 
is needed in order to provide a more complete narrative over time and space. In terms 
of history, it is necessary to examine how debt campaigning changed over time and put 
this in the context of the changing world order during the three decades of debt cam-
paigning, rather than see earlier phases of campaigning just as precursors to the Jubilee 
2000 campaign. In terms of geography, a wider span than provided in studies carried 
out to date is needed, one that focuses on a range of countries which are situated differ-
ently within world order and including campaigns from debtor countries, creditor non-
G7 countries and creditor G7 countries. This will enable a more robust comparison be-
tween campaigning in different country contexts and also a more nuanced approach to 
civil society power, identifying how it may vary in relation to the inequalities between 
countries within world order.  
At a theoretical level a multi-layered concept of power that looks at how civil 
society power is exercised through a range of mechanisms would provide more com-
plex understandings of the power of the transnational debt campaign. The range of 
mechanisms would include discourse/knowledge/frames, leveraging the nation-
al/international interface, and different relations with the state and international deci-
sion makers. Within such a framework, a broader approach to the discourses used by 
the debt campaign and to the civil society/state relationship is needed, going beyond 
framing and political opportunity structures which currently dominate the literature on 
this topic. 
The next chapter therefore examines theoretical perspectives on the power of 
transnational civil society in order to set the framework which will be used to analyse 
the empirical data from an agency perspective in the case study chapters. 
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Chapter Two: Power and Transnational Civil Society 
2.1 Introduction  
Following the brief review of the literature on debt campaigning which concluded the 
previous chapter, this chapter provides a more in-depth examination of the major theo-
retical approaches to the power of transnational civil society. The purpose is to provide 
the theoretical background to the understandings of power and how it is exercised which 
inform the analytical framework used to examine the two research questions: on the na-
ture of the power of transnational civil society, and on how this is exercised. The chap-
ter is structured as follows. First the understanding of the nature of civil society power 
is set out. This is followed by a review of four theoretical approaches to the power of 
transnational civil society: power as persuasion, power as political opportunity, anti-
systemic power, and the power of GCS within global governance. Finally, the conclu-
sion sets out the framework within which the case study material is analysed.  
2.2 Understanding power: an agency approach  
As power is the focus of this study it faces the difficulty that power is a contested con-
cept (Lukes 2005). How we imagine power depends on our motives for analysing power 
in the first place (Said 1986), and this means that locating power empirically is not a 
neutral undertaking (Davis 1988). The implication for empirical studies of power such 
as this research is that the theories chosen will depend on both the values and political 
assumptions of the researcher and on the demands of the research (Davis 1988). This 
raises a number of issues for this study. As the focus of the study is the agency of trans-
national civil society, an understanding of power from that perspective is needed. A fur-
ther issue is that there is disagreement as to whether the first question, on the nature of 
power, should even be addressed. Foucault (1980) argues that, as power has no essence, 
asking about the nature of power reifies it and therefore the focus should be on the 
mechanisms through which power is exercised, as this centres attention on power rela-
tions. However, Lukes (2005) counter-argues  that  Foucault’s  approach  reduces  power  to  
sequences of observable events and equates power with the vehicle of power such as 
wealth and weapons.  While  accepting  the  validity  of  Foucault’s  warning  about  the  dan-
ger of reifying the concept of power, Lukes’  position that asking about the nature of 
power is valid was more useful to this research. Foucault’s  central  question  was  to  re-
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veal the history “of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are 
made subjects” (Foucault 1982, p.208). His central question, therefore, did not demand 
a definition of power, but rather a focus on the mechanism through which power is ex-
ercised.   Foucault’s   theory   of   the   exercise   of   power  which   is   relevant   for   this   study   – 
governmentality – is therefore reviewed in the following section which focuses on theo-
ries of the exercise of power. 
Lukes’ (2005) definition of social power as the potential to “make or to receive 
any change, or to resist it” (2005, p.69) is the fundamental understanding of power that 
informs this thesis. This potential was leveraged in relation to the debt crisis by groups 
and individuals making common cause in relation to the nature of the problem and how 
this was to be contested. Lukes (2005) is best known for his third dimension of power, 
which  operates  by  influencing  and  shaping  people’s  desires  and  preferences  and  achiev-
ing their compliance even against their objective interests. This is a form of structural 
‘power  over’  which  can  be  relatively  invisible.  Lukes  in  fact  argues  that  the  less  visible  
the exercise of power, the more effective it is. This concept of power may not fit well 
with transnational civil society, which is not positioned to exercise this kind of structur-
al power and generally operates more effectively in the public arena (Risse 2000). As 
the focus of this study is on the agency of transnational civil society, following Davis, 
the definition of power to be used is the one which fits best with the questions being 
asked. 
2.3 Theories explaining the exercise of power of transnational civil society 
Theories which examine the exercise of power by transnational civil society can be dis-
tinguished along a number of dimensions. One factor is the degree to which theories 
focus on transnational civil society as largely consensual or conflictual. Theories can 
also be distinguished by the degree of change sought by the groups on which they focus. 
This varies between those who focus on transnational civil society groups seeking spe-
cific, incremental changes and those who focus on groups challenging the basic premis-
es of neoliberalism. Other theorists analyse the function of global civil society (GCS) 
within global governance (Sending and Neumann 2006; Lipschutz 2005; Amoore and 
Langley 2004). Campaigns such as those for debt cancellation can be situated within 
any of these approaches – or insights can be drawn from a number of theories.  
In the next sections four major conceptions of transnational civil society power 
are examined: 
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(a) power as persuasion which relates to consensual methods seeking limited 
change on specific issues;  
(b) power as political opportunity which includes contentious methods and 
which share a number of concepts with theories of power as persuasion e.g. framing;  
(c) anti-systemic power which analyses the anti-globalisation elements within 
transnational civil society as a challenge to the overall system;  
(d) power of GCS within global governance: this includes two approaches, 
one which sees GCS as helping reform global governance and another which posits 
GCS as an operational part of global governance.  
2.3.1 Power as persuasion 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, power as persuasion is used to examine the 
transnational dimension of debt campaigning. Persuasion is linked to transnational civil 
society’s  ability   to  contribute   to  changing   international  public  policy  by  getting   issues  
on agendas, promoting particular solutions, monitoring implementation, highlighting 
shortcomings/failures in implementation and sometimes setting off new cycles of agen-
da setting towards further new norms. These approaches cohere around the concepts of 
communicative power, soft power, moral authority and norm change/cycle, which are 
used somewhat interchangeably. Habermas’ (1984) theory of communicative action 
flows through these theoretical approaches – albeit mainly implicitly. Of particular rele-
vance is his distinction between communicative action (through which actors engage in 
argument in order to reach common understanding) and strategic action (through which 
actors seek to achieve their own goals). Central to this distinction is the absence of 
power from communicative action where all have equal access to the discussion, and the 
only power which prevails is the power of the better argument. While not claiming that 
this   ‘ideal   speech   situation’   exists widely empirically, Habermas (1984, p.19) argues 
that “No one would enter into  a  moral  argument  if  he  didn’t  start  from  the  strong  pre-
sumption that a grounded consensus could in principle be achieved among those in-
volved”. 
A challenge for those arguing for power as persuasion is the relationship be-
tween knowledge and power. This is unpicked to differing degrees by, Dryzek (1999), 
Risse (2000), and Sikkink (2002). Testing the applicability of the theory of communica-
tive  action  to  world  politics,  Risse  (2000)  tries  to  reconcile  Habermas’  theory  that  pow-
er should not enter the process  with   Foucault’s   theory   that   power   resides  within   dis-
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courses themselves. He acknowledges that it is unlikely that power will ever be absent 
from international politics and seeks to solve the Habermas/Foucault impasse by accept-
ing that there is no ideal type behaviour, that in practice people act both strategically 
and discursively (Risse 2000, p.18). He identifies different points in the political process 
when discursive rather than strategic action takes places – at the agenda-setting stage 
and when there is uncertainty of interests and /or lack of knowledge in relation to an 
issue. It is at these points that transnational civil society groups have a role according to 
Risse.  Transnational  civil  society  power,  according  to  Risse,  is  the  ‘power  of  the  better 
argument’, as these organisations lack substantial material resources. As  Risse’s  focus  is  
on world politics in general rather than the particular contribution of transnational civil 
society, he does not explore the process whereby transnational civil society groups pit 
their  ‘better  arguments’  against  the material resources of states, international organisa-
tions and corporations. However, he does highlight that argumentation in the public 
sphere advantages transnational civil society as it is almost impossible to argue publicly 
from a totally self-interested position. Some form of common good or shared values 
must be invoked. INGOs/ transnational civil society who can claim authoritative 
knowledge or moral authority are better able to convince public audiences than actors 
suspected of promoting private interests. The more an issue is subject to public scrutiny, 
therefore, the more likely it is that civil society groups have access to the discourse and 
that their arguments are endorsed by the public. 
Dryzek (1999) also situates transnational civil society power within communica-
tive action, but for him the power of transnational civil society is enabled by structural 
aspects of the international system rather than situational factors as in the case of Risse. 
Since formal institutional rules are relatively underdeveloped in the international sys-
tem, this gives greater significance to discourses than at domestic level, where rules and 
institutions are stronger. Transnational civil society can, therefore, change “the terms of 
discourse and alter the balance   between   competing   discourses” (Dryzek 1999, p. 46). 
Sikkink (2002) takes the question of the relationship of power and ideas further using 
Ruggie’s  (1982) concept of world order, where power structures are linked with struc-
tures of social purpose which provide the content for that order. For Ruggie power and 
norms/social purpose can operate independently of each other, allowing for two sources 
of change in the international system – a power shift through a decrease in the power of 
dominant actors or a norm shift. For Sikkink the latter facilitates a role for transnational 
civil society in changing international norms. But the separation of norms and power is 
not equal across all issue areas. Sikkink distinguishes between issues where power and 
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norms are almost fused (e.g. in relation to economic liberalisation and free trade where 
the interests of the most powerful states are at stake) and other situations where there is                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
more room for norm contestation, such as on debt reduction.  
Among the processes through which persuasion operates are soft power and 
norm  cycles.   Soft   power   is   ‘the   ‘ability to get desired outcomes because others want 
what  you  want’ – as distinct from hard power, which is the ability to get others to do 
what they would not otherwise have done in the absence of threats or rewards (Keohane 
and Nye 1998, p.86). While Nye (1990) originally applied the concept of soft power to 
the changing nature of US power, soft power is not the sole preserve of powerful states. 
The ability to disseminate free information as a result of the information technology 
revolution has increased the potential for persuasion in world politics, thus increasing 
the soft power of transnational civil society (Nye 2004, p.90). Another mechanism 
through which persuasion works is norm cycle which captures the process of norm 
change – consisting of norm emergence, reaching a tipping point resulting in a norm 
cascade and ending with norm internalisation (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Yanacopu-
los 2004). Norm cycle gives a privileged role to powerful states, with one criterion for 
reaching the tipping point being when the support of key states has been achieved. Jubi-
lee 2000 keyed off this hypothesis, focussing their campaign on the G7. Moving 
through the norm cycle, alliances between civil society and state and international insti-
tutions are  a  key  mechanism  in  creating  a  ‘norm  cascade’  leading  to  norm  internalisa-
tion. Transnational civil society groups work in alliance with states which have already 
accepted the new norm to press other states to do likewise. This has been conceptualised 
as a transnational advocacy network (TAN) (Keck and Sikkink 1998). TANs are cross-
sectoral transnational networks of those working on an issue who are bound together by 
common values and discourses. They include civil society groups such as NGOs, social 
movements, churches, trade unions and from states/international institutions, parts of 
governments and of regional and intergovernmental organisations. 
But is change really achieved through the power of norms and ideas? Focussing 
on  changes  in  G7  countries’  debt  policy  Busby  (2007)  asks  whether  states ever act for 
moral reasons. He   agrees   with   Risse   (2000)   that   ‘true’   persuasion   based on Haber-
masian communicative action, free of power, is rare in political life. Rather, a mixture 
of coercive and consensual approaches operates from successful framing, fundamental 
belief change and more coercive action. Busby, however, does not apply this distinction 
to Jubilee  USA’s  role   in   influencing  US  debt  policy.  Whether persuasive communica-
tion is really the way in which normative change is achieved has also been questioned 
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by Payne (2001), who points to the degree to which the use of shaming, threats, promot-
ing sanctions have been identified in case studies that apply power as persuasion. This 
suggests that persuasion does not exist as a stand-alone mechanism for the exercise of 
power, but is intermeshed with more coercive methods, but how these methods interact 
to bring about change is not addressed by theorists providing these explanations.  
 
Power as persuasion –analysing consensual transnational civil society 
 
Power as persuasion provides a number of useful understandings in relation to consen-
sual approaches of transnational civil society. 
 
a) Power of ideas: central to these theories is the power of ideas, which operates mainly 
through norm change with proposed new norms framed to resonate with existing cultur-
al values. Sikkink (2002) makes a useful contribution by highlighting limitations to the 
persuasive power of ideas because of the uneven linkage between power and discourse 
in world order.  
 
b) In terms of transnational civil society operating across the national/international in-
terface, Dryzek (1999) provides a useful analytical insight in his argument that the dif-
ference degrees of institutionalisation at national and transnational level provide differ-
ent opportunities to transnational civil society. The lack of strong formal rules and insti-
tutions at international level provides greater opportunities for transnational civil society 
to exercise communicative power, because discourse and norms play a more important 
role transnationally.  
 
c) Alliances between civil society and states/international institutions: the concept of 
TANs provides a framework to analyse civil/political society consensual relationships. 
Using the concept of a network, however, suggests an overly consensual, horizontal re-
lationship and does not distinguish between the power and roles of different partici-
pants. Callaghy’s (2002) concept of a triple helix between the international debt regime, 
transnational debt networks with elements of the epistemic community providing a 
bridge between them may be a more usefully way of looking at consensual civil society 
relations with states and IGOs.  
2.3.2. Power as political opportunity   
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This approach, based on the significance of political opportunity structures, sits within 
theories of social movements and differs radically from the concept of persuasion out-
lined above in that the power to disrupt is seen as key to how social movements operate 
(della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Central to power as political opportunity is the argument 
that contention is more closely related to opportunities for and constraints on collective 
action than to the underlying grievance. Political opportunities emerge as institutions 
open up, divisions appear within elites, or influential allies become available (Tarrow 
2005, p.23). Political opportunity structure has been criticised for its weak theory of 
agency based as it is on  a  ‘rational’  actor  who  weighs  the costs and benefits of action. 
While emotions, identity and culture have been introduced over time, this has been as 
an add-on rather than leading to a rethink of the basic approach (Crossley 2002). 
In terms of use of knowledge, persuasion and political opportunity theorists both 
use the concept of framing, but apply it differently. While for the former, frames which 
resonate with broadly held cultural understandings are part of the process of persuading 
decision makers, for social movement theory framing is part of how movements are 
built in order to take part in contentious collective action for change (Silva 2009; Ben-
ford and Snow 2000; Tarrow 1998). This involves defining the problem, attributing 
blame and posing alternatives with a view to motivating people to act to achieve these 
(della Porta and Diani 2006). Critics, however, point to the fact that framing does not 
tackle the relationship between meanings and power (Crossley 2002). Tarrow, however, 
has recognised the contradiction arising from framing messages to resonate with cultur-
al understandings when those understandings defend existing inequalities (Tarrow 2005, 
p.61) which movements are challenging. But this has not led to a critical review of the 
concept. Since political opportunity theory is overly reliant on a business- type model, 
stressing  the  role  of  ‘political  entrepreneurs’  who  recognise  a  niche  in  the  social  move-
ment market and provide  ‘framing’  services  to  these  niche  markets,  the  public  can  ap-
pear as a passive consumer, constrained by cultural understandings in terms of the scope 
of the challenge to which they can respond.  
 
While political opportunity structure has focussed mainly on national-level ac-
tivities, it has also examined how groups campaign across the national/ international 
interface (della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Sikkink 2002). Sikkink uses institutional access 
to examine how activists leverage the national/transnational interface. A key factor is 
the relative openness of domestic and international opportunity structures vis-à-vis each 
other. This distinction enables Sikkink to define when the boomerang pattern or insid-
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er/outsider coalitions are likely to happen. When both domestic and international sys-
tems are open this leads to insider/outsider coalitions (similar to TANs). Where the in-
ternational system is open but the domestic system is closed, the boomerang effect op-
erates. This refers to situations where civil society groups unable to achieve redress 
from national government leverage outside pressure through transnational NGOs. These 
allies mobilise forces from the international arena and pressure then boomerangs back 
on the national government in question (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Friesen (2012) devel-
ops   the   concept   of   ‘boomerang   politics’   further, highlighting the different alliances 
which operated between Jubilee 2000, governments and IGOs who shared overlapping 
proposals in order to pressure unresponsive governments or IGOs to support debt reduc-
tion. Grenier (2003), however, argues that the boomerang effect is not relevant for Jubi-
lee 2000, as the issue was not domestic blockage but the lack of openings for southern 
groups to challenge creditors. Grenier is right to restrict  the  use  of  the  ‘boomerang  ef-
fect’  to  the  situation  for  which  it  was  developed.  Otherwise  the  difference  between  the  
concept of the boomerang effect and that of insider/outsider alliances may become 
blurred, reducing the efficacy of both concepts. 
Constraints in operating across the national/international interfaces have also 
been identified in relation to framing. Tarrow (2005) points to the discontinuity which 
may exist between the resonance of global frames and their ability to generate the action 
needed  to  progress  a  particular  cause.  While  the  ‘global  justice’  frame  has  managed  to  
mobilise  diverse  social  groups  (e.g.  at  the  ‘Battle  of  Seattle’),  it  hasn’t  managed  to  weld  
these into a more cohesive force. This is because activists work within differing domes-
tic cultural and political systems. This is illustrated by the fact that the Jubilee 2000 bib-
lical framing was replaced in Japan by the importance of being seen responsible mem-
bers of the international community (Busby 2007; Holms 2006).  
In terms of modes of engagement Tarrow (2001) usefully disaggregates transna-
tional civil society into transnational social movements (TNSMs); international nongov-
ernmental organisations (INGO) and transnational advocacy networks (TANs). The key 
distinction is between what organisations do and what they say - engage in contentious 
politics   (transnational   social  movements)  or   in   ‘routine   transactions’   i.e.   lobbying and 
collaborating  with  international  elites’ (TAN and INGO) (Tarrow 2001, p.11). Underly-
ing the different modes of engagement are different relationships between civil and po-
litical society – adversarial in the case of TNSMs, shared principles in terms of TANs. 
That these clear distinctions, however, may not exist empirically is acknowledged by 
Tarrow (2005, p.29).  
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Applying political opportunity 
As noted in the previous chapter, a number of studies apply political opportunity 
structure to the debt movements. Josselin (2007) used domestic institutional access as a 
key variable to examine the different levels of mobilisation by Jubilee 2000 in Britain 
(major), Germany (less major but significant) and France (limited). There appears to be 
a good fit with greatest access in Britain and very limited in France. But there were oth-
er relevant factors, such as the influence of past campaigning on current opportunities. 
This raises a key question – to what extent are political opportunities external to social 
movements, and to what extent do social movements create political opportunities 
through their ongoing engagement with states and international institutions. For exam-
ple, to what extent was UK Chancellor Gordon Brown’s  strong  support  for  debt  cancel-
lation an independent political opportunity arising from the election of the Labour Party 
in 1997, as argued by a number of academics (Broome 2009; Mayo 2005 a+b) and to 
what  extent  was  Labour’s  debt  policy  shaped  by  the  strength  of  British  debt  campaign-
ing from the 1980s (see chapter 5). One of the UK interviewees in this study recalled a 
conversation with Gordon Brown just before the 1997 election in which he indicated 
that he was aware of the political salience of the debt issue and of the strong action tak-
en by his Conservative predecessors. This suggests that past campaigning was a signifi-
cant   factor   in   Brown’s   support for debt cancellation while he was Chancellor (Inter-
viewee UK, No. 5).  
The importance of interaction between activism and political opportunity is rein-
forced  by  the  Ariate  et  al’s  (2009)  study  of  the  Philippine  Freedom  from  Debt  Coalition  
(FDC). Whereas  they  also  attribute  FDC’s  success  to  political  opportunities,   including  
allies in parliament, they point out that FDC may also have provided opportunities to 
these allies in the form of an issue and a constituency which might have helped in their 
re-election (Ariate and Molmisa 2009, p.53). This points to the need to put the concept 
of political opportunity structure in the wider framework of the dynamic of civil society 
relations with states and international institutions.  
 
Implications of power as political opportunity for this research 
The emphasis on the domestic embeddedness of transnational campaigning and the dif-
ficulties this may raise for successful global frames which can resonate across diverse 
national political and cultural contexts, are useful insights in examining how transna-
tional civil society operates across the national/international interface. Further, distin-
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guishing between discourse and modes of engagement, what groups do rather than what 
they say (Tarrow 2001), can contribute towards differentiating between the consensual 
modes of persuasion and more adversarial approaches of contentious politics. 
2.3.3 Anti-systemic power  
While political opportunity applies to contentious politics, its focus is on how move-
ments are built and what they do rather than on the level of challenge posed to the dom-
inant system. Writers starting from a critical perspective on neoliberal globalisation ask 
how systemic inequalities can be contested. They focus on the global justice movements 
made up of a multitude of causes (including debt campaigns) loosely held together by a 
very broad critique of neoliberalism. The problem facing these theorists is the lack of 
some form of central agency which holds together these diverse groups or an overarch-
ing transformatory project which drives them. One approach is to revisit European 20th 
century thinkers, Gramsci and Polanyi. The other is a 21st century radical, postmodern 
approach to power which emerged in particular from struggles in Latin America. 
 
Diffuse counter-movements  
Polanyi provides the starting point for many academics examining global social justice 
movements (Silva 2009; Evans 2008; Munck 2006b; Birchfield 1999 and 2005; Robin-
son 1999; Bernard 1997). The attraction of Polanyi arises from his powerful exposé of 
the myth of the self-regulating market—a myth revived by late 20th century neoliberal-
ism—and his concept of the double movement through which this ideology was op-
posed. The double movement consisted of a movement by the trading classes promoting 
the self-regulating market resulting in the disembedding of the economy from society. 
This was countered by a movement for social protection involving diverse social forces 
(working class and landed classes) resulting in a rebalancing of the economy and socie-
ty.  A  powerful  symmetry  is,  therefore,  perceived  between  today’s global justice move-
ments and Polanyi’s  ‘counter-movement’,  both  challenging market supremacy and con-
sisting of diverse autonomous groups (Munck 2006b; Birchfield 2005 and 1999; Ber-
nard 1997). 
But   Polanyi’s   project   was   very   different   from   that   of   today’s   theorists   of   re-
sistance to neoliberalism. He was not primarily interested in explaining agency, but 
wished to counter arguments from contemporary liberals that the downfall of the self-
regulating market was due to a collectivist conspiracy. He, therefore, deliberately plays 
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down the role  of  social  movements  presenting  his  ‘counter-movement’  as spontaneous 
and diffuse. “At innumerable disconnected points it set in without any traceable links 
between the interests directly affected or any ideological conformity between them 
(2001, p.156). Polanyi’s  counter-movement was therefore held together by conjunctural 
objective coincidences of interest between different social forces rather than any con-
scious organisational or ideological links. 
Other  thinkers  grappling  with  the  amorphous  nature  of  today’s  global  social  jus-
tice movements have introduced a stronger sense of agency. Falk’s  concept  of  globalisa-
tion-from-above being contested by globalisation-from-below has resonances of Po-
lanyi’s  double  movement, but he takes the concept further, distinguishing between the 
two movements not just in terms of their aims and social base, but also in terms of ho-
mogeneity versus heterogeneity:  
Just as globalization-from-above tends towards homogeneity and unity, so glob-
alisation-from-below tends towards heterogeneity and diversity, even tension 
and contradiction. This contrast highlights the fundamental difference between 
top-down hierarchical politics and bottom-up participatory politics. (Falk 1997, 
p.24)  
 
Starting from the perspective that  ‘revolutionary  certainties  no  longer  stand’, Holloway 
(2010, p.9)  uses  the  ‘method  of  the  crack’  to  explain  how  capitalism  can  be  contested. 
The cracks are the crises of the system and provide the basis for overcoming that system 
(2010, p.84). The aim should be to expand the cracks and promote their confluence. 
Silva  (2009)  and  Friesen  (2012)  provide  more  specific  applications  of  Polanyi’s  
double movement: in the case of Silva to anti-neoliberal movements in Latin America, 
while Friesen presents the campaign for debt cancellation as part of a double movement 
at transnational level against the Washington Consensus. They highlight very different 
processes through which the double movement took place: contentious action involving 
road blocks, strikes and town uprisings in the first; the consensual application of persua-
sion in the second. Silva uses the concepts of brokerage and framing to provide Po-
lanyi’s  missing  agency.  Through these mechanisms broad coalitions were built to force 
neoliberal governments from power.  Framing linked specific grievances into broader 
critiques of neoliberalism, and brokerage linked formerly unconnected movements to-
gether. Cannon and Murphy 2013 highlight  how  Silva’s  combination  of  Polanyi’s  ex-
pose of the self-regulating with concepts from social movement theory can be usefully 
applied to countries beyond Latin America, for example, to Ireland. Friesen’s  applica-
tion of Polanyi situates change largely within the power of ideas exercised through re-
framing the debt issue in moral terms within a double movement including widely di-
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verse social forces. In addition to popular debt campaigns the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) supported debt cancellation in 2005 in order to prevent a backlash against global 
capitalism   and   also   because   it   was   ‘the   right   thing   to   do’. Friesen places the double 
movement in the context of the capacity of capitalism to adapt to opposition to market 
supremacy, and this enhances the stability of the system. In the next Chapter the WEF is 
presented as a key element in the internationalising state consensus-making process ra-
ther than as a civil society body, albeit an elite one, contesting dominant policy. This 
highlights the need for more specific definitions of the double movement – in particular 
there is a need to distinguish between the social forces threatened by the effects of the 
self-regulating market and those which create the new consensus in response to the 
double movement. In this study, the WEF is placed in the second category.  
The renewed interest in Polanyi demonstrates the mobilising power of ideas with 
Polanyi’s  analysis  bridging  the  divide  between  19th century liberalism and late 20th cen-
tury neoliberalism. His double movement, while capturing many of the features of to-
day’s  global  social  justice  movements,  calls  for  new  concepts  to  grasp  the  transnational  
modes of engagement. Falk and Holloway contribute to this process by introducing a 
sense of agency, but they differ from each other in terms of their approaches to the 
power being contested and the nature of the engagement involved. For Falk (1997), 
globalisation-from-above is homogeneous and united; for Holloway the capitalist sys-
tem is cut across by a multitude of cracks and crises. Falk presents a dichotomised 
struggle between globalisation-from-below and globalisation-from-above, while for 
Holloway those resisting are not outside capitalism, but are themselves the contradic-
tions of capitalism as crises arise from a misfit between the needs of capital and the fail-
ure or refusal of people to adapt to those requirements (2010, p.9). In the context of his 
empirical studies, Silva found limited evidence for transnational influence on domestic 
movements nor of transnational movements playing a role in linking domestic anti-
neoliberal mobilisations through developing overarching anti neo liberal strategies 
(2009, p277). This means that his study does not bring an international dimension to 
Polanyi, as it does not throw light on how civil society/social movements operate across 
the national/international interface.  
 
Counter-hegemony  
Unlike Polanyi, Gramsci engages explicitly with the nature of resistance – covering the 
social forces involved (working class and other subordinated social groups) and their 
interconnection (through political, moral and intellectual leadership), their modes of en-
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gagement with dominant power (war of movement, war of position) and the terrains 
across which these struggles happen (civil and political society) (Gramsci 1971). Gram-
sci’s  concept  of  power  as  a  double-edged mixture of consent and coercion provides the 
mortar which holds all this together. Hegemony exists where power is predominantly 
based on consent, as is the case in bourgeois democracies, where the dominant class has 
managed to gain the consent of other classes to its world view. In explaining how con-
sensus is maintained in deeply divided societies, Gramsci highlights the centrality of 
civil society to the stability of the state: 
 
… in the west there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and 
when the State trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. 
The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system 
of fortresses and earthworks… (Gramsci 1971, p. 238)  
 
 Through a combination of cultural, spiritual and intellectual means, the institutions of 
civil society (e.g. media, churches, education and trade unions) create and maintain the 
consent underpinning the state. Civil society is also where hegemony is contested – 
largely through a struggle to win the argument within civil society rather than through 
an onslaught on the state. This contestation of ideas is carried out through a counter- 
hegemonic project integrating the interests of a range of diverse social forces into a new 
commonsense – distinguished by Gramsci from a strategic alliance within which groups 
coalesce in relation to a particular coincidence of interest but keep their own specific 
identities. Ideas, culture and the transformation of consciousness play a central role, as 
the  ability  to  shape  people’s  minds is the main terrain of struggle to move people from 
bourgeois   ‘commonsense’   to   ‘good   sense’. Gramsci (1971, pp.326-327) points to the 
difference between thought and action enabling different understandings of the world to 
coexist. Chin and Mittelman (1997) interpret this as the existence of seeds of dissonance 
within  apparently acquiescing subordinate groups providing space for the emergence of 
resistance. This enables an escape from the limitations of framing discussed above. 
In  spite  of  the  richness  of  Gramsci’s  ideas,  efforts  to  apply  the  concept  of  coun-
ter-hegemony to the changed landscape of contemporary antagonisms, particularly at a 
global level, have not been entirely successful. Gill (2000) and Morton (2002) apply a 
Gramscian analysis respectively to two key moments/movements within globalised re-
sistance: the  ‘Battle  of  Seattle’  against  the  1999 WTO summit and the Zapatista upris-
ing in Mexico. Gill describes the Seattle protesters as a new form of emerging political 
agency   struggling   for   an   alternative   to   neoliberal   globalisation.  Keying  off  Gramsci’s  
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‘modern   prince’   (the   communist   party),   he   dubs   this   the   ‘postmodern prince’, a new 
postmodern international political party without leadership, but further development is 
needed on how this new agency will operate over time and across the national 
/international   interface.  Morton’s   application   of   a  Gramscian   analysis   to  Zapatista   re-
sistance to neoliberalism in Mexico is more successful than is his consideration of  their 
transnational role (2002). Examining the transnational aspect of the Zapatista struggle, 
he concludes that the terrain of state-civil society relations remains the arena for politi-
cal struggle (Morton 2002, p.53) tagging on the coda “resistance to globalisation cannot 
be successful unless it is also prosecuted beyond national boundaries” (Morton 2002, 
p.114). This suggests that counter-hegemony, developed to apply to national settings, 
may not be easily transferred to transnational struggles.  
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) tackle another challenge facing those applying Gramsci 
to   today’s  social  struggles: the poor fit between his concept of counter-hegemony and 
the different configuration of class, left-wing party and social movements operating at 
the end of the 20th century. Their aim is to provide the basis for a new left-wing counter- 
hegemonic   project   linking   workers’   struggles   with   those   of other social movements. 
 Rejecting the idea that there is one central antagonism (class), they identify three broad 
foci of contention which motivate the myriad of social movements emerging since the 
1960s: commodification (capital), bureaucratisation (state) and homogenisation of so-
cial life (the media). The very nature of these dominances leads to the autonomous na-
ture  of   the   ‘new’   social  movements, giving rise to a contradiction between autonomy 
and hegemony. This contradiction is at the heart of tensions within the global social jus-
tice movements today, where there is strong resistance to any political party leading a 
counter-hegemonic project. The principles of the World Social Forum (WSF) for exam-
ple, state that no-one is authorised to speak on behalf of the WSF, or to put forward po-
sitions which they claim to be those of all its participants.3 Laclau and Mouffe struggle 
to articulate a relationship between autonomous social movements and a universal he-
gemony.  A  new   ‘common   sense’   is   needed   that   changes   the   identity   of   the  different  
participating groups in such a way that the demands of each group are articulated equiv-
alently with those of others: e.g. workers’ rights are not defended at the expense of 
women’s  rights  (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, pp.183-184).   
While  Laclau  and  Mouffe’s  reconfiguration  of   the  aspects  of Gramsci’s   thinking  
which do not fit  a  fractured  post  ‘universal’  world  – a central political subject and a uni-
                                                 
3 http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id_menu=4&cd_language=2  [Accessed 4 June 2011] 
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fied transformatory project – is useful, their analysis fails to explicate the   core   ‘how’  
question: how can these diverse groups merge together beyond a limited alliance but 
still  leave  room  for  the  ‘logic  of  autonomy’?  Is ideational convergence sufficient or is 
organisational convergence also called for?  
 
Concluding on anti-systemic power 
Knowledge is central to anti-systemic   struggles.   Polanyi’s   (2001) exposé of the self-
regulating market has strong resonances, and Silva (2009) shows how framing and bro-
kerage enabled successful counter-movements to neoliberalism. Gramsci’s   (1971) ap-
proach to the role of ideas and culture in the transformation of bourgeois common sense 
into good sense posits a deeper transformation than does the concept of framing, but 
constructing the relationship through which this would be pursued - a counter-
hegemonic project - is more problematic. In terms of anti-systemic modes of engage-
ment, Gramsci’s   linkage of the state and civil society in terms of conflict and consent 
provides a useful framework within which transnational civil society can be analysed. 
This counterbalances some of the theories in the next section, which focus largely on 
civil society’s   functionality   to   global   governance.   Holloway’s   (2010)   ‘method of the 
crack’ suggests that in the short term the myriad of resistances are fracturing neoliberal-
ism rather than constructing an alternative collective project, but over time the cracks 
may join up. This approach avoids the need to jump to premature judgement as to 
whether the anti-globalisation/global social justice movements are a counter-movement 
or a counter-hegemonic project or a new political formation. Anti-systemic theories, 
however, throw little light on how civil society operates across the national/international 
interface, but as will be seen in the next chapter neo-Gramscians have provided substan-
tial structural analysis of this interface.  
2.3.4. Power of global civil society within global governance  
This section covers approaches which position civil society - including campaigns such 
as those on debt – in relation to global governance. Two major approaches can be iden-
tified:  
 
(a) theories which argue that GCS has the potential to contribute to the democratisation 
(Scholte 1999, 2002b, 2004, 2007; Kaldor 2003a) or transformation (Evans 2008) of 
global governance.  As stated in the Introduction, theorists taking this approach use the 
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term global civil society (GCS) whereas transnational civil society is the preferred term 
for my study.  
 
b) theories which position GCS as a central part of global governmentality which calls 
into being civil society actors with the appropriate identities and necessary expertise to 
participate in this form of governance (Sending and Neumann 2006; Drainville 2005; 
Lipschutz 2005; Amoore and Langley 2004).  
 
The following sections examine these two approaches.  
2.3.4.1 Global civil society power: bridging the democratic deficit  
Within this approach GCS is situated in the context of a shift from state-centred govern-
ance to global governance which has accompanied the growth of globalisation. Accord-
ing to Kaldor (2003a, p.583) global governance involving a range of international 
agreements, treaties and rules, has led to a ‘conditioned  sovereignty’. Increasingly these 
agreements are based not just on states, but also on public support generated via GCS. 
For Scholte (1999, p.18-23), the expansion of GCS has played a significant part in the 
shift   to   ‘post-sovereign  governance’.  The lack of democratic processes at global level 
results in very limited explicit consent to global governance (Scholte 2002b, p.289). 
While recognising that GCS suffers its own internal democratic deficit, it is seen as hav-
ing the potential to help bridge those at global level (Kaldor 2003a; Scholte 2002b; 
Florini 2000) by increasing public participation, giving a voice to those excluded, rais-
ing public awareness about how global governance operates, promoting debate about 
governance arrangements, and mobilising people to demand transparency and public 
accountability from traditionally closed institutions such as the IMF (Scholte 2002a). 
Cumulatively this action could result in greater legitimacy for global governance, with 
people acknowledging that global institutions have the right to govern.  
Theorists of GCS recognise that it is not a homogenous, unitary body, but rather 
it reflects the hierarchically structured world order with the south/north interface posed 
as a particular fault line. GCS, dominated by northern civil society, is seen as having 
strengthened the centrality of northern values and ideas within the globalisation project 
rather than contributing towards the creation of a global society (Omelicheva 2009 
p123).   Scholte   goes   further   and   points   to   a   ‘westernisation’ of parts of southern civil 
society with activism on global issues dominated by “western-styled, western-funded 
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NGOs led by Westernised elites” (2002b, p.296). Rather than being the proponents of 
global democracy, therefore, GCS promotes the central values of its dominant members 
from North America and Europe (Pasha and Blaney 1998). At an operational level, giv-
en the disadvantaged position of southern states, northern-dominated GCS may cause 
damage by contributing to shifting the balance of decision making from the national to 
the transnational arena (Edwards 2001; Tussie and Tuozzo 2001; Nelson 2000; Scholte 
1999) and  undermine  a   country’s   ability   to  pursue  progressive   goals   (Edwards 2001). 
Through over-reliance on international solutions, INGOs may undermine local partici-
pation and weaken governmental accountability to their citizens in favour of accounta-
bility to donors (Nelson 2000). In this context, GCS may be contributing to the globali-
sation process which is weakening third world states, fragmenting their societies with 
elites being integrated into the global project while the mass of people are increasingly 
marginalised (Pasha et al 1998).   
As regards GCS modes of engagement with global governance, contrasting 
views are provided by Scholte (2002b) and Edwards (2001). Scholte is critical of exces-
sive behind closed door lobbying by GCS and in particular highlights the dangers of 
‘critical  cooperation’.  This  mode  of  engagement  exists  where  high levels of conflict and 
consensus coexist between GCS and global institutions because of the simultaneous ex-
istence of significant convergence and divergence of interests (Covey 1998). This criti-
cism raises the question as to what are the alternative levers of power open to GCS, an 
important question given the lack of formal democratic processes at global level and the 
logistical difficulties of sustained global mobilisations. In contrast, Edwards (2001, 
pp.9-10) argues that as globalisation generates complexity and uncertainty, civil society 
should   switch   from   ‘conversion’   to   ‘engagement’   strategies,   supporting   a   process   of  
dialogue rather than simply lobbying for a fixed set of policies. This approach resonates 
with the argument made by Risse (2000) that Habermas’  ideal speech situation is most 
likely to prevail where there are uncertainties. Suggesting that uncertainty exists within 
global policy in general implies that power is largely absent from the global arena, 
which is clearly not so, given the fusion of knowledge and power in relation to key ne-
oliberal beliefs.  
The main issues raised for this research relate to the geography of power. One 
issue is whether, rather than operating across the national/ transnational interface, trans-
national civil society has crossed into the global arena and become GCS or whether the 
finding of domestic embeddedness of transnational campaigning (Josselin 2007) cap-
tures reality better. Further, rather than the question of leveraging the national and 
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transnational interface being one of strategy alone, these theories highlight challenging 
ethical and political issues, as south/north inequalities are being exacerbated by globali-
sation.  
2.3.4.2. Power within governmentality: Global Civil Society  
Foucault’s   concept   of   governmentality provides an alternative framework for under-
standing GCS to the sovereignty/post sovereignty debate. Governmentality is defined as  
[t]he ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit 
complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form 
of knowledge political economy… (Foucault, 1991, p.102). 
 
  Given the nature of governmentality as a decentred form of governance, it trans-
fers fairly smoothly to the global arena, where there is no central authority but a range 
of separate but differently interrelated governance regimes. Civil society also stands out 
more clearly in this arena empty of political parties and institutional democratic pro-
cesses.  In  line  with  Foucault’s  general  analysis  of  power,  governmentality  is  exercised  
through a nexus of technologies of power and political rationality/discourses which to-
gether constitute the subjects of this form of power – the populations being governed. 
Foucault distinguishes between sovereignty, the form of rule which operated in Europe 
up to the 17th century, involving rule over territory through law and prohibition and 
governmentality on which the modern state is based. Neoliberal governmentality in-
volves a particular meshing of government and self-government. In this context gov-
ernmentality is as much about how we conduct ourselves as it is about formal political 
processes such as elections (Danaher 2000, p.83). This element  of  ‘self-governing’  links  
the emergence of neoliberal governmentality with the growth of civil society in the 
1980s (Sending and Neumann 2006, Drainville 2004). The view of civil society as the 
site of autonomous economic actors who can limit the power of the state is no longer 
relevant according to a Foucauldian analysis. Civil society is neither separate from nor 
in opposition to the state, but “the correlate of a political   technology  of  government”  
(Foucault 2008, p296). As the emergence of governmentality depended centrally on its 
ability to harness civil society, according to Sending and Neumann (2006, p.656) “we 
would therefore expect that new practices of government emerge whereby civil society 
organisations on the global level are harnessed to the tasks of governing”.  
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Applying Foucauldian thinking to GCS  
Thinkers applying governmentality provide different explanations of the rela-
tionship between governmentality, resistance and GCS. One approach presents GCS as 
seamlessly interwoven into the web of governmentality - but not absorbed by it (Send-
ing and Neumann 2006). Others present a more ambiguous view with some autonomous 
space for GCS (Lipschutz 2005; Amoore and Langley 2004). A final approach posits 
two modes of relating to the world economy – as part of governmentality and as part of 
concrete struggles (Drainville 2005a).  
Rejecting claims that there has been a transfer of power from states to civil soci-
ety actors, Sending and Neumann (2006) explain the evolution of state/civil society re-
lations  through  changing  ‘governmental  rationality’. The new identities and action ori-
entation called for from civil society resulting from these changes is illustrated through 
a study of the role of Norwegian NGOs in shaping government policy on banning 
landmines. While Norwegian NGOs operated in opposition to and in collaboration with 
the Norwegian government, Sending and Neumann (2006) argue that this was not a case 
of independent civil society groups persuading the government to change its policy. 
Neither was it a case of co-option of NGOs, but rather it represented a particular form of 
governmental rationality which included NGO expertise and ability to mobilise public 
opinion as key to effective government. Within this understanding, civil society groups 
are subjects of government as well as objects – as subjects their capacity to criticise and 
mobilise are used in the process of government. Questions of resistance or counter- 
power do not arise but rather  
 
[g]overnment takes the freedom and agency of those that are governed as both 
an end and a means for governing. New practices of government emerge where-
by civil society organisations at global level are harnessed to the tasks of gov-
erning. (Sending and Neumann 2006, p.656).  
 
Lipschutz (2005, p.237) also presents GCS as a central element of the expanding 
global neoliberal regime of governmentality helping to legitimise that system. The shift 
in  the  role  of  the  state  from  modifying  the  effects  of  capital  on  people’s  welfare  to  one  
of providing the most attractive conditions for global capital has led to responsibility 
being transferred to civil society to pressure for regulation  of  the  “sharper  edges  of  the  
market” (2005, p.234)  and   their  activities  “serve to stabilise and normalise conditions 
that are seen as threats or disturbances to those conditions of normality” (2005, p.238). 
Much of what constitutes resistance may therefore be alternative tactics integral to gov-
ernmentality. Ruptures and discontinuities within the web of governmentality, however, 
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provide  micro  spaces  within  which  resistance  can  occur.  While  this  echoes  Holloway’s  
(2010) method of the crack, Lipschutz is less optimistic than Holloway as to the possi-
bility that resistance can eventually overcome neoliberal governmentality. While also 
seeing  GCS   as   “a means to making the global political economy governable” (2004, 
p.90), Amoore and Langley place GCS in a more ambiguous light than Lipschutz. They 
acknowledge that civil society may be an emancipatory force - pointing to the ambigu-
ous role played historically by civil society with churches, trade unions, for example, 
playing emancipatory roles at times while acting as part of systems of control at others.  
Abandoning efforts to provide a unitary understanding of GCS, Drainville 
(2005a) divides GCS on the basis of its practices and autonomy positing two modes of 
relation to the world economy. One  mode  relates  closely  to  the  ‘governmentality  mode’  
used by the above thinkers, which involves abstract subjects gathered by global govern-
ance into problem-solving  humanity  (‘cosmopolitan  ghosts’). Governance’s  GCS  comes  
together at UN conferences, in dialogue with the IMF and World Bank and at a myriad 
of other transnational and regional fora. The second mode of relation involves cam-
paign-based movements who enter the world economy with situated, concrete struggles. 
Examples are strikes which become transnationalised. While the first mode is a depolit-
icised and largely consensual process, the second mode involves forces which contest 
neoliberal globalisation  via  ‘placed  struggles’.  While  the  two  modes  of  relation  appear  
as a Manichean dichotomy within GCS between victims/villains and heroes, Drainville 
acknowledges that global governance itself is a site of struggle.  
As can be seen from the above, the more Foucauldian thinkers (Amoore and 
Langley and Drainville) try to identify space for resistance, the closer they move to 
Gramsci’s  concept  of  civil  society  as  a  site  for  both  the  maintenance  and  contestation  of  
the established order albeit the mechanisms through which consent is maintained and 
contested vary.   
In terms of geography, while Foucault did not focus on the transnational arena, 
his thinking about where power should be analysed has relevance for the question of 
how GCS operates across the national/ transnational interface.  Foucault  argued  for  “as-
cending analysis of power, starting from  its  infinitesimal  mechanisms” (Foucault 1980, 
p.99). Following on from this, Lipschutz (2005, p.246) argues against viewing GCS as 
an aggregate of transnational organisations, but that GCS can be found within “the local 
politics of groups focussed on specific places but informed by a globalised epistemolo-
gy”. Amoore and Langley also point to the local as to where the concrete manifestations 
of the global can best be understood. 
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 It is in the everyday realms of family, cultural, religious life that GCS in its 
concrete, multiple forms form can be found with its many tensions and contra-
dictions. (Amoore and Langley 2004, pp.109-110)   
 
Keying off his second mode of engagement Drainville (2005b) goes fur-
ther, positing a dialectical relationship between transnational movements and 
struggles within national boundaries, presenting this as the key defining feature of 
anti-capitalist movements. Seeking theoretical underpinnings for his analysis, 
Drainville  uses  Gramsci’s  distinction  between  a  war  of  position  (operating  at  na-
tional level) and a war of movement (operating at transnational level), arguing 
that as social hegemony has been established at national but not at international 
level different forms of action are possible. Drainville’s   formulation   parallels  
Dryzek’s   distinction   between   the   national   level   (where   there   are   formal   institu-
tional rules) and the transnational (where formal institutions are underdeveloped 
giving greater significances to discourse). While  Drainville’s  concept  of  a  dialec-
tical relationship between national and transnational level activism is the most 
interesting approach to this dimension of activism in the literature, this concept 
needs further development to increase its explanatory value.  
 
Concluding on Foucauldian approaches to GCS 
An emerging framework for civil society engagement can be identified from Foucauldi-
an theorists: as an integral part of governmentality; seeking to exploit existing fractures 
in governmentality; or through concrete, placed campaigns challenging power relations 
in the world economy.  Underpinning each of these modes is a different perception of 
the degree to which power and knowledge are fused and therefore the spaces which ex-
ist for counter-movements. In terms of geography both the second and third approaches 
emphasise   concrete,   ‘placed’   struggles   as  ways   of   avoiding   being   drawn   into   govern-
mentality.  This  echoes  Holloway’s  method  of  the  ‘crack’,  fracturing  capitalism  through 
a myriad of concrete struggles – with the various local resistances linked by global 
framings of the issues (Lipschutz 2005).  Drainville’s  presentation  of  the  national/  trans-
national activist interface as a dialectical relationship takes us beyond the limited con-
cept of the boomerang effect linking the national and international arenas. But the fac-
tors   driving   this   dialectical   relationship   need   further   elucidation.   Foucault’s   thinking  
appears to converge with Gramsci in terms of understanding civil society as a site of 
consent and contestation once the possibility of taking a counter position to governmen-
tality is accepted.  
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2.5 Power of transnational civil society: analytic framework  
A number of key issues relevant to transnational civil society and the exercise of power 
have emerged in the course of this chapter. These relate to the interaction of knowledge 
and power; the relationship between campaigning at national and international level; 
and understanding modes of engagement with power. The main relevant issues are set 
out below.    
Knowledge and power: the use of ideas is a key factor in all theories of transna-
tional civil society, but there are different understandings: framing to leverage current 
cultural values, knowledge used as part of a long struggle to change current com-
monsense to good sense and Foucauldian understandings of power and knowledge as 
almost fused. Knowledge can be mobilised to present two different levels of challenge - 
challenges within the system and challenges to the system. Structural features which 
facilitate the first are the fact that knowledge and power are differentially fused, depend-
ing on how strategically important an issue is for dominant neoliberalism allowing for 
contestation on issues like debt but less so on market liberalisation (Sikkink 2002). 
While  there  is  a  huge  literature  on  ‘framing’,  there  has  been  far  less  examination  of  how  
groups move beyond the current dominant commonsense. For Gramsci there are always 
seeds of dissonance within social groupings from which fundamental challenges can be 
mounted.  
Geography of Power: How transnational civil society operates across the na-
tional/transnational interface is still relatively under-theorised. Among the useful con-
cepts distilled from the literature reviewed were 
a) The domestic embeddedness of transnational activism was highlighted by politi-
cal opportunity theory, whereas Foucauldians highlighted the need to pose chal-
lenges at the most local and micro levels of power. These approaches, however, 
are informed by different understandings of power. Power as political opportuni-
ty highlights the opportunities provided in formal domestic political contexts as 
key to the success of social movements (Tarrow 1998, 2005). Foucault’s  argu-
ment is for a bottom-up approach to power, avoiding targeting dominant power 
or  seeking  ‘global’  solutions  (Hoy  1986)  and  therefore  not  overly  focussing  on 
institutional opportunities. We  can  assume  that  Foucault  was  not  using  ‘global’  
in its current meaning but was referring to the search for overarching solutions 
to problems from central authorities. 
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b) Differences between the national and international arenas and the resulting dif-
ferent opportunities available to transnational civil society were identified. 
Dryzek (1999) highlighted the lack of strong institutionalisation at the interna-
tional compared to the national level providing greater opportunities for transna-
tional civil society’s discursive engagement at the international level. Drainville 
(2005b) expresses the difference between the national and international levels in 
terms of the presence of hegemony at national level and its absence at interna-
tional level, and this allows for different forms of struggle – long struggles to 
win the argument in civil society at national level and more adventurist forays at 
international level. While Dryzek and Drainville provide more dynamic explana-
tions of the different national and international terrains facing transnational civil 
society their analyses remain underdeveloped. The relative advantage to transna-
tional civil society of the discursive opportunities available at transnational level 
vis-à-vis the more formal political procedures at national level has not been ad-
dressed by Dryzek. Nor has Drainville sufficiently developed his concept of a 
war of manoeuvre at international level or how this operates dialectically with a 
national-level war of position. 
 
Modes of engagement with power  
 
Tarrow (2001) provides a useful framework distinguishing between INGO, TAN 
and TNSM on the basis of what they do rather than what they say – the degree to which 
they engage in contentious politics vis-à-vis routine transactions such as lobbying. The-
se formations may involve temporary alliances between states and international institu-
tions, depending on the issue. This differentiation raises questions about our understand-
ing of civil society. Three broad understandings of civil society can be drawn from the 
above literature. Theories of power as persuasion (Sikkink 2002) are based on a view of 
civil society as independent of states and international institutions makers with the mor-
al authority to call decision makers to account. Gramsci and Foucault both posit differ-
ent forms of intermeshing of civil society and the state. For Gramsci, civil society is 
where the consensus underpinning a hegemonic order is created, maintained and also 
contested (Gramsci 1971). From a Foucauldian perspective civil society is an element in 
a particular method of government in which civil society is engaged as a subject of as 
well as an object of government. The understanding used within this thesis takes ele-
ments of these different approaches on board. While accepting that civil society is not 
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an autonomous sphere in any absolute sense, it has some autonomy from the state. Civil 
society’s  own  self-identity as independent of the state albeit exaggerated is a strong part 
of what underpins how it operates and as pointed out by Foucauldians, it is because of 
this autonomy that civil society can be useful to the state. A Gramscian perspective of 
civil society as consisting of consensual and adversarial elements adds to this under-
standing. Elements of these three theoretical approaches to civil society will be used in 
the   study,   namely,   civil   society’s   own   self-identity as autonomous together with the 
consensual or conflictual modes of engagement with decision makers. 
Based on the above discussion and the earlier discussion of Lukes’ definition of 
power as potential, the following is a summary of the analytical framework to be used 
to examine the research questions on the nature of transnational civil society power and 
how this is exercised. 
 
Source of power: realising power as potential 
Leveraging power as potential, transnational civil society makes common cause on the 
causes of and solutions to the debt crisis and how to work together to tackle the prob-
lem. The empirical chapters will examine how transnational civil society debt cam-
paigns made common cause transnationally, and the impact of the fractures and tensions 
which emerged.   
 
Exercising power 
 
Knowledge and power 
The questions to be examined in the case studies under this heading are: to what extent 
was the debt issue explained within the confines of current common sense and to what 
extent was it explained as part of a broader challenge to the inequalities of the global 
system. This will be examined in the context of understandings provided by theories of 
power as persuasion and anti-systemic power. 
 
Geography and power 
The questions to be examined in the case studies under this heading are: to what extent 
did debt campaigns focus on national level or international level decision making pro-
cesses and what was the relationship between action taken at these two levels. This will 
be examined in relation to the concepts provided by Drainville (2005b) and Dryzek 
(1999) and in relation to the concept of domestic embeddedness (Josselin 2007). 
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Modes of Engagement 
The questions to be examined in the case studies under this heading are: to what extent 
were the methods of debt campaigns consensual or adversarial; what was the nature of 
the relationship with the state/international institutions which ensued; and what was the 
level of challenge posed by debt movements to the system. These will be considered in 
the light of the understanding of civil society drawn from liberal, Gramscian and Fou-
cauldian understandings set out above.  
 
The next chapter examines theories of world order and sets out the theory which will be 
used in this thesis to provide the structural context to complement the above framework, 
which focusses on the agency of transnational civil society.   
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Chapter Three: Understanding World Order 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter concluded with a framework to analyse the agency of transnation-
al civil society. Although the focus of this thesis is on agency, it is recognised that this 
agency operates in relation to a structural context. The purpose of this chapter, there-
fore, is to examine different understandings of power within the international system in 
order to set the structural context for transnational civil society debt campaigning – rec-
ognising that transnational civil society interacts with and impacts upon this context ra-
ther than being simply constrained by it. For campaigning groups seeking to change in-
ternational policy, the starting point is to identify who is responsible for the problem 
and how can these be challenged. This raises the question of the locus/loci of power in 
relation to the contested issue. A central issue is the extent to which, in a globalising 
world, states still have power – and which states have power – an issue still hotly debat-
ed within IPE/IR literature. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides a brief review of 
two approaches to world order: firstly as an interstate system and secondly as a multi-
lateral system, identifying the implications of these different perspectives for civil socie-
ty. The following section examines the internationalising state, which bases world order 
within a changing state/capital relationship and explains why this theory has been se-
lected for use in this study. The next section operationalises the internationalising state, 
explaining the institutions and processes through which it works and the implications of 
this for transnational civil society power. The final section examines the different possi-
bilities for transnational civil society engagement - with the institutions of world order 
and the state, respectively. The conclusion identifies the key dimensions of the interna-
tionalising state relevant for this research and links these with the framework identified 
at the end of the previous chapter to provide a framework which engages with both 
agency and structural dimensions. 
3.2 A state or a multilateral system of world order  
Notwithstanding the onward march of globalisation, it is strongly argued by a range of 
theorists that world order is still mainly an interstate system with powerful states pro-
ducing and maintaining that order (Waltz 2008; Gilpin 2002). While the relevance of 
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ideas and norms in international politics are not discounted, there is scepticism about 
the relevance of universal moral principles, as in the context of struggles between states 
ethical  questions  concede  to  ‘reasons  of  state’  (Donnelly 2009). In the absence of a cen-
tral authority in the international system, power politics rather than persuasion is what 
propels international affairs (Gilpin 2002). This is because world order is driven by 
competition between states seeking their own self-interest, and there is no supra- state 
central authority which can mediate this competition. 
Those  holding  this  position  are  also  sceptical  about  ‘globalisation’,   that  greater  
interconnectivity due to technological, communications and transport development is 
leading to a significantly more interdependent world. The state is not being superseded 
by power from above or below and “internationalist ideas are the continuation of stat-
ism by other means” (Dunne and Schmidt 2001, p.159). Theorists also question wheth-
er global markets are more integrated today than at other historical periods, pointing out 
that capital flows in the nineteenth century, as a percentage of global economic produc-
tion was far greater than today (Hirst, Thompson and Bromley 2009). While they may 
agree that there are growing links between national economies, they disagree that these 
linkages are creating a single world economy with the relevance of national borders 
dissolving (Burchill 2009). 
This raises the question of whether the existence of a range of intergovernmental 
organisations involve some concession of sovereignty by states? According to theorists 
(Waltz 2008; Gilpin 1987, 2002), emphasising the state as the key actor, these institu-
tions are still state-dominated, with states making the rules by which such institutions 
operate. Further, while states may come to joint agreements within international organi-
sations where their interests coincide, in the absence of any legitimate supra-state body, 
implementation of such agreements is dependent on states. In the context of state-
dominated world order, international institutions are created by the more powerful 
states and survive in their original form for as long as they serve the interests of those 
states. An example given is the US unilateral decision in 1971 to take the dollar off the 
gold standard, ending the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates (Waltz 2008). 
International institutions are therefore seen as having little if any autonomy from states 
(Gilpin 2002).  
In this context, civil society groups/social movements/NGOs are seen as periph-
eral to world order, as it is mainly through states (particularly major states) that they 
influence global decision making (Omelicheva 2009, Peterson 1992). Broome (2009) 
examining the role of NGOs in bringing about change in international debt policy, ar-
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gues that while NGOs exercised moral authority, it was through influencing major 
states that they achieved change. While debt policy was implemented through the IMF 
and World Bank, these are essentially state-driven. Broome (2009, p.78) is sceptical 
that a global civil society is emerging “that can help to generate transnational democra-
cy without accessing formal decision-making structures”. Further, the lack of priority 
given to ethical principles suggests a limited role for transnational civil society within a 
state-focussed system as one way that transnational civil society exercises power is by 
framing issues to resonate with strong moral and human values, as outlined in the pre-
vious chapter. 
Countering the above analysis are arguments that globalisation is transforming 
the world, with states no longer able to control the flow of ideas, money, arms or drugs, 
and facing acute problems which cannot be resolved within state borders such as cli-
mate, change and financial contagion. In this context, the emergence of  a  ‘multilateral’  
state (Kaldor 2003b) in the form of an emerging rule-based global governance system 
is posited within which hard power politics can be superseded (McGrew 2002). Gov-
ernance operates through a variety of institutions, some interstate, (e.g. UN, WTO, IMF 
and World Bank) and some private sector bodies (e.g. credit rating agencies). Global 
governance institutions are both formal (based on constitutions) and informal (created 
through repeated practices). Ultimately their authority is based on their ability to 
achieve compliance from those to whom they direct their activities (Rosenau 2002). 
Within this perspective international institutions are central to global governance and 
contain mechanisms to prevent their capture by the most powerful states (McGrew 
2002). By creating the conditions within which states can cooperate for mutual benefit, 
they reduce the costs of making agreements and reduce uncertainty giving powerful 
states an interest most of the time in following the agreed rules (Keohane 1988). Rather 
than being the agents of states, international institutions have some autonomy and au-
thority of their own, which they derive from their knowledge and technical expertise 
and from their self-presentation as impartial in serving a common social purpose in 
contrast to self-serving states (Barnett and Finnemore 2005, pp.173-175). This perspec-
tive presents global governance and international organisations as a progressive force, 
with some seeing this as an opportunity to create an ethical cosmopolitan world order 
based on universal morality, with a world community formed of individuals with rights 
in addition to states (Held 2002). 
The democratic and legitimacy deficits due to the dispersed nature of global 
governance among public and private bodies are acknowledged (Keohane 1998). Given 
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that international institutions are run by elites – managed by technocrats and supervised 
by senior government officials – governance activity takes place largely outside the 
public realm (Keohane 1998). There is some albeit limited, formal indirect representa-
tive democracy in intergovernmental organisations in so far as member states are ac-
countable back to their citizens. This very limited national accountability is supple-
mented  by  ‘transparency  politics’,  with international policy scrutinised by transnational 
networks, including civil society networks (Keohane 1998). A further opening for 
transnational civil society within this perspective highlighted in the previous chapter 
arises from the fact that there is significant space for persuasion within world politics, 
giving civil society a role in changing international norms (Sikkink 2002). As discussed 
briefly in the previous chapter thinkers who posit a post-sovereign world in particular 
highlight the potential for global civil society to bridge the democratic deficit in global 
governance (Scholte 1999, 2002b, 2004, Kaldor 2003a). Unlike state-centric approach-
es, which situate civil society action on international issues mainly in relation to major 
states,  ‘post-sovereign’  thinkers  position  civil  society  in   the  international  arena  and  in  
direct relation to IGOs. This is facilitated by the fact that most of the major global gov-
ernance bodies have established offices to liaise with NGOs (Scholte 2001b, p.26). 
While state-centric views see civil society as working mainly through major 
states, those positing the emergence of a multilateral state recognise a role for transna-
tional civil society in relation to the global governance institutions which provide the 
infrastructure to that multilateral state. Both these views provide an inadequate theoret-
ical perspective for this research on a number of fronts. The actual state/transnational 
interface, a key dimension, is insufficiently elucidated, and neither theory therefore 
provides an adequate explanation of how civil society leverages this interface. The im-
plication of the hierarchical positioning of states within world order on different nation-
al civil society groups is a further area which is underexplored. The focus of state-
centric approaches is largely limited to the most powerful states, while the overly con-
sensual multilateral views tend to treat civil society as a fairly homogenous actor within 
global governance. As can be seen from the previous chapter, there is evidence that the 
hierarchies within world order are reflected back into civil society, in particular along 
south/north lines (Omelicheva 2009; Scholte 2002b; Pasha 1998). 
The next section examines a third approach to world order which is based on an 
analysis of the changing relationship between state and capital over time within a hier-
archically structured world order. 
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3.3 State /capital relationship: the internationalising state 
A third approach to world order situates the state in the context of the growing interna-
tionalisation of the economy (Cox 1987, 1992, 2002; Sklair 2001; Falk 1999; Gill 
1998). A number of processes and mechanisms are identified through which the chang-
ing relationship between the state and capital resulting from this is portrayed – the 
transnational capitalist class (Sklair 2001), the new constitutionalism of disciplinary ne-
oliberalism (Gill 1998) and the internationalising state (Cox 1987, 1993, 2002). 
For Sklair the emergence of a transnational capitalist class – an alliance of the 
corporate sector, globalising professionals, globalising politicians and bureaucrats - sets 
the parameters for the state-capital relationship. Members of this class see their interest 
as promoting the practices of global capitalism, and they lobby on behalf of transnation-
al corporations in the international arena e.g. the GATT/WTO (2001, pp. 298-299). Gill 
also sees a shift in authority from state to capital through the ‘new  constitutionalism’  
which locks in neoliberal policies at national level, putting quasi-legal restrictions on 
the policy space available to states. Gill (1998) dates the new constitutionalism from the 
1980s, linked to the rise of transnational corporations. The aim of the new constitution-
alism is to reconfigure the state so that governments are facilitators of and operate with-
in the context of market values and discipline. To do this, areas of economic policy such 
as fiscal, monetary and trade policy are isolated from political influence through e.g. 
independent central banks and the rule of technocrats. These changes are then further 
locked in through WTO trade related intellectual property and investment measures 
(TRIPs and TRIMS), IMF World Bank structural adjustment programmes imposed on 
developing countries and regional agreements such as the Maastricht Treaty and 
NAFTA. A central aim is to secure the property rights of capital including its right of 
access and exit and to insulate dominant economic forces from democratic processes 
and  popular accountability, co-opting opposition with a view to preventing a Polanyian 
‘double  movement’  (Gill  1989,  1998,  2003).                                           
Cox’s  concept  of  the  internationalising  state  provides  a  more  in-depth historical 
examination of the stages and processes through which the state/capital relationship has 
been reconfigured in parallel with the internationalisation of production (1987, 1992, 
2002). He distinguishes between how this process took place in industrialised countries 
and developing countries. In terms of industrialised countries, during the 1930s the na-
tionalist/protectionist state in the industrialised world operated as a buffer between do-
mestic societies and the demands of the international economy which at that time large-
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ly consisted of trade between countries. Government agencies with a national focus 
such as ministries of industry and labour held dominant positions. The post-1945 order 
of ‘embedded  liberalism’  on  which  the  original Bretton Woods system was based, bal-
anced trade liberalisation with space for state intervention in the interest of domestic 
stability (Ruggie 1982). While states became accountable to the IMF and GATT in rela-
tion to trade and exchange rate policies, they were given time to adjust to the world 
economy enabling the state to mediate between the world economy and the needs of 
domestic society. 
Further changes took place in the state-capital relationship from the 1970s fol-
lowing a number of developments which led to the disembedding of liberalism. From 
the 1960s financial markets were increasingly liberalised, and in 1971 the original Bret-
ton Woods agreement ended when the US government removed an anchor of the system 
by breaking the link between the dollar and the gold standard. The 1970s economic cri-
sis led to an increasing internationalisation of production driven by the information rev-
olution (Castells 2000). The emergence of transnational corporations with weak national 
affiliations and developing global strategies was a key element in the move towards a 
world economy (Sklair 2001). As a result, production was increasingly operating 
through international production networks rather than largely nationally based (Cox 
1987). The combination of liberalisation of capital and recession in the west resulted in 
an exponential increase in commercial lending to developing countries. This followed 
on from the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973, which resulted in  huge  deposits  of  ‘petro’  
dollars in European banks. Recycling these deposits through loans to developing coun-
tries was promoted by the IMF and the G7 in order to avoid deeper recession in the west 
and led to the debt crisis which was set off in 1982 when systemically important coun-
tries like Mexico, Brazil and Argentina were unable to continue servicing their debts. 
With the increasing financialisation of the world economy as governments and 
corporations moved from financing through taxation/equity to debt financing, finance 
capital gained power in relation to governments (and also in relation to industry). Faced 
with threats of investment strikes and capital flight, states were forced to prioritise creat-
ing business-friendly environments and became more accountable to bond markets, no-
tably to credit rating agencies (Cox 1992). In this context, financial markets were able to 
exert strong influence on British government policies following financial market liberal-
isation in 1971 (Baker 1999, p.83). The French socialist government elected in 1981 
experienced  ‘disciplinary  neoliberalism’  when  it  tried  to  continue  domestically  oriented  
interventions e.g. reducing working time, increasing wages. The backlash from currency 
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markets forced the government to devalue the franc (Castells 2000, p.139). As liberal-
ism   became   ‘disembedded’, the   state   became   a   ‘transmission   belt’   – an unfortunate 
choice of term by Cox suggesting that the state is passive in the process – from the 
global to the national economy, adjusting national policies and practices and subordinat-
ing domestic economies and social priorities to the perceived demands of the world 
economy (Cox 1987, 1992). 
A key element of the process through which the state is internationalised is the 
changing social base of the state as internal structures are adjusted to enable the transfer 
of the global consensus into national policy and practice. State agencies most connected 
to the global economy—ministries for finance and central banks—now take precedence 
over domestically oriented agencies, such as those dealing with industry, labour and 
welfare. On the business side, with the internationalisation of production, the sectors 
oriented to the world economy take precedence over those domestically oriented (Cox 
1987).  While  Cox’s  description  gives  the  impression  of  a  smooth  transition  within  the  
state, Sklair (2001, pp.83-84)  poses the impact of globalisation on the state and national 
capital as a struggle between outward oriented coalitions of corporate executives, state 
agencies and political parties versus inward oriented capital – and non-capital – localis-
ers. 
Further consolidation of the primacy of globally orientated actors takes place 
through the appointment of technocrats close to global markets to key positions in gov-
ernment bodies. The Spanish Socialist Party, faced with a severe economic crisis on tak-
ing power in 1982, appointed a new class of neoliberal technocrats throughout the gov-
ernment, some  recruited  from  ‘IMF  circles’  (Castells  2000, p.145). President Cardoso of 
Brazil – formerly an academic exponent of dependency theory – facing a monetary cri-
sis in 1999 appointed an ex-manager  of  Soros’  hedge   fund as president of the central 
bank (Castells 2000, p.145). A new nexus of influence emerged, with the dominant 
globalising forces within government and business coming together in international pol-
icy networks with key central agencies of government and big business (Cox 1987, 
p.263). 
As   regards   southern   countries,   the   period   of   ‘embedded   liberalism’   between  
1945 and the late 1960s was when countries across Africa and Asia achieved their inde-
pendence. Populist regimes were in place across Latin America and developmental 
states emerged in Asia and Africa (Meyns and Musamba 2010; Mkandwire 2001). De-
velopmental states gained some control over their national economies with a view to 
bringing about structural change and growth and breaking out of dependant develop-
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ment. This included control over access to the economy by foreign capital and the terms 
and conditions of their operation once in the domestic economy (Cox 1987, 1992). The 
emphasis was on import substitution behind protective barriers rather than a major ori-
entation towards the world economy. An inability to continue to provide benefits to the 
social groups on which the populist state was most dependent led to takeover by mili-
tary bureaucratic regimes. In Latin America the majority of countries were run by mili-
tary regimes starting from the 1960s up to the 1980s. The legitimacy of the military re-
gimes was based on maintaining order and promising greater security to foreign inves-
tors. The neoliberal counter-revolution of the 1980s (Toye 1993), back-to-back with the 
explosion of the debt crisis, provoked the restructuring of southern states in line with the 
requirements of international production (Cox 1987, p.265). In return for access to in-
ternational resources, they were required to open up their economies to world markets 
and  transnational  capital.  At  first  this  involved  ‘rolling  back  the  state’  through  privatisa-
tion, deregulation and liberalisation, but subsequently the focus shifted to embedding 
‘good’  policies  and  institutions  in  the  state  to  enable  the  required business-friendly envi-
ronment, with legal protection for property and contracts an important element. A fur-
ther requirement was that priority should be given to repaying international lenders over 
the social and economic rights of citizens. There was a move to multi-party democracy 
in line with the neoliberal consensus of open markets and democracy – from single-
party rule in some African countries (e.g. in Tanzania and Zambia) and in Latin Ameri-
ca the end to the military regimes. 
In addition to the processes internationalising the state, geopolitical considera-
tions also impacted on southern states and contributed to the debt crisis. Some of the 
lending was driven by cold war imperatives – to support allies on either side of the di-
vide resulting in keeping many military and oppressive regimes in place such as Mobutu 
in the former Zaire. The neoliberal counter-revolution coincided with the weakening of 
the power of the Soviet Union and therefore a lessening of cold war imperatives. Once 
the Berlin Wall fell, issues of good governance, human rights and democracy took over 
from cold war considerations in terms of aid and lending. 
While both industrial and developing countries experienced a shift in the balance 
of power between the state and capital, the process through which this took place dif-
fered. For the public in industrialised countries the internationalisation process appeared 
to arise from impersonal forces and could be separated from domestic political debates 
(Cox 1987). In the case of developing countries the external pressure on states to re-
structure in the context of the debt crisis exercised through the IMF was very visible. 
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This  elicited  strong  resistance  from  governments  and  people  in  southern  countries.  ‘IMF  
riots’  took  place  across  Africa  and  Latin America in opposition to structural adjustment 
in the 1980s, and resistance continued through the 1990s. For post-colonial African 
governments   IMF/  World   Bank   conditions   curtailed   their   ability   to   ‘develop   in   free-
dom’, instead of which they had to hand over the management of their economies to the 
IMF and World Bank (Nyerere 1991). Nyerere resigned as President of Tanzania in 
1985 rather than sign an IMF agreement, leaving the door open to a new leader who was 
prepared to take this step. President Kaunda suspended Zambia’s  programme with the 
IMF in 1987, and relations were not fully reinstated until 1992 (Situmbeko and Zulu 
Jones 2004). President Sankara of Burkina Faso also sought to resist IMF conditions, 
and called for an African front to repudiate the debt at an OAU meeting in 1986 (Millet 
and Toussaint 2004, p.19).   Following   Sankara’s   assassination   in   1987, Burkina Faso 
came into line with IMF conditions. In Latin America, Alan Garcia, elected President of 
Peru in 1985, took the strongest debtor country line against debt and IMF conditions, 
unilaterally capping debt repayments at 10% of export earnings. By 1989, however, Pe-
ru had been forced back into an IMF programme.  
3.3.1 Internationalising state in action   
Cox does not suggest that state authority has moved to market actors such as transna-
tional corporations, but that  
 
There is a transnational process of consensus formation among the official care-
takers of the global economy. This process generates consensual guidelines, un-
derpinned by an ideology of globalisation, that are transmitted into the policy-
making channels of national governments and big corporations (Cox 1992, 
p.30).  
 
Through these processes the state is being internationalised into official and unofficial 
transnational networks of states, corporate representatives and intellectuals - IMF and 
World Bank, UN, G7, WTO, Bank for International Settlements, Trilateral Commis-
sion, WEF, Bilderberg conferences. It is noteworthy that many of the informal fora were 
set up in the first half of the 1970s: the WEF was set up in 1973, the Trilateral Commis-
sion in 1973 and the G7 in 1975. The  resulting  ‘nébuleuse’  is  a  commitment  to  reaching 
consensus in the interests of promoting an open world economy facilitated by the domi-
nant neoliberal ideology; but this is not a centralised force (Cox 1987, 1992, 2002). The 
consensus-forming processes shape the discourses within which policies are defined 
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(Cox 1992), with policy harmonisation as the operationalisation of the consensus (Pa-
nitch 1994). Networking for policy consensus at global level is also highlighted by 
Sklair (2001) and Gill (1998) – between the different fractions of the transnational capi-
talist class (Sklair 2001) and between transnational elites of business, state officials, 
members of international organisations enabling common perspectives on the role of 
international business (Gill 1989). These processes are served by a range of media pub-
lications such as the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal (Gill 1989). This fo-
cus on networking to achieve common understandings reflects  Dryzek’s  (1999) under-
standing of discourse as a source of power internationally, as the absence of formal 
rules at international level increases the importance of discourse (1999). 
Participation in the internationalising state is hierarchically structured. States 
contribute differentially to the consensus-making process and are subject to different 
pressures to implement the ensuing agreements as outlined above. Part of the process of 
restructuring southern states involved sidelining the south/north dialogue which devel-
oped in relation to the NIEO during the 1970s. There was also a shift in the hierarchies 
of power between international organisations, with the UN marginalised on major polit-
ical and economic issues, operating as a subordinate body to the IMF, World Bank and 
later the WTO, which was created in 1995 (Olsen 2005, Cox 2002). Southern govern-
ments had a strong base within UNCTAD and UNDP, but both these organisations lost 
some of their power. The centre of gravity in relation to trade and intellectual property 
rights shifted from UNCTAD and the World Intellectual Property Organisation to the 
northern government-dominated WTO. UNDP lost influence on development to the 
World Bank and even the IMF with the introduction in 1999 of the requirement for 
debtor governments to adopt Poverty Reduction Strategies which had to be endorsed by 
the IMF and World Bank before debt reduction or further financing was made available. 
Parts of southern civil society groups/social movements began to lose faith in UN insti-
tutions, perceiving them as having been captured by neoliberalism (Bond 2006, Jubilee 
South 2002b). 
The operation of the G7, central to policy consensus formation on global finan-
cial issues – and a key target of debt campaigners – illustrates the consensus formation 
process in action. Set up in 1975 after the fall of the Bretton Woods system and the in-
creasing mobility of capital, the G7 sits at the apex of a diffused system of global finan-
cial governance involving private and public bodies within which no one actor domi-
nates. The G7 started as the G5, with Italy and Canada joining at a later stage. Follow-
ing the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, the role of the G7 changed with the 
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emergence of the G20. It is underpinned by a transnational state/society alliance involv-
ing departments of finance, central banks and financial interests in G7 countries (Baker 
2006). Most officials involved in the G7 process see their national financial sectors (e.g. 
Wall Street and the City of London) as their main constituency, with the national inter-
est seen as coinciding with the interests of this sector (Baker 2006). The G7 process 
largely functions  through  a  network  of  ‘deputies’  i.e.  senior  officials  from  international  
divisions of finance ministries and the deputy governors of central banks. The shared 
understandings on financial issues held by these officials – an international financial 
system based on the principles of sound money and open markets - enables them to 
come to consensus positions (Baker 2006, p.231). 
While interstate negotiation and bargaining takes place, the G7 operates mainly 
as a transgovernmental coalition in that there is a degree of autonomy from politicians 
and heads of government. The main focus is technical, with expertise as the key re-
source leading to a perceived depoliticisation of the process. The G7 process is informal 
– there are no recorded minutes of deputies or ministerial meetings (Baker 2006) – and 
the close ongoing contact between the individuals involved strengthens the network. 
The aim of the G7 is to maximise its collective influence towards the wider decision 
makers on global finance. It has no direct power over the private sector and communi-
cates   largely   to   financial  markets   through   ‘strategic   signalling’   i.e.   statements  with   a  
view to persuading these bodies to take the action envisaged in G7 communications. 
The G7 is the most powerful set of countries within the IMF and World Bank, holding 
41% of the vote at the IMF (IMF undated) and 41.5% at the World Bank (World Bank 
2013). The G7, therefore, directly intervenes in policy making in these bodies. G7 fi-
nance ministers meet before the Spring and Annual IMF/World Bank meetings with a 
view to promoting their consensus at these meetings. 
3.3.2 Criticism of the internationalising state 
The internationalising state has rightly been criticised for presenting the national / 
transnational relationship as largely one-way, with influences from the international 
arena impacting on a passive nation state, neglecting the fact that there was active state 
input into the process of globalisation. This is a significant weakness for this thesis, as 
the role of the state in relation to the transnational arena is a crucial question in terms of 
situating transnational  civil  society  within  world  order.  Cox’s  reduction  of  the  state  to  
that of a transmission belt for the smooth transfer of transnational policy consensus into 
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national policies and practices has been particularly criticised (Hobson and Ramesh 
2002; Shaw 2000; Baker 1999; Panitch 1994). Rather than becoming an agent of trans-
national capital, the critics argue that the state is being re-organised involving a shift in 
power relations within the state – states in fact have played a strong role in promoting 
globalisation (Panitch 1994, Baker 1999, Hobson and Ramesh 2002). For Shaw (2000) 
the internationalisation of western states was a precondition for globalisation. This view 
of the state as actively involved in facilitating globalisation is supported by the wider 
literature on the subject of the state (Amoore, et al 1997; Obi 1997; Stevens and Bos-
well 1997). For Panitch the state is being reorganised, not bypassed, and is working 
with the capitalist class to  secure  the  ‘new  constitutionalism  of  disciplinary neoliberal-
ism’  (Panitch 1994, p.64) e.g. through GATT and NAFTA. In terms of NAFTA, he ar-
gues:  
 
this is not something imposed on the Canadian and Mexican states by American 
capital and state as external to the latter; rather it reflects the role adopted by the 
Mexican and Canadian states in representing the interests of their bourgeoisies 
and bureaucracies as these are already penetrated by American capital and ad-
ministration. (Panitch 1994, p.75) 
 
The relationship is two-way: not just that international institutions erode national 
sovereignty, but also that states bind themselves to international agreements as a way of 
resisting domestic demands and to push through measures against opposition from 
strong domestic forces (Hobson and Ramesh 2002). Further, rather than operating as a 
transmission belt for transnational agreements to the domestic arena, states are still a 
site of struggle over these power relations e.g. between those representing national and 
international capital. It is to the City of London rather than to international finance that 
the British government is accountable when drawing up its budget (Panitch 1994). Sub-
stantial lobbying has been carried out on behalf of corporate interests in GATT and 
WTO by these globalising bureaucrats and politicians (Sklair 1999). 
Baker   (1999)  provides   the  most   substantial   critique  of  Cox’s   internationalising  
state, based on an empirical study of the internationalisation of the British state. He ar-
gues that the internationalisation process was due to a shift in the social basis of the 
state and a domestic climate of ideas, rather than the impact of external forces of the 
nébuleuse. There was, in fact, a two-way relationship between the globalisation dis-
course and the state (Baker 1999, p.97). He illustrates his argument through examining 
the roles of the Bank of England and the British Treasury in the internationalisation of 
the state. The shift from heavy industry to more mobile factors of production resulted in 
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the financial sector and multinational corporations (both British MNCs operating abroad 
and foreign MNCs operating in Britain), dominating the new social base of the state. 
Baker confirms the process outlined by Cox, which resulted in precedence being given 
to state bodies geared towards the world economy. National discourse fora involving 
trade unions and industry were abolished; sections dealing with overseas issues in the 
Treasury took precedence over those dealing with domestic issues, and the climate of 
ideas changed with the appointment of advisers holding monetarist views. This repre-
sented a restructuring at the heart of the state with interests of international mobile capi-
tal prioritised over those of domestic capital and labour. Key for Baker is that as well as 
existing as external actors, global economic actors also exist within the state - the Brit-
ish state now has a transnationalised social base as market criteria are increasingly used 
to determine public policy (Baker 1999, p.96). Further, the relationship between the 
state and international discourse is mutually reinforcing rather than operating in one di-
rection from the international to the national. 
In the face of the above criticism, Cox withdrew his unfortunate metaphor of the 
state  as  a  ‘transmission  belt’  between  the  national  and  transnational arena (2002), clari-
fying his Gramscian understanding of the state as a political authority structure together 
with the balance of social forces sustaining or challenging its rule. He also accepted that 
there is complex, and multi directional interaction between various forces of the 
‘nébuleuse’ – the pro globalisation social forces within the state, the evolving neoliberal 
ideology within universities and wider intellectual circles and intergovernmental organi-
sations develop the guidelines to be translated into domestic policy and practice by gov-
ernments’  (Cox 2002, p.33). This clarification rescues the internationalising state from a 
one-directional relationship between the state and the transnational arena and makes it a 
useful concept to analyse the dynamics of the state/international interface. Setting the 
balance of social forces at the heart of the internationalising state opens up the possibil-
ity for struggles over the internationalisation process and makes the concept consistent 
with  Baker’s  empirical findings in relation to the restructuring of the British state. 
Findings in relation to southern states differ  from  Baker’s findings in relation to 
the British state. Examining the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), a major devel-
opment project involving Mozambique and South Africa, Soderbaum and Taylor (2001) 
found that the state did act as  a  ‘transmission  belt’  for  transnational  capital with its role 
reduced to that of an investment promotion agency rather than that of a developmental 
state. This meant that the state was unable to mediate between popular groups and pri-
vate capital to tackle the negative social effects of the project:  
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An outspoken `market paradigm' rules investment decisions in the MDC project, 
with the mediating influence of the state being absent at most levels. The project 
represents   ‘part   of   a   deal   between   political   elite   and   international   capital   sup-
ported by IFIs [international financial institutions] and international donors to 
precipitate liberalisation by the state. (Soderbaum and Taylor 2001, p.687) 
 
In the Philippines, critical economic policy agencies (the Central Bank and Min-
istry of Finance) are transnationalised and are therefore more accountable to external 
bodies (i.e. World Bank, IMF and bilateral official aid agencies) than to Philippine citi-
zens. The purpose of this transationalisation, started under the Marcos regime, was to 
ensure access to foreign capital (Gershman 1997, p.88). 
The  difference  between  Baker’s  analysis  and  that  of  Soderbaum  and  Taylor  and  
Gershman further confirms the hierarchical structuring within the internationalising 
state. Clearly Britain, sitting at the heart of global financial governance as a member of 
the G7, will play a greater part in the creation, maintenance and imposition of the trans-
national consensus than countries subject to stronger external restructuring forces. It is 
important, however, not to overstate the role of external forces in relation to debtor 
countries nor to present the southern state as powerless within the internationalising 
state. Nor is it the case that all debtor countries are in the same power relationship to 
their  creditors.   In  a  study  of  the  Argentinean  government’s  negotiations with its credi-
tors 2001-2003, Cooper and Momani (2005) highlight the important role played by do-
mestic political factors. Rather than being passive in the hands of its creditors, the gov-
ernment took a proactive role in its negotiations, separating the IMF off from its private 
creditors and managing to secure a better deal with both. The government also presented 
the social unrest generated by the debt crisis which took the form of regular road block-
ages, factory occupations and popular assemblies as a threat to the stability and survival 
of the state and so managed to shift the balance between the demands of international 
capital and domestic society back towards the latter (Cooper and Momani 2005). 
A further criticism of the internationalising state particularly relevant for this re-
search is the lack of serious consideration given to resistance to the restructuring of the 
state in the interest of global capital and opportunities to pose alternatives. A common 
problem with theories offering an overly structural explanation, as does Cox, is that they 
invariable come close to determinism. Within such explanations, dominant power inevi-
tably dominates while resistance or counter-power   becomes   ‘other’   and   sometimes   is  
almost absent. According to Drainville (2005a, p.29), Cox poses the world economy as 
a place of absolute unilateral power, and he is  bemused  at   their  “unexplainable confi-
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dence” that hegemony will of itself beget counter-hegemony (2005a, p.29). The cursory 
approach to counter-hegemony by Neo-Gramscian thinkers is demonstrated by Gill 
(2003) who dedicates most of his book Power and Resistance in the New World Order 
to analysing dominant power. While a short  postscript  ‘The  Post  Modern  Prince’ focus-
ses on the emergence of the anti-globalisation/global social justice movements follow-
ing the Battle of Seattle, he provides limited understanding of these counter-movements. 
Holloway (2005) is also critical of the Neo Gramscian over-focus on hegemony – argu-
ing that focussing on the reproduction of dominant power through concepts like hegem-
ony, makes that reproduction seem inevitable. What is needed is a theory of the vulner-
ability of domination rather than a theory of domination. Scott (1990) goes even further, 
arguing  that  rather  than  signalling  consent  to  dominant  power,  subordinated  groups’  ap-
parent acquiescence is veiling continual, covert acts of resistance. 
Cox (2002), however, clarifies that he does not see the internationalisation of the 
state as irreversible, acknowledging that a   ‘counter-nébuleuse’   is   emerging   in  opposi-
tion to the dominance of global capital with the pressure for change coming from ‘glob-
alisation  from  below’. He posits resistance as two-pronged: firstly, using existing inter-
governmental organisations to press grievances with the UN as the most hospitable to 
oppositional voices – albeit the UN has been marginalised in relation to major economic 
issues, as referred to above – and secondly, building national civil society movements 
which are  “transnational  in  orientation” (Cox 2002, p.40). Social forces within domestic 
societies are increasingly coordinating their resistance to globalisation and elaborating 
alternative visions for the future (Cox 2002, p.33).  As  a  ‘counter-nébuleuse’  was  intro-
duced as an add-on in response to criticism, this is a very underdeveloped concept. Cox 
admits he is a better critic than advocate. His concept resonates somewhat with Po-
lanyi’s  – equally undeveloped - concept of a diffuse counter-movement against the su-
premacy of the self-regulating market (Polanyi 2001).  
3.3.3 Why the internationalising state as the framework for this research  
While civil society is deemed largely irrelevant for the interstate system in realise theo-
ry and a sought-after ally by proponents of the liberal order, counter-systemic thinkers 
see a potentially emancipatory role for civil society but fail to adequately theorise it, 
because they are overly preoccupied with explaining dominant power. The concept of 
the internationalising state, however, provides a useful framework for the structural con-
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text within which transnational civil society operates – using the more nuanced concept 
provided by Cox following the criticism received. 
Firstly, the genesis of the debt crisis sits centrally within the processes which 
gave rise to the internationalising state and is also the event which set off the restructur-
ing of southern debtor states. 
Secondly, the internationalising state provides an historically based explanation 
of the changing role of the state in relation to capital (internal and external). From this, 
key elements of the internationalisation process which faced transnational civil society 
during the period covered by this research (1976-2005) can be identified. The depoliti-
cised, neoliberal-based international consensus which developed over this period pre-
sented as  ‘common sense’  based  on  sound  technical  expertise  provide  the context within 
which transnational civil society sought to introduce counter-understandings on debt 
and to bring back ‘political  will’  to  solve  the  debt  crisis. 
Thirdly, the hierarchical structuring of the internationalising state highlights the 
need to look at the implications for civil society of the different power positions of their 
states within world order. There are a number of different relevant dimensions to the 
hierarchical structuring of states. The south/north interface within civil society becomes 
particularly relevant for debt campaigning because the debt crisis starkly reflects the 
creditor/debtor divide. There are, however, also other differences e.g. between northern 
G7 and non-G7 countries. 
Fourthly, the interactive nature of the state/international interface enables a dy-
namic examination of the geography of power, how transnational civil society operates 
across the national and international interface rather than confining civil society mainly 
to state-level action as in a state-centric view or presenting civil society as part of global 
governance from a liberal view. The limitation of a cosmopolitan perspective for this 
research is that its focus has been on the political domain, on limiting abuses of political 
power with little attention to regulation of economic power or market mechanisms 
(Held 2002, p.317).  
While providing an overly structural explanation of the state/international arena 
with little explicit attention to counter-power, Cox (2002) makes clear that the interna-
tionalising state is not a done deal, allowing room for struggle against the forces of ne-
oliberal globalisation. This provides an opening to consider how transnational civil so-
ciety groups interact with and impact upon the structural context of world order, rather 
than being simply shaped or constrained by this. 
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Having established the rationale for selecting the internationalising state as the 
world order framework for this study, the next sections operationalises this concept in 
relation to debt, and highlights the implications for transnational civil society.  
3.4  Operationalising  the  ‘debt  nébuleuse’ 
International policy on debt is developed through the ‘nébuleuse’ consensus making 
processes as outlined above. This section identifies those parts of the nébuleuse which 
are relevant for the making and implementation of debt policy – the  term  ‘debt  nébule-
use’  will  be  used  to  describe  this  ensemble  of  institutions.  It  then  highlights  the  hierar-
chical relations within and between these institutions and considers the implications for 
transnational civil society power. Finally, there is a brief examination of the processes 
through which transnational civil society can engage with the debt nébuleuse – whether 
through direct interaction with the relevant international institutions or through engag-
ing with states. The overall purpose is to set the structural backdrop for the application 
of the analytical framework set out at the end of Chapter 2.  
 
Hierarchically structured institutions of the debt nébuleuse 
 
In terms of debt, there are four main bodies which make up the debt nébuleuse, the in-
ternational fora within which decisions on debt are taken. These are the G7 central to 
global financial governance, the Paris Club of bilateral creditors and the IMF and World 
Bank both inter-governmental bodies with membership covering virtually all nation 
states. The London Club of commercial creditors figured less centrally particularly 
when the focus shifted from commercial to official debt from the start of the 1990s. A 
striking feature of the institutions of  the  ‘debt  nébuleuse’ is that while two are formally 
constituted organisations (IMF and World Bank), the other two (G7 and Paris Club) are 
informal fora with no real, formal organisational existence. According to Baker (2008, 
p.103) referring to the G7: 
 
[B]y no conventional measure or definition is the G7  process’  an  institution.   It  
has no official legal status, no permanent home base and no secretariat.  
 
Examining the Paris Club, Callaghy (2002, p. 14) makes a parallel point:  
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The Paris Club has been one of the most powerful international organisations 
operating over the last several decades, directly affecting the lives of millions of 
people, although technically it does not exist.  
 
The creditor/debtor country divide operates differently across these four institutions. 
Creditors and debtors are all members of both the IMF and World Bank but a state’s  
power within these institutions varies in relation to the size of its economy. Membership 
of the Paris Club is open only to creditor governments; and the G7 is limited to the most 
powerful states (with Russia included from 1998 it becomes the G8). While dealing 
with different types of debt, bilateral (Paris Club) and multilateral (IMF and World 
Bank), the four institutions are interlinked. Firstly, as intergovernmental organisations 
they have overlapping membership with G7 countries belonging to all four fora. Sec-
ondly as they all participate in the transnational consensus formation process on debt, 
they reinforce each other in ensuring its implementation. To receive bilateral debt re-
scheduling from the Paris Club, for example, a debtor government must have a pro-
gramme agreed first with the IMF.  
The next section sets out how these different bodies operate and the implications 
for civil society groups.  
The G7 has played a major part in determining international debt policy over 
three decades, influencing policies adopted by the IMF and World Bank and also the 
Paris Club. As outlined above it is an informal discourse, not an implementation forum 
– it sets the parameters for financial and economic policies and initiatives and then 
seeks to influence other bodies to integrate these into their practice. As the dominant 
body within the debt nébuleuse it exercises direct power at the IMF and World Bank, 
where it holds the power of veto over proposals to which G7 members are collectively 
opposed (Baker 2008). All the major debt deals in relation to bilateral debt, while initi-
ated by different states, emanated from the G7 and were subsequently adopted by the 
Paris Club. These deals were: the Toronto Terms 1988, London Terms 1991, Naples 
Terms 1994, and Lyon Terms 1996. The broader agreements covering multilateral and 
bilateral debt were also initiated at the G7: the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative 
(HIPC) in 1996, Enhanced HIPC1999 and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative in 2005 
with the IMF and World Bank taking the lead on implementation. The IMF and G7 are 
particularly entwined, with the IMF Managing Director attending G7 meetings and a 
significant number of senior G7 deputies having previously worked as national Execu-
tive Directors at the IMF (Baker 2006, pp.111-112). The links between the G7, IMF and 
World Bank are drawn tighter by the fact that the Executive Directors for the G7 gov-
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ernments which serve on the IMF and World Bank boards are directly answerable to 
their national G7 deputies (Baker 2008, p.105). 
The G7 represents a virtual fusion of the national and international. As an in-
formal body there are no formal processes for most civil society groups to engage with 
the G7 – other than weakly through G7 embassies in their countries (Baker 2006). Civil 
society groups from G7 countries, however, have privileged access. By operating na-
tionally, civil society in G7 countries also operates as transnational civil society as the 
national and international are virtually fused for them. Engagement with the G7 has 
therefore been led by civil society from G7 countries, starting with the counter-summits 
organised to parallel G7 summits from the 1980s (see Chapter 5). Nor has the G7 shown 
much interest over the years in opening up to civil society - the first G7 mention of 
NGOs was in their 1995 Communiqué, a limited technical reference to improving coor-
dination between donors, international organisations, bilateral donors and NGOs. The 
first official dialogue between civil society and the G7 was at the 1998 Birmingham 
summit, when a special document was produced on the debt issue as 70,000 debt cam-
paigners congregated in the centre of Birmingham (Hajnal 2007). 
The Paris Club, founded in 1956 with a secretariat based in the French Treasury, 
is the least well-known of the bodies of the debt nébuleuse. It is an informal group of 
creditor countries which has no permanent members, no formal rules or statutes, and 
agreed minutes of meetings that are neither published nor legally binding (Brown and 
Bulman 2002). It functions under the principles of consensus and burden sharing and 
has links to the other bodies within the debt nébuleuse. In addition to representatives of 
the debtor country and its creditors, participants at Paris Club meetings include the IMF, 
which has an advisory but no decision making role. Other intergovernmental organisa-
tions attend as observers – OECD, World Bank, regional development banks and 
UNCTAD, which provides assistance to debtor countries at the Paris Club (UNCTAD 
no date). Power relations are very stark. Negotiations which take place at the offices of 
the  French  Treasury  take  the  form  of  ‘proximity  talks’, with the collective creditors and 
single debtor operating from separate spaces and the French Treasury representative act-
ing as a mediator between them (Vilanova and Martin 2001). The creditors act as judge 
in their own case, with a minimal role for debtor countries, who can only either accept 
or decline the offer from the creditors (Eurodad et al no date). Finally, as pointed out 
above, the framework for the deals implemented by the Paris Club are set out at G7 
meetings. 
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As an informal group based in the French Treasury, from an organisational point 
of view, the Paris Club is virtually part of the French state. This has given France a 
sense of ownership of this institution. According to Callaghy (2002, p.13), the French 
fought hard to protect the Paris Club in the battles over HIPC which resulted in a shift in 
the centre of gravity of the international debt regime from Paris to Washington, with the 
IMF and World Bank taking leadership. As a very secretive body with no formal proce-
dures, there are no discursive entry points to the Paris Club for civil society groups. As 
a creditor country forum, only civil society groups from these countries have a possible 
entry point through their national delegates. Given the key role of the French Treasury, 
however, French NGOs became an intermediary between the secretariat of the Paris 
Club and civil society groups from other countries in the early 2000s. 
In contrast to the G7 and Paris Club, the IMF and World Bank are the only for-
mal institutions within the core organisations of the debt nébuleuse. There are a number 
of multilateral regional banks in addition to the World Bank, which also lend to south-
ern governments, e.g. the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and 
the Inter-American Development Bank. For the purposes of this research, however, the 
focus is on the World Bank, as the highest profile and dominant development bank. The 
IMF and World Bank operate through similar governance structures, and therefore the 
focus here is on the IMF to illustrate the situation in relation to both institutions. The 
IMF Board of Governors is made up of the Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Gov-
ernors of all member countries. Voting is based on the size of a  country’s  economy so 
that power in the organisation is distributed according to  ‘shareholdings’.  An  argument  
given for this is to ensure that powerful states are strongly represented and play a key 
role so that the IMF is effective in world affairs (Woods 2000, p.828). Voting, in fact, 
rarely happens, as the IMF operates through consensus decision making, but a running 
tally of votes is kept on decisions under discussion to enable the chair to assess the 
‘sense  of  meeting’  (Woods  2000). Day-to-day running of the organisations is carried out 
by 24 Executive Directors (IMF 2013).  Eight states have their own Executive Director 
at the IMF – the US, Germany, France, Japan, UK, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia (IMF 
2013) - with the other 16 seats divided between the remaining 179 members, organised 
in constituencies, with Executive Directors elected by those constituencies biannually. 
The G7 together hold over 40% of the vote whereas Sub-Saharan African countries, 
which make up a quarter of IMF membership, collectively hold just over 4% of the vote 
(Woods 2008, p.1). Countries are represented at Executive Board level by nominees 
from their departments of finance and central banks. 
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The different power positions of countries within the IMF have strong implica-
tions for civil society groups. Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, is virtually disenfran-
chised given that their collective vote is so low. The Canadian-led constituency which 
includes Ireland and ten Caribbean countries illustrates another facet of the complexity 
of the national/international linkages within this system of governance. As Canada 
holds over 60% of the constituency’s   votes,   it   holds   the   Executive Director position 
permanently. Canadian Executive Directors have not usually consulted with countries 
from the Caribbean and Ireland in formulating their statements to the Executive Boards 
(Momani 2010b). There are therefore very different levels of access to these institutions 
through states for civil society, with some groups virtually disenfranchised, although 
formally being represented, while civil society in countries which have their own execu-
tive directors or where the country holds a strong position within a constituency have 
greater access. The IMF and World Bank are the only bodies within the debt nébuleuse 
which engage significantly with civil society – highlighting the differential access to 
formal and informal bodies within the consensus formation process. 
Based on this outline of the hierarchical structuring of the debt nébuleuse, civil 
society can be divided into four groupings in relation to their degree of access to the in-
stitutions of the debt nébuleuse. There are civil society groups in G7 countries and 
groups in non-G7 creditor countries but with significant intermediary power in that they 
have access to the Paris Club through their country representative and their country 
holds the Executive Director position at the IMF and World Bank. There are also groups 
in creditor countries more weakly positioned within the internationalising state which 
do not have their own Executive Director at the IMF and World Bank. Finally, there are 
groups in debtor countries which have no direct access to the G7 or Paris Club and 
where their country has a very limited or virtually no voice at the IMF and World Bank. 
In the next section opportunities for direct engagement with the IMF and World 
Bank is explored. 
 
Engagement with/challenging the debt nébuleuse 
 
Having set out the institutions of the debt nébuleuse, the power relations within and be-
tween them and how this segments civil society, this section examines the channels of 
engagement available to civil society within the debt nébuleuse. Given the interactive 
nature of the relationship between states and the transnational arena, where within this 
process does civil society seek to engage – to what extent with international institutions, 
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to what extent through states – and do different sections of transnational civil society 
operate differently in relation to this question. The following section first sets out the 
opportunities to engage internationally with the debt nébuleuse and then looks at under-
standings of the state and civil society engagement.  
 
Transnational engagement in the debt nébuleuse  
 
Turning first to consensus formation within the internationalising state, there are a num-
ber of threads to the relationship of civil society to this process. International bodies 
have been keen to promote certain kinds of civil society involvement. In addition to in-
creasing their support to NGOs significantly during the 1980s particularly to support 
project implementation, the UN, World Bank and bilateral donors have pressed southern 
governments to engage with NGOS   as   ‘development   partners’   from   the   early   1990s  
(Brautigam and Segarra 2007, Reimann 2006). This reflects the significant leverage do-
nors have because of the support they provide. Involvement of civil society became in-
stitutionalised at national level in 1999 through Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Coun-
try conditionality. The interest of international and bilateral bodies within these initia-
tives has been to promote engagement between civil society and national governments. 
As regards opportunities to engage at international level, links between civil so-
ciety and the World Bank go back to the 1970s, when some limited operational collabo-
ration took place (Covey 1998). This became more formalised with the establishment of 
the NGO World Bank – NGO Working Group in 1981 to enable dialogue and collabo-
ration between the World Bank and NGOs. Originally the committee involved NGO 
members from Europe, North America and Japan, but subsequently representatives 
from Africa, Asia and Latin America were included, and over time the remit extended to 
include policy discussions. Collaboration was made more formal with the adoption of a 
World Bank directive in 1989 instructing staff to involve NGOs in projects (Covey 
1998). As regards the IMF, there was little engagement with civil society up to the 
1980s, when the explosion of the debt crisis and the introduction of structural adjust-
ment  programmes  led  to  ‘IMF  riots’  across  Latin  America  and  Africa  (see  Chapter  5). 
The IMF was under severe international pressure during the mobilisations against the 
IMF/World Bank AGM in Berlin in 1988, and the following year the IMF set up a pub-
lic affairs department with a remit to engage with civil society (Scholte 2002a, p.37). 
The most institutionalised engagement between the IMF, World Bank and trans-
national civil society takes place  at  the  institutions’  Spring  and  Annual  meetings when 
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the IMF and World Bank jointly organise a Civil Society Forum covering a range of 
issues with some events jointly organised with civil society groups. Contact between 
civil society groups and the IMF and World Bank do not take place totally independent-
ly of governments, however. As these bodies are inter-governmental organisations, for-
mally their main relationships are with governments. The World Bank points out that, 
while it has extensive contact with civil society organisations, its “member governments 
remain  the  institution’s  owners,  clients  and  decision  makers,  and  its  ultimate  accounta-
bility is to these shareholders” (World Bank 2005, p.ix). Similarly for the IMF, contacts 
with civil society organisations must not go so far “that they interfere with the IMF's 
primary relationship with the national government” (IMF 2003, p.6). The IMF advises 
its employees engaging with civil society:  
 
If a government raises objections to IMF- civil society relations, explain the ra-
tionale in terms of the aims identified above. If government resistance persists, 
refrain from the contacts and refer the matter to headquarters for possible fol-
low-up. (IMF 2003, p.3) 
 
As regards attendance at IMF/World Bank fora, civil society participants must get ac-
creditation from the IMF and World Bank and all requests for accreditation are first 
cleared with the relevant Executive  Director’s  office (World Bank 2012). 
IMF/World Bank motivations to engage with civil society are a mixture of seek-
ing to convince civil society of the validity of the dominant consensus they are promot-
ing, improving their projects (in the case of the World Bank) and defending themselves 
against criticism and threats to their funding. Given its major project portfolio in addi-
tion to its role in policy, the World Bank engages NGOs in order to improve its perfor-
mance in addition to defensive reasons (Kelly 2005; Nelson 2000a). The  World  Bank’s  
own rationale for engagement is that: 
 
Civic  engagement  is  now  an  integral  piece  of  the  Bank’s  strategy  to  strengthen  
the investment climate and promote empowerment in developing countries, and 
is  part  of  the  Bank’s business model. (World Bank 2005, p ix)  
 
The IMF whose role is solely a policy one, engages with civil society in order to 
try to build consensus for its neoliberal restructuring policies and to improve the chanc-
es of implementation (Thirkell-White 2004; O’Brien  et  al. 2000). But the fault-line in 
the   IMF  approach   is   that   the  organisation   is  a  central  plank   in   the   transnational   ‘tech-
nical’  consensus  based  on  sound money and open markets. If this consensus is not open 
to political challenge, with debate limited to technical issues, this leaves little room for 
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civil society to contribute to reshaping the dominant consensus (Thirkell-White 2004). 
The limitation of the IMF approach is illustrated by the difficulty that IMF resident rep-
resentatives have in envisaging   that   farmers   or   women’s   organisations   could   provide  
relevant input for their macroeconomic policies (Scholte 2012, p.194). 
Given the major legitimacy deficit of both organisations, they are vulnerable to 
national and transnational civil society pressure. Particularly worrying for the IMF and 
World Bank is the possibility that transnational civil society might lobby their govern-
ments to withhold funding (Kelly 2005, Scholte 2002a, O’Brien  et  al  2000). US NGOs 
in particular have lobbied the US Congress to either not provide funding or to attach 
conditions to funding. In 1992 US NGOs opposed the proposed US $18 billion contri-
bution to the tenth replenishment of IDA, the concessional lending wing of the World 
Bank which lends to low-income countries. It is funded by donor countries and is re-
plenished every three years. Civil society opposition to IDA was motivated by World 
Bank involvement in funding the controversial Sardar Sarovar dams in India with their 
huge displacement of peoples and heavy environmental impacts (Udall 1998). Pressure 
from US NGOs and the US Congress pushed the World Bank to create an independent 
Inspection Panel (Woods 2000). There were, however, concerns at this campaign from 
some southern NGOs and INGOs because of the importance of IDA funding for Sub-
Saharan African countries (Covey 1998; Udall 1998). In 1980, 1983, 1989, 1991-92, 
1994 and 1997-98 US NGOs lobbied “with considerable effect to delay and/or qualify 
congressional support for increased US funding to the IMF” (Scholte 2002a, p.38). On 
a smaller scale, a civil society coalition in Ireland with parliamentary support success-
fully  pressed  the  Irish  government  to  withhold  its  contribution  to  the  IMF’s  programme 
in low- income countries (ESAF) from 1995 to 1999 (Irish Mozambique Solidarity et al 
1997). 
IMF and World Bank motivation for engaging is likely to influence which parts 
of transnational civil society they target. To defend against possible threats to their 
funding, their focus is likely to be on northern civil society, while if the priority is to 
improve  their  organisations’ policies/performance, the focus will have a stronger south-
ern civil society involvement. Overall evidence is that northern groups dominate the 
IMF/World Bank interactions with civil society. Participants in the major formal 
IMF/World Bank forum with civil society at the spring and autumn meetings are mainly 
from the north (Scholte 2012, Kelly 2003). A bias towards engaging with northern civil 
society groups operating in or with members in southern countries has also been noted. 
Seeking discussions with civil society on structural adjustment in Honduras the World 
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Bank approached a number of INGOs, and the meetings were often held in English. 
Later local civil society groups were included in discussions (Interviewee INGO Central 
America). A detailed study of IMF/ civil society relations in six African countries, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria and Uganda, 
found that most   of   IMF   resident   representatives’   limited   contact with civil society 
groups was with local branches of northern-based organisations rather than with indige-
nous associations. Given its role in global financial governance which is closely allied 
to private financial sector interests as outlined above, it is  not  surprising  that  the  IMF’s  
closest links were with associations linked to the financial sector, such as the Congolese 
Association of Banks, the Bankers Association of Malawi, and the Financial Markets 
Dealers Association in Nigeria.Overall the study concluded that relationships reflected 
the same broad hierarchies of access and influence which can be found across world 
politics generally – north/south, rural/urban, class, gender and cultural divides (Scholte 
2012). As with interaction within the debt nébuleuse, interaction between the IMF and 
World Bank and civil society is hierarchically structured.  
 
Engaging with the state 
  
Engagement within states in order to win power, seize power or pressure states to 
change their approaches has been central to civil society activity since the emergence of 
the nation-state (Tarrow 1998). In the context of the changing relationship between the 
state and the international arena on which the internationalising state is based, the ques-
tion arises, to what extent is the state still a useful site for struggle. To what extent can 
civil society groups’ impact on international debt policies by engaging directly with rel-
evant officials and ministers including the country representatives to debt nébuleuse 
bodies, or by lobbying parliaments. Or given the role played by institutions of the debt 
nébuleuse in creating and promoting international policy consensus, can transnational 
civil society engage more effectively at international rather than state level. It is, of 
course, not necessarily an either/or option but it is important to identify how, when and 
for what reasons do transnational civil society groups engage at either level. 
Within the complexity of the relationship between states and the international 
arena, a number of different approaches to the significance of the state in terms of chal-
lenging international policy in a globalising world can be identified. There are those 
which argue that the state is still a significant player and therefore a worthy site for 
struggle (Bond 2006; Bendaña 2005; Bello 2002). Others take this further and argue 
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that the state can be rearticulated as an ally to rebalance the relationship between global 
capital and states (Gills 2000). An opposing position is that the state should be by-
passed, either because the space for action at national level has become so limited or 
because   the   state’s   role   supporting   capitalist   forces   weakens   its   ability   to   respond   to  
domestic demands to counter the transnational consensus (Evans 2008; Cox 2006; Hol-
loway 2005). 
As was set out above, that the state is a significant player in world order is key 
to both a state-centric view of world order and to the concept of the internationalising 
state. Gills (2000) argues for a new coalition of social forces working together and 
where possible through governments pressing for social change. An aim of this coalition 
is to rearticulate the state towards resistance to neoliberal globalisation. For Falk (1998) 
, while globalisation is a done deal and cannot be reversed, the state remains the critical 
focus of the struggle for the democratisation of globalisation. The aim of globalisation-
from-below (those resisting the adverse effects of globalisation) is to reorient the state 
in terms of how it mediates between the logic of capital and the priorities of its peoples. 
At global level, coalitions may develop between states and social movements e.g. in re-
lation to human rights, the environment with different potential coalitions involving dif-
ferent governments depending on the issue area. 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) highlight that sovereignty and structural inequality are 
closely linked for southern civil society groups and as a result, defence of sovereignty is 
an important part of resistance. It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of southern 
thinkers emphasise the importance of the state. Bello (2002) calls for ‘deglobalisation’,  
to re-empower the local and national within a pluralist global economic governance. 
Bond argues against civil society involvement in promoting global targets like the 
MDGs highlighting the importance instead of struggles which make demands on the 
state  to  “lock down capitalism” (2006, p.352). For Bendaña (2005), it is difficult to con-
ceive of a viable alternative to the current development path without a recapture of the 
state (participative rather than vanguardist) and the defence of “key state development 
instruments that globalisers wish to negotiate away” (2005, p.68). 
There are a wide range of thinkers who claim that the space for contestation at 
national level has shrunk with the shift of power away from the state, and the struggle 
therefore moves to the international arena (Evans 2008; Cox 2006; Drainville 2005a; 
Robinson 1999). Rather than seek to restore the nationalist developmental state, Evans 
(2008) argues for the construction of a counter-hegemonic globalisation which would 
prioritise democratic political control, equitable human and environmental stewardship. 
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Cox also sees an activist focus on the state as ineffective, since the ability of the state to 
maintain popular consent has declined as a result of the closing of national policy space 
by neoliberalism. This has resulted in a “declining credibility of political strategies 
which   aim   to   work  within   ‘the   system’   or   to   capture   that   system intact” (Cox 2006, 
p.221). He sees the involvement of particular groups (e.g. community activists) with the 
state as a major difficulty in creating broader alliances with the anti-globalisation/global 
justice movement. Holloway is also a strong proponent that resistance should bypass the 
state arguing that as the state is situated within a set of social relations based within the 
capitalist mode of production, engagement with the state pushes activists towards rec-
onciliation with capital. For Holloway, the alternative is the drive to self-determination 
(communism) – and the struggle for self-determination and the struggle within the state 
cannot coexist: “engagement of the state is never innocent of consequences” (Holloway 
2005, p.235). Recognising, however, that current movements combine those who seek 
state power with those who reject the state as a form of organisation, he concludes that 
“movements for radical change will be and should be, a dissonant mixture of positions 
and forms of organisation” (Holloway 2005, p236).  
3.5 Conclusion  
Following an examination of the internationalising state – including its weaknesses – 
the chapter shifted to an operationalisation of the concept in relation to debt. The institu-
tions of the debt nébuleuse were identified and the power relations within and between 
them were highlighted. Four different sets of states were identified defined by these 
power differences: G7 countries; non-G7 creditor countries with significant power in 
the debt nébuleuse; non-G7 creditor countries weakly positioned within the debt 
nébuleuse; and debtor countries. Transnational civil society is also hierarchically struc-
tured by these power differences and these categories provide the basis for distinguish-
ing between campaign groups in different countries. Finally, consideration was given to 
what factors might pull groups towards engagement at the international and those which 
might privilege national level engagement to set the scene for the case study chapters. 
To apply the concept of the internationalising state in the case study chapters 
three questions are relevant: (i) what are the key relevant dimensions of the internation-
alising state; (ii) how did the internationalising state change over the case study period; 
(iii) how will the framework identified in the previous chapter to analyse the power of 
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transnational civil society interact with the understandings of the internationalising state 
provided in this chapter?  
First, the following are the key relevant dimensions of the internationalising 
state: 
a) the changing social basis of the state, so that influence moves from do-
mestically oriented to externally oriented forces; 
b) the non-transparent, consensus-making fora in which international policy 
is developed vis-à-vis representative democratic processes at national level;  
c) the dominance of technical knowledge over political or normative ideas; 
the dominance of technocrats over democratically accountable agents within the 
process in which mainstream understandings are maintained;  
d) the hierarchical structuring of the internationalising state. 
 
Second, the following is a summary of the relevant changes in world order over 
the three case study periods. The debt crisis emerged towards the end of the 1970s as 
liberalism became disembedded, with the increasing internationalisation of production 
and the liberalisation of financial markets. The move towards the end of the dual world 
economy was also underway. The period from 1991 to 1996 coincided with the triumph 
of neoliberalism and the move to a unipolar world economy with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, and a sharp reduction of the space for consideration of alternative economic and 
social frameworks. From the mid-1990s, a multiplicity of cracks appeared in dominant 
neoliberalism from within the system (financial crises) and from outside the system 
(challenges from  social movements and civil society groups). 
Third, while the two theory chapters separated agency and structure in order to 
achieve maximum clarity on both dimension, in the next chapter on methodology, the 
framework which was drawn up at the end of Chapter 2 is brought together with the 
outcome of this chapter. 
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Chapter Four: Researching Debt Movements  
 
This chapter describes how the research was carried out, including the design, the ra-
tionale behind this and how this was implemented. The research was designed as a qual-
itative study of the nature of transnational civil society power when they seek to change 
international policy and how this power is exercised using transnational debt move-
ments as a case study. In applying the concept of power to the relationship between 
transnational civil society and dominant power within world order, the research draws 
on three sets of literature – that on power, social movements and international political 
economy. The concept of power used is taken from Lukes (2005), who defines power as 
a potential to make a change in the world or to maintain the status quo. An analytic 
framework was developed from the social movement and IPE literatures and provides 
the operational basis for the study to answer a) how power as potential was leveraged by 
transnational civil society by making common cause on debt cancellation; b) how the 
power of this common cause was leveraged through knowledge, geography (operating 
across the national/transnational interface) and different modes of engagement with the 
state/internationalising state which may be consensual or conflictual. The study focuses 
on three periods of debt campaigning, with each period marked by different approaches 
by transnational civil society against a background of changing world order (1976 – 
1990; 1991 – 1996; 1997 – 2005). The geographic scope is wide, as campaigning took 
place across the world over the course of its history – although the actual geographic 
spread varied at different periods. The research was designed to provide a broad spread 
of campaigning between northern and southern campaigns. Data was collected through 
documentary research – primary and secondary – media searches and interviews with 
key informants. Given the nature of the study, with the questions being asked about 
power, a relatively long historical period covered and wide geographic span, qualitative 
methods were used. Data were collected through a number of methods and analysed 
within the parameter of the analytic framework developed for the study. Interpretation 
was based on themes which were drawn from the data during analysis.  
The chapter is structured as follows: after a brief overview of the research, the 
theoretical background is set out. The scope of the study in terms of the historical and 
geographic spans is then defined. This is followed by reflection on the research design 
and finally an outline of how the data was collected, analysed and interpreted. As this 
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was an exploratory study the data collection and analysis processes are set out in some 
detail.  
4.1 Theoretical framework of the study 
This research is a study of the debt movements from the start of the debt crisis towards 
the end of the 1970s to 2005. It examines the question: what is the basis of the power of 
transnational civil society, and how do they exercise this power when seeking to change 
international policy on debt issues?  
Based on the literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, the following framework 
to analyse the power of debt movements was developed. This thesis adopts a basic con-
cept of power as potential : “power is being able to make or to receive any change, or to 
resist  it” (Lukes 2005, p.69).  Considering how power relations operate between trans-
national civil society and dominant power, IPE with its engagement across the political 
and the economic spheres provided insights into the structural backdrop of transnational 
civil society activism. From this literature the concept of the internationalising state 
(Cox 1987) was drawn as a framework to examine the national/international interface—
referred to as the geography of power in this study. IPE, however, with its emphasis on 
dominant power is weak in relation to civil society actors. As pointed out by Broome 
(2009, p.60), IPE scholars “have failed to move beyond conventional understandings of 
who is able to act in the global political economy and, more importantly, whose actions 
matter  and  how.” Even the Neo-Gramscian school, within which the concept of the in-
ternationalising state was developed, privileges dominant power in spite of their empha-
sis on the need for transformation (Drainville 2005a). Social movement theory and con-
structivism provide insights into how social movements operate (e.g.   through  ‘persua-
sion’,  framing,  leveraging political opportunities and allies), and there have been limited 
attempts to provide anti-systemic explanations through the application of Polanyi’s  
double  movement  and  Gramsci’s  counter-hegemony to the anti-globalisation/global so-
cial justice movements. From these literatures the following analytical framework was 
devised bringing together insights from Chapters 2 and 3.  
Firstly, power is the potential to make a change in the world or to maintain the 
status quo. (Lukes 2005).  Secondly, this potential was operationalised by debt move-
ments making common cause among a range of social groupings nationally and transna-
tionally. Thirdly, debt movements sought to exercise this power through three dimen-
sions: knowledge; geography; and particular modes of engagement.  
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Actualising power as potential: how did transnational civil society make common cause 
on the causes, solutions to the debt crisis and on how they would work together to tackle 
the crisis? To what extent did the inequalities within the internationalising state affect 
the development and maintenance of common cause by transnational civil society, in 
particular in terms of the south/north relationship?  
 
Exercising power 
Knowledge: to what extent was the debt issue situated within the limits of current 
‘commonsense’ and to what extent was it situated as part of a broader challenge to the 
inequalities of the global system? To what extent were debt campaigners drawn into the 
technical approach of the debt nébuleuse? 
Geography: to what extent did debt campaigns focus on national- or international-level 
decision making processes, and what was the relationship between action at these two 
levels; and is this decision by civil society groups affected by the power position of their 
country within the internationalising state? 
Modes of Engagement: to what extent did debt campaigns use consensual or adversarial 
methods; what was the nature of the relationship with the state/internationalising state 
which ensued; and what was the level of challenge posed by debt movements to the sys-
tem? How did debt campaigns engage with the consensus-making internationalising 
state fora? 
 
Changing World Order 
How did debt campaigning change over the three case study periods and, to what extent 
can this be attributed to a changing world order?  
 
Dominance Dominates 
An issue for studies of civil society power is the disproportionate focus in the literature 
on dominant power – even among theorists who wish to see people emancipated from 
that dominance, such as Lukes (2005), Foucault (1980, 2009), Gill (1989,1998, 2003) 
and Cox (1987, 1992, 2002). Since dominance dominates, dominant power sits centre 
stage, with resistance or counter-power  treated  as  “other”.  Without deliberate efforts to 
rebalance these imbalances within theories of power, there is a danger of a magnetic 
pull towards explanations from the perspective of dominant power, e.g. that transna-
tional civil society is part of global governance, is being created by the new technolo-
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gies of power of governmentality (Sending and Neumann 2006; Burchell et al 1991). 
Given the imbalance in terms of historical material available on NGOs/civil society 
groups vis-à-vis dominant bodies such as the World Bank or the G7, there is inevitably 
a bias in terms of whose perspective provides the dominant explanation of the interac-
tion between transnational civil society and dominant power bodies.  Scott (1990), 
whose  analysis  is  based  on  a  close  study  of  ‘the  weapons  of  the  weak’, contests the con-
cept of hegemony, that is, that subordinate groups comply because their consent has 
been won by the leading class. He argues that their compliance should be understood as 
a tactical/strategic response rather than as consent. But dominant power understandings 
prevail  because  of  what  Scott  calls  ‘infra  politics’  consisting  of  public  and  hidden  tran-
scripts. Public transcripts contain the views of the dominant actors from which history is 
written, while hidden transcripts consist of what subordinate actors express outside the 
realm of the public transcript.  While transnational civil society cannot be equated with 
subordinate groups as described by Scott, and they carry out their contestation in the 
public arena, because this contestation is often of the moment and adequate records are 
not kept, history is likely to be written predominantly from public transcripts of domi-
nant bodies.  
While explanations of transnational civil society coming from the perspective of 
dominant power are not invalid, it is important that some researchers try to stand outside 
of dominant power so that understanding can be built through a process of engaging 
perspectives from outside and inside dominant power. The approach I take in this study 
is to try to maximise the difference between dominant power and its resistances, not be-
cause I think power is a system of binary opposites, but as a device to throw greater 
light on resistance to dominant power which is the focus of this research.  
4.2 History and geography of debt movements  
This is a case study of one transnational campaign, but one which contains a significant 
amount of variation. Transnational civil society action on debt can be traced back to the 
late 1970s (Donnelly 2002). Over three decades (1976 – 2005) debt campaigning ebbed 
and flowed against a backdrop of changing world order. This made it possible to identi-
fy different periods of campaigning with different approaches by debt campaigners 
which can be set within the context of this changing world order. The following three 
periods provide the historical framework for the study.  
 86 
Period 1: from 1976 to 1990: when transnational civil society was trying to create itself 
as a transnational debt movement and struggled to understand the complexity of the 
debt issue while embedded liberalism was going through its death throes and neoliberal-
ism was on the rise. The year 1976 was chosen as a start date as this marked the first 
protests in Peru in response to their debt crisis, and 1990 was chosen as the end of the 
first period, as it marked the end of the bipolar world with the fall of communism, but 
also because the Brady Bond initiative to tackle Latin American debt was introduced in 
1989, and this contributed to a lull in debt campaigning, followed by a shift of emphasis 
from Latin American debt to Sub-Saharan African and other low-income country debt 
from the early 1990s. 
Period 2: 1991 – 1996: this covered the first period of concerted, coordinated civil soci-
ety campaigning on debt against the backdrop of the triumphant neoliberal counter-
revolution, with its central belief that there was no alternative world order. In this con-
text there was a shift in civil society campaigning to greater coordination and greater 
engagement with the state/internationalising state. This period ends with the introduc-
tion of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative. 
Period 3: 1997 – 2005: this period covered the Jubilee 2000 campaign. While Jubilee 
2000 was planned to end in 2000 by the British group which initiated the campaign, 
campaigning continued beyond the millennium and flowed over into the Make Poverty 
History/Global Call to Action against Poverty (2004/5). By the time Jubilee 2000 
emerged, cracks and fissures had appeared in the neoliberal uni-polar economic vision 
as described in Chapter 1. Against this backdrop Jubilee 2000 operated more as a trans-
national social movement than was the case for debt campaigning in the previous peri-
od, which resembled a transnational advocacy network.. 
As a set of (at a moment in time) or a series of (across time) national and region-
al and transnational groupings, questions of the geography of debt campaigning were 
central to the research design. The campaign geography varied over time, for example, 
during the first case study period the focus was largely, although not exclusively, on 
Latin America and the Philippines. In the second period 1990-1996 Sub-Saharan Africa 
became the dominant focus and this affected which debtor country civil society groups 
were involved in campaigning. With the broad framing of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, 
the geographic spread extended across the globe. While transnational civil society is 
often treated in the literature as a unitary agent, it has, in fact, a complex geography 
generally consisting of a range of groupings – national coalitions, regional networks and 
INGOs - which continually and simultaneously aggregate into transnational formations 
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and disaggregate back into their national and regional level operation. This study is 
based on the second view of transnational civil society and seeks to decentre debt cam-
paigning within its complex geography, and the challenge was to capture a sample of 
that geographic spread within the resource constraints which obviously applied. Within 
this   ‘decentring’  approach   the   transnational  dimension  of  campaigning  becomes  prob-
lematised, enabling an exploration of what is the particular transnational dimension of 
transnational campaigning beyond an aggregate of national level actions. The aim is to 
throw light on how transnational civil society groups operate across the nation-
al/transnational interface.  
4.3 Reflections on study design  
The study was designed as a single case study of debt movements using qualitative 
methods. This raises a number of issues which need to be clarified. These relate to sin-
gle case studies and qualitative methods more generally and also to the fact that I was an 
insider researcher. The aim of this section is to clarify my position on these issues and 
how this influenced the research design.  
Recognising that single case studies are criticised for failing to provide a basis 
for comparison, I first considered studying three examples of transnational civil society  
campaigns. For a number of reasons, I decided to focus on the debt movements rather 
than to do a comparative study. Firstly, it was difficult to identify appropriate compara-
ble campaigns to the debt campaign; i.e. ones which dealt with economic justice issues. 
While transnational debt movements can be traced back to the late 1970s (Donnelly 
2002), transnational campaigns on other parallel issues are relatively new. For instance, 
ATTAC was set up in 1998; the tax justice movement was set up in 2003 (Tax Justice 
Network, no date); the campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment ran 
between 1996 and 1998 (Global Non-Violent Action Database no date); and the Boycott 
World Bank Bonds campaign was set up in 2000 (Jubilee USA, no date). While there 
has been civil society action on trade, aid and environmental issues for many decades, it 
proved difficult to identify a transnational activity which could parallel the debt cam-
paign. On trade there were strong campaigns against NAFTA and FTAA, but these were 
regional campaigns of the Americas. The International Trade Union Confederation 
campaign for the integration of labour standards into WTO agreements started after the 
establishment of that organisation in 1995. Gerring (2004), however, points out that a 
case study never represents only one case, as there is always variation over time or 
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space – or both - within what may appear to be a single case, and this provides the basis 
for comparison. In this context I decided that given the history and geography of the 
debt movements as set out above, this provided enough variation for comparative pur-
poses. Variation existed between different time periods (e.g. pre and post the end of a 
uni-polar economic world order) and also across different geographic spaces as debt 
campaigns operated from Sweden to South Africa. Further variation could be identified 
between campaigns in countries with different power positions within the international-
ising state: e.g. those in debtor and creditor countries; those in G7 countries; and those 
in non-G7 countries. The value of a single case study over time was that this would en-
able an in-depth exploration of what is a relatively new format – transnational civil so-
ciety campaigning on international financial issues. As the study was particularly fo-
cussed on ‘how’  questions i.e. aiming to identify the mechanisms through which civil 
society sought to change international policy on debt, the case study method was partic-
ularly appropriate (Gerring 2004; Yin 2003).   
While the case study method is widely used, there are significant reservations 
about this method, particularly in political science, where some hold it in  ‘low  regard’  
(Gerring 2004). Reservations relate to anticipated problems about validity (how well the 
findings fit the evidence), reliability (whether the results can be replicated using the 
same method) and representativeness (whether the findings can be generalised across 
other cases). Others, however, defend case studies, as these are essential for description 
“it is pointless to seek to explain what we have not described with a reasonable degree 
of precision” (King et al 1994, p.44). I would argue strongly that there is a need for 
more detailed and varied individual case studies on transnational civil society cam-
paigns. As was seen in Chapter 1, even though debt campaigning can be traced back to 
the late 1970s, there are very few studies covering the period before the Jubilee 2000 
campaign, and research on the latter is still limited. There is substantial room for more 
studies, including more individual country studies, comparative studies of debtor coun-
try campaigns, detailed studies of the south/north relationship within Jubilee 2000, and 
the relationship of debt campaigning in general and Jubilee 2000 in particular with the 
development of the global justice/anti-globalisation movements.  
While the power struggle between those advocating quantitative and qualitative 
methods has now abated and “paradigm   peace” has broken out (Bryman 2006), the 
standards set for research - validity, replicability and representativeness - tend to be 
those developed for quantitative research, but these have been modified to fit the reality 
of qualitative research (Merriam 2009; Flyvbjerg 2006; Burawoy 1998; 
 89 
1997; Wolcott 1994). In this context firstly a regards validity, I aimed at providing find-
ings that were ‘credible’   in   relation   to   the  material  gathered   rather   than  claiming they 
represented some form of objective reality. (Lincoln and Gubba quoted in Merriam 
2009, p.213 ). Credibility can be based on the rigour with which the research was car-
ried out and this can be increased in a number of ways including by using multiple 
sources of information and seeking feedback. I used a number of sources of information 
– interviews and primary and secondary documents. I could not use observation as the 
study covered past events, but I sought feedback from a number of the people inter-
viewed. An example of using multiple sources of information was in relation to the 
question of the contribution  of  Oxfam  UK’s  1986  debt  campaign  to  the  introduction  of  
the Toronto Terms debt 1988. I  visited  Oxfam  UK’s  archives  to  get  details  of  their  1986  
campaign and interviewed the organiser of that campaign. As both the British and 
French governments played a part in the introduction of the Toronto Terms I referred to 
then Chancellor  Lawson’s  memoirs (1992) and at a memoir of President Mitterrand by a 
close adviser (Attali 2005), both of whom provided partisan accounts and also at a doc-
ument by the IMF (1999) which gave a more measured account of the role of both gov-
ernments and finally interviewed another British campaigner to check further. The out-
come was that there was not a simple relationship between the Oxfam UK campaign 
and the Toronto Terms. Other issues which affected the introduction of the new initia-
tive were competition between France and Britain in relation to which led at interna-
tional level on African issues and the fact that debt was an easier issue for Britain to 
move on than, for example, aid which was had been cut. Further, setting out in some 
detail in this chapter how I carried out the research is another element in seeking to es-
tablish the credibility of the study.   
        As regards generalisability, I   would   endorse   Flyvberg’s (2006, p.236) argument 
that, as there are no universals in human affairs, formal generalisations are overvalued 
and case studies undervalued in terms of the development of scientific  knowledge’.  Fol-
lowing on from this and taking the point made by King et al (1994, p.45) that  “good de-
scription is better than   bad   explanation”, my approach was to accept that there is a 
trade-off between the rich descriptive understanding which can be provided by an in-
depth case study and the  “thin explanations” which may emerge from quantitative com-
parisons (Gerring 2004, p.348). Using  the  words  ‘rich’  and  ‘thin’  may  give  the  impres-
sion of a bias in favour of the former, but I recognise that rich descriptions will not de-
liver the parsimony and elegance much valued by political scientists and may in fact 
result in an overly cluttered picture. In terms of this research, I started with a single case 
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study and an exploratory question. While accepting that an aim of research may be at 
least some degree of generalisation, my first aim was to provide concrete contextualised 
knowledge, inducting explanations as far as reasonable from the information collected, 
avoiding jumping prematurely to interpretations or theoretical linkages.  
A further issue for this research is that I was an insider researcher, as I had coor-
dinated the Debt and Development Coalition Ireland (DDCI) from November 1993 until 
December 2005. I was therefore deeply involved in debt campaigning at national and 
transnational level for part of the second case study period and all of the third period. It 
was this substantial experience as a practitioner which motivated me to undertake this 
study. The research questions were those which arose for me while working on the debt 
campaign: why did we think we could make a difference; what did we, as civil society 
groups, bring into play that could get the G7 and IMF to change course. For the purpos-
es of the study, this translated into: what is the power of transnational civil society and 
how does civil society leverage this power? The other question was where should DDCI 
as a campaign in a small peripheral northern country put its energy – seeking to change 
Irish government policy, for which we as Irish civil society had some responsibility; or 
should we concentrate on creating strong transnational networks and action aimed at the 
transnational arena? For this study, this question translated into: how does transnational 
civil society operate across the national/transnational interface? The dilemma of the in-
sider researcher can first be put in the general context of qualitative research which - 
regardless of the background of the researcher - calls for continuous reflexivity and self-
scrutiny. The qualitative researcher is advised to continually   ask   the   question   “How 
might my knowledge, position, and experience be shaping my analysis?” (Pyett 2003, 
p.1171). The  advice  is  to  counter  researcher  bias  by  making  one’s  “assumptions, inter-
ests, and objectives concerning the research and social practice as explicit as possible 
and   to   acknowledge,   where   relevant,   one’s   own   philosophical   and   political   perspec-
tives” (Pyett 2003, p.1171). The call for transparency and self-reflection increases for 
those, like me, who have had substantial and direct involvement in the area being stud-
ied.  
Most  of  the  discussion  of  ‘insider  researcher’  in  the  literature  relates  to  participa-
tion observation. As my experience was of being a past participant in the case study, 
rather than participation being the central method used, not all of the issues identified in 
the literature apply. One  which   is   relevant   is   that  an   insider   researcher  may  be  “over-
familiar with the community”  being  studied  (Delyser  2001).  This  was  certainly  an  issue  
for me, as I had at least some direct acquaintance with 25 of the 37 people I interviewed 
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– and substantial acquaintance with some - and the other interviewees were aware of my 
long engagement with the debt issue. I had taken part in some of the transnational meet-
ings examined. I attended Eurodad meetings as the DDCI representative, was on the ex-
ecutive for a number of years (and chaired it for my last year) wrote some of the materi-
al reviewed, and was involved in organising some of the activities.  
Looking for the biases I may have brought to the research e.g. finding what I 
wanted to find, this was mediated somewhat by the study design i.e. an exploratory ap-
proach and therefore, I was open to being – and hoping to be - surprised. One potential 
bias has been highlighted by Tarrow, who points to the fact that many scholars of social 
movements come to the research process with strong commitment to the goals of such 
movements:  
 
Such scholars often saw states as unremittingly hostile to transnational actors, 
when empirical data show conclusively that states— particularly western 
states—are deeply implicated in their funding and promotion. (Tarrow 2001, 
p.10) 
 
Tarrow correctly identifies the issue of the independence of civil society from the state 
(as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2) as a sensitive issue for civil society campaigners. As 
the relationship between civil society/state-internationalising state emerged as a central 
theme for this study, this called for a degree of self-reflection on my part as a research-
er. When analysing the speech by the head of the IMF at a seminar in Dublin 1994 
which I had been involved in organising, for example, I was a bit taken aback at his 
statement :  
 
It  isn’t  so  frequent  for  me  to  attend  a  meeting  organised  hand  in  hand  by  NGOs  
and a Minister of Finance showing that dialogue in your country on important 
issues is going on. (Camdessus 1994). 
 
 This motivated me to cast a dispassionate eye on what had been the respective roles of 
DDCI, the Irish Department of Finance and the IMF in the organisation of that event. 
The outcome of this was a recognition that the degree of DDCI autonomy was limited 
by the fact that the event was initiated by the IMF with the Department of Finance play-
ing an intermediary role. It appeared that this event was an example of the new global 
norm of participation in action.  
 In addition to reducing bias by trying to be continually aware of the effect that 
my insider status might have on the research, the very process of carrying out the study 
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over time – 6 years - enabled a degree of distance from the material. Immersion in theo-
ry during the early period of the research also helped in drawing me gradually away 
from my direct experience. In the case of insider researcher, the aim of replicability is 
even less realistic and in fact the existence of a mixture of researchers in the social 
movement field coming from both activist and academic backgrounds, as noted by Tar-
row (2001), strengthens the case for an approach which builds knowledge through creat-
ing engagement between studies carried out by insider researchers and outsider re-
searchers.  
 
4.4 Collecting, analysing and interpreting case study material  
Turning to the practical aspects of the study, there were a number of significant chal-
lenges in gathering material which covered the history and geography of the three case 
study periods. The dearth of archival material on transnational civil society campaigns 
both in terms of span (geographic reach) and depth (historic coverage) was particularly 
problematic for the first period and to a lesser extent for the second period. Since a ma-
jor focus of the study was to reveal the mechanisms involved in debt campaigning, con-
siderable primary sources were needed.  
Data were collected through a number of methods – documents (primary and 
secondary), media searches and interviews with key informants.  Primary documents 
were gathered by visiting archives (Newcastle University Jubilee 2000 archives contain 
documents, news cuttings, cassette tapes and videos, mostly from the UK,  but also 
from other countries and periods other than Jubilee 2000). I also visited a number of 
NGOs to access their archives (Oxfam UK, Christian Aid UK, NEF UK, Novib Nether-
lands, Erlassjahr Germany and Eurodad Belgium) and used internet searches. Two ma-
jor problems arose. One was in relation to language – while I can read English, French 
and Spanish, in terms of European campaigns I could not read material from Scandina-
vian countries, the Netherlands, German-speaking countries or Italy, all of which were 
very active in the debt movements. This also applied to media searches: for example, for 
the 1988 IMF and World Bank AGM in Berlin, when there were massive protests, it 
would have been useful to have had been able to check coverage in the German news-
papers. In terms of countries beyond Europe, all the documents I found were in English, 
Spanish or French. 
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My main aim was to access material which related as closely as possible to an 
organisation’s  decision-making processes such as annual reports, newsletters, strategic 
plans, evaluations, press releases, funding applications, minutes of relevant meetings, 
relevant correspondence, and reports on events, policy analysis and educational materi-
als. Very little of this is available on the internet, particularly for the first and second 
historic periods. As some of this is internal to the organisation, it will never be made 
available on the internet, and therefore to assemble enough material for a transnational 
case study some travel is involved: but this had to be limited due to resources – both 
time and money.  Even regarding material which civil society organisations do make 
available on the internet, there is generally a shallowness to the amount of historical ma-
terial posted on the internet. Annual reports for Eurodad, for example, a key organisa-
tion for the second case study period, are only available on their web site from 1998 
onwards. I had to visit three countries (Belgium, Netherlands and Germany) in order to 
assemble enough documents on Eurodad to carry out the study of the second case study 
period. In contrast, it took a couple of hours to download all G8 communiqués on debt 
from 1982-2005 from the University of Toronto G8 Information Centre.  Civil society 
organisations appear to pay little or insufficient attention to their histories for a number 
of reasons. One is the constant imperative to live in the now so that websites focus on 
current events and issues: how the site visitor can help right then by donating or taking 
part in a campaign action. The other issue is limited material resources: e.g. to employ a 
librarian/archivist or even space to keep past hard copy material. I was sometimes one 
step behind NGOs closing down their libraries and getting rid of  much  of   their   ‘grey  
material, which cannot be found easily through conventional channels such as publish-
ers which is particularly difficult to get hold of: e.g. reports on events and newsletters 
from campaigns around the world. Fortunately I was also just one step ahead of other 
organisations about to make their archival and library staff redundant and therefore in 
time to access their material. A further limitation on data collection related to media ar-
chival material. The database used, NexisUK, did not cover the relevant southern news-
papers for the period in question. Coverage of, for example, The Manila Times starts in 
2006, The Monitor (Kampala) from 2010, El Comercio (Peru) from 2005, resulting in a 
northern bias in material from this source. These points illustrate some of the practical 
difficulties in producing a comprehensive study of a transnational social movement or 
civil society campaign.  
As the first case study period, in particular, was marked by a lack of access to a 
significant volume and coherent sequences of documents, this posed particular chal-
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lenges in completing the study. Accepting that “an important topic is worth studying 
even if very little information is available on it” (King, et al 1994, p.6), my approach 
was to continue to delve until sufficient material had been amassed to provide a coher-
ent, if not totally full, narrative of the origins of debt campaigning. While primary and 
secondary sources for the 1976-1989 period were limited, a number of very good prima-
ry sources were found. These included reports of transnational civil society conferences, 
regional trade union conferences in Latin America and Africa, some NGO educational 
material and a range of Declarations made at various civil society events – Arusha 
(1990), CEDETIM (2005), AITEC (1986, 1989). Oxfam archives provided material on 
debt campaigning in the UK in the 1980s, and Christian Aid material covered the emer-
gence of the Philippine Freedom from Debt Coalition in the late 1980s and their opera-
tion up to 2000. It has to be acknowledged that finding some of this material was by 
chance – i.e. this was the material that somehow survived out of the mass of material 
which must have been produced during the 1980s when Latin America in particular was 
convulsed by the debt crisis which provoked such robust grassroots responses. Refer-
ences were found to transnational civil society gatherings, for which no further material 
could be found. No doubt other declarations were made which have not survived. Some 
rich material on protests and the development of debt campaigning were available from 
secondary   sources,   in  particular  Donnelly’s   in-depth actor-oriented account of the de-
velopment of debt activism from 1976 (2002) and Walton’s  mapping of Latin American 
debt protests in the 1980s (1989).  Media archives were useful in putting together a pic-
ture of contestation between debtor governments and their creditors during the period 
1976-1989. There was, however, limited media coverage of civil society/social move-
ment action during this period, other than for the protests at the IMF/World AGM in 
Berlin 1988. A major limitation of the media archival material, as pointed out above, 
was that the newspapers included were all from creditor countries. Given the centrality 
of the Latin American debt crisis to this period, some access to coverage from that con-
tinent would have enriched the study.  
In the context of the above, I would describe the method of collecting material 
for  the  first  case  study  period  as  ‘archaeological’. I  am  not  using  ‘archaeological’  in  the  
Foucauldian sense here, but more impressionistically from studying archaeological at an 
earlier period of my life: as in assembling the chance findings of pottery shards and 
tools, the remains at prehistoric sites, icons or paintings available from a particular his-
toric period and place from which inferences can be drawn about the life lived by those 
peoples. It is because of the incompleteness and somewhat arbitrariness of the evidence 
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which has survived that I refer to the method used to reconstruct debt movements in the 
1980s as archaeological, painstakingly mining all possible sources of information, col-
lating the limited results and putting this together as coherently as possible. Fewer in-
ferences are therefore made in Chapter 5 than in the other two case study periods.  
Documentary evidence for Eurodad, a major focus of the second case study pe-
riod 1990-1996, were more substantial, and sequences of documents were found: annual 
reports, funding proposals, evaluations, minutes of network meetings, newsletters, some 
correspondence. In addition to covering Eurodad activity as a secretariat, annual reports 
contained summaries of action carried out by members of the network, enabling an 
overview of action taken by European debt groups over the period of the case study. 
This material was supplemented by considerable material sourced from media archives. 
As most of this came through press services, in particular IPS inter-press services and to 
a lesser extent Africa News, much of it was probably never published or broadcast in 
the mainstream media. For the researcher, however, these news services operate as an 
archive of press releases and reports issued by civil society groups/NGOs. As the doc-
uments on which the media reports were based were written for publication, they can 
therefore be seen as providing an insight into the public face of Eurodad supplementing 
the internal face which was gleaned from the documents studied. Media archives also 
covered the protests at the 1994 IMF/World Bank AGM in Madrid and the development 
of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative. Christian Aid archives provided a 
southern perspective with substantial material on a number of their partners in debt 
campaigning, FDC and Tanzania Social and Economic Trust (TASOET). Documents 
included annual reports, funding proposals, evaluations and correspondence. Significant 
amounts of information on the UK Debt Crisis Network for this period was sourced 
from the NEF archives. Limited primary sources on other groups active at the time were 
also found in the various archives e.g. on the US 50 Years is Enough and UK students’ 
group  ‘Third  World  First’,  World  Development  Movement,  Uganda  Debt  Network, and 
Oxfam International network.  
Substantial material on Jubilee 2000, particularly but not exclusively in the UK, 
was found in the Jubilee 2000 archives at Newcastle University. Particularly useful was 
a chronologically complete set of newsletters. There was much more material available 
on the internet for this period - on the French, Spanish, Uganda, Zambian, South Afri-
can, Philippine, Peruvian and Honduran Jubilee 2000 campaigns and Jubilee South. 
This was supplemented by documents picked up at transnational debt meetings and by 
material from the various archives mentioned above. Because of the volume of material 
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gathered, less recourse was made to NexisUK in relation to Jubilee 2000, except for key 
moments such as the G8 summits in Birmingham 1998 and Cologne 1999.  
Documentary evidence was supplemented by interviews. Efforts to source inter-
views through Irish media archives provided an interview with the President of the Phil-
ippine Freedom from Debt Coalition and one with ex-President Nyerere of Tanzania 
both carried out in 1991. Thirty-seven key informant interviews were carried out direct-
ly. All were with people who had been centrally involved in debt campaigning with 
some interviewees spanning the whole period of the research, others spanning the last 
two periods while for some their involvement related to one period. Thirty-five inter-
views were carried out by phone or face-to-face; two were carried out by email. The 37 
interviews break down geographically as follows: Latin America: 2 (Peru and an INGO 
based in Central America); Africa: 3 (South Africa, Uganda, Zambia); Europe: Austria, 
Belgium (2), France (2), Germany (3); Ireland (6); Italy (1); Netherlands (4); Spain (1), 
Sweden (1), Switzerland (1); UK (7) ; Asia (1) (Philippines). These include interviews 
with three people who had also acted as coordinators of regional groups (Latindadd and 
Eurodad) and one person who had coordinated an international network on debt. From 
the point of view of history of debt campaigning, 19 of the interviewees had been in-
volved for at least part of the first period, and 10 spanned the 3 periods. Given that these 
were key informants, the long historic span of their involvement is probably less strik-
ing than if they represented a more random sample of debt activists. Three of the inter-
viewees had worked for the World Bank or a government department as well as for 
NGOs campaigning on debt, and one had operated as an advisor to both civil society 
debt campaigns and debtor and creditor governments. One had started out as a direct 
action environmentalist and had been involved in exposing the negative impact of 
World Bank projects and then moved on to coordinate first a national and then a region-
al network which covered IMF/World Bank and debt issues. 
 
Interviewees were selected broadly on the following criteria:  
 
a) knowledge of particular events or organisations e.g. a German interviewee 
who had knowledge of the events at the 1988 Berlin IMF/World Bank AGM; a 
British interviewee who had knowledge of the early years of Eurodad from a 
member organisation point of view, and two of the Irish interviewees had been 
involved in transnational networks dealing with debt as well as in national-
level debt campaigning. 
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b) Geographic span from a debtor and creditor point of view. For debtor coun-
tries, the aim was to gain: coverage of campaigns in Africa and Latin America 
as the most indebted continents and the Philippines as the heavily indebted 
country of Asia. Coverage of creditor country campaigns focused on Europe, 
because the variety of countries and political cultures involved and their dif-
ferential positioning within world order provided substantial variation i.e. G7 
(4 members in Europe), non-G7 creditor countries with intermediate power 
(e.g. Spain, Netherlands, Belgium) and those more weakly positioned in world 
order (e.g. Ireland). Focussing on Europe also helped to avoid capture by the 
hegemonic English-speaking world. It must be noted that more interviews 
were carried out with British and Irish informants. This was partly because of 
the strong British involvement in debt campaigning over the three periods of 
the case study and also partly because of ease of access. In relation to Ireland, 
some interviewees had played a dual role as members of the DDCI and of 
transnational networks on debt. 
c) In terms of selecting debtor countries, the criteria were ability to contact a key 
informant, together with having access to some documentary/media evidence 
for that country.    
d) For the European countries, the aim was to cover the span of campaigning 
across Europe, and with the exception of Scandinavian countries, at least one 
interview was carried out for each of the countries which had participated sig-
nificantly in debt campaigning. One interview was carried out with a Swedish 
key informant, and while some issues to do with Scandinavia were covered, 
this mainly covered campaigning in Sweden. 
 
No reply was received to four approaches for an interview with prospective key inform-
ants in Brazil, France, Argentina and Tanzania. It was not possible to check whether the 
approaches had reached the person in question or whether they had decided not to par-
ticipate.  
Interviews were semi-structured, following the themes of the analytic framework 
set out above, but leaving room to follow up on particular themes raised and for re-
spondents to introduce further issues. An outline of the interview themes was sent to the 
interviewees in advance to give them a chance to reflect, given the time that had elapsed 
since the events being discussed – in particular in relation to the earlier case study peri-
od. This prompted a number of interviewees to check organisational documents from 
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the period being covered in the interview. This was important, as clearly one issue was 
that for some they were recalling events from over 30 years ago, and sometimes they 
struggled to remember particular details. In spite of the significant time lapse from 
when the events had happened, interviews were essential to supplement the shortage of 
primary sources for the early period and also to provide more reflective information 
than can usually be found in organisational documents such as newsletters and annual 
reports. What was lost in historical recall was compensated for in the ability of the in-
terviewees to take a long view and contextualise events within a changing world order 
over the 1980s and 1990s, which was one of the themes of the study.   
4.5 Analysing the case study material 
The aim was to follow the sequence of description, analysis and interpretation (Wool-
cott 1994). One objective of the thesis was to provide a fuller description of debt cam-
paigning over time and across geography than has been provided hitherto. For that rea-
son a fair amount of descriptive material is contained in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. A coding 
frame consisting of the categories set out in the analytic framework was formed, and the 
material was coded as it was collected within this framework. As coding progressed, the 
broad categories of knowledge, geography and mode of engagement were broken down 
into sub-categories responding to the material collected. The coding was refined a num-
ber of times, resulting in deep engagement with the material and further clarification of 
the analytic sub-categories and in particular the distinctions between them. As the start-
ing categories of common cause, knowledge, geography and mode of engagement were 
very broad - and intentionally so, as this was an exploratory study - there are no abso-
lute a priori distinctions between them. As regards  ‘knowledge’ and  ‘mode  of  engage-
ment’, for example, how knowledge is used by campaigners can be part of the mode of 
engagement: i.e. frames may be aligned with dominant power understandings to gain 
access to decision makers. However, through continual engagement with the material 
working distinctions were made: i.e. knowledge related to content, mode of engagement 
related to activity. Similar issues arose with mode of engagement and geography. Some 
material fitted with both categories e.g. engagement with national decision makers was 
an indication of prioritising the national rather than the international arena but was also 
an indicator of the type of relationships operating between civil society and the 
state/internationalising state in that particular situation. Here the solution was that mode 
of engagement related to the nature of the relationship in terms of conflict/consensus 
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whereas the scale of targeting of decision makers defined the geographic dimension. 
Clearly, however, there will always be some blurring of these categories in practice.  
Proceeding to analysis, themes were identified from the coded data. A key is-
sue which emerged within the category common cause was the national/international 
and south/north interfaces within civil society rather than ideological differences. These 
themes are covered in detail in Chapter 6 (relating to the national/international interface) 
and Chapter 7 (relating to the south/north interface). A further central theme became the 
degree  to  which  civil  society’s  discourses  were  shaped  in  opposition  to  or  shaped  by  the  
exigencies of the state-internationalising state, for example, by the need to gain access 
to decision makers (Chapter 6). The nature of the relationship became an overarching 
theme in both Chapters 6 and 7. This was not a static category but involved the shifting 
relationship between civil society and the state/internationalising state, including recip-
rocal interactions on some issues, conflicts on other and the ebb and flow of the rela-
tionship over time. On the geography of power, the privileging of national action came 
across so strongly that the question became to identify what transnational campaigning 
consisted of beyond an aggregation of national-level action. 
Examining mechanisms and discourses through which civil society sought to leverage 
power involved breaking down categories like ‘moral  authority’  and  ‘lobbying’  which  
are often used in the transnational civil society literature as irreducible categories. The 
aim was to try and get behind these concepts. Given the overwhelming focus on moral 
discourse in the literature on debt campaigning, it was important to identify what this is 
and how does it relate to or differ from other discourses. This is explored in Chapter 7. 
A similar process was carried out in relation to ‘lobbying’, and in Chapter 6 the lobby-
ing process is broken into a number of elements. Lobbying is presented in both Chapters 
6 and 7 as an interactive process between civil society and states/internationalising state 
rather than one way from civil society to decision makers.  
 
Once the analysis was done, a number of key themes provided the focus from 
which broader interpretations were drawn. These are listed below: 
 
a) How to explain the relationships between civil society and the 
state/internationalising state which emerged from the study.   
b) In the context of the strong national embeddedness (Josselin 2007) of debt cam-
paigning, particularly in the Jubilee 2000 period, what then is the nature of the 
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transnational dimension of debt campaigning and how does this relate to the nation-
al element?  
c) The changing nature of the south/north relationship within transnational civil society 
over the case study period.  
d) The nature of the relationship between the overlapping structural and moral dis-
courses of civil society on debt over the case study period.  
 
Analysis involved an iterative process between theory and the data. Firstly ex-
planations were inducted as far as possible from the material. Then a number of compet-
ing theoretical explanations were applied. In the case of the first question, for example, 
liberal, Gramscian and Foudauldian theories of civil society were tried against the data. 
I also brought my personal experience of working within national and transnational civil 
society into play to find an explanation which had both theoretical and practitioner res-
onance. In terms of the second theme, in addition to the internationalising state, I had 
recourse to Dryzeck (1999) and Drainville (2005b), both of whom try to define the dif-
ferent opportunities arising for transnational civil society as a result of the different lev-
els of institutionalisation at national and transnational levels.  
Conclusions were drawn in relation to the analytical framework in the three case 
study periods in Chapters, 5, 6, and 7. This was done by inducting as far as possible 
from the data and then engaging with the theory. In the final conclusion there is an ef-
fort to move from analysis to interpretation  in  line  with  Wolcott’s  definition  as  making  
a leap beyond the data in relation to two questions: one in relation to the source of 
transnational civil society power; and one in relation to the exercise of power. The first 
question relates to the south/north relationship within transnational civil society cam-
paigning as a key element in making common cause. The second question relates to the 
level of challenge posed by debt campaigns.    
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Chapter Five: The Making of Transnational Debt Movements 
1976-1990  
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a narrative of the first case study period of debt campaign-
ing from 1976, when the first anti-austerity protests took place in Peru (Walton 1989) 
up to 1990. This period covers the emergence of debt campaigning and also the period 
in which transnational civil society focus on global issues was beginning to gain impe-
tus. Early activists faced the challenge of making common cause transnationally on a 
complex technical issue involving multiple governments, international financial institu-
tions and the private sector. A further challenge was to develop the organisational and 
networking structures needed to facilitate common or parallel action across the vast ter-
ritory over which the debt issue was contested. This was before the tools facilitating 
globalisation – information and communication technology and changes in transport—
were widely available to civil society activists (Evans 2008).  Debt campaigns illustrate 
the dynamic of south/north civil society relations involving both solidarity and conflict 
and how these relations were negotiated over time. This chapter tracks the start of this 
relationship. Debt activism took place against the background of enormous changes in 
world order with two major features. One was the escalation of the internationalisation 
of the state, with the debt crisis as both a product of and a further driver of this process. 
The other was the move from a bipolar towards a unipolar economic world order domi-
nated by neoliberal ideology. While this change took effect with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989, the weakening of the Soviet Union over the 1980s prefigured the coming 
change. Two interacting struggles underpin this narrative – the struggle to contest debt 
policy and the struggle to create the transnational civil society that debt movements 
needed to contest that policy.  
The chapter covers an overview of how the two debt crises outlined in Chapter 1 
were managed and contested during the 1980s. Following an outline of how the bodies 
of the debt nébuleuse dealt with the crisis, a brief outline of resistance from debtor gov-
ernments is given. The main body of the chapter details the creation of transnational 
debt groups as a vehicle to contest international policy and the start of this contestation 
at national and international levels. It concludes with an assessment of how debt cam-
paigns sought to create common cause in order to exercise power in relation to the debt 
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crisis. As stated in the previous chapter, because less material was available for this pe-
riod, the conclusion contains fewer inferences than the other two case study chapters. 
5.2 Managing and contesting the debt crisis: an overview 
Debt policy was made and remade in the context of engagement between the global fi-
nancial governance bodies and groups challenging them – debtor governments and civil 
society groups. The  main  institutions  of   the  ‘debt  nébuleuse’ which formulate interna-
tional debt policy, as described in Chapter 3, are the IMF, World Bank; the regional de-
velopment banks (Inter-American, African, and Asian); the Paris Club of OECD credi-
tor government; and the G7 which dominates these fora. During the 1980s the main fo-
cus was on commercial bank debt and therefore the London Club, an informal forum 
which brings together commercial creditors, was also relevant.  
How was the debt crisis managed in the 1980s within   this   ‘diffuse   system   of  
global   financial  governance’  (Baker  2006)? World Bank treasurer, Eugene Rothbergh, 
speaking in 1986, stated: 
  
The hard point is that no-one is in control anymore, not us, not the indus-
trial   governments,   certainly   not   OPEC   and   not   the   debtor   countries  ….  
No-one has the power or the authority. (Reuter 1986)   
 
An analysis of G7 communiqués 1983-19904 indicates  the  G7’s  signalling role to com-
mercial creditors over the 1980s in an effort to influence their decisions. Soft verbs such 
as  ‘call  upon’ are used (G7 1984) in relation to commercial creditors whereas it took a 
more directive role towards the bodies where it had direct power. In addressing the Paris 
Club, IMF/World Bank, for example it urges them to take the action identified by the 
G7 (G7 1988). Baker (2006) and Bayne (2000) both argue that the G7 did not play a 
central role on debt in the 1980s. According to Bayne, the G7 showed little leadership in 
spite of the fact that many commercial banks were very exposed and default could have 
led to a systemic crisis. Bayne’s  explanation  is  that  as  US  Banks  were  the  most  exposed  
to Latin American countries, the US took the lead in pressing solutions.  Both plans to 
deal with commercial debts in the 1980s came from US Treasury Secretaries (Baker and 
Brady plans, 1985 and 1989). Baker (2006) claims that because of the acrimonious na-
ture of discussions on developing country debt the issue was side-lined during - US in-
terest rates were a source of tension because of their effect in increasing the burden of 
                                                 
4 Available at: http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/ 
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southern  country  debt  and   the   threat  posed   to  western  countries’   recovery  from  reces-
sion. 
In spite of this lack of leadership there was remarkable consistency in the credi-
tor model which determined how the debt was dealt with during the 1980s involving a 
case  by  case  approach  whereby  debtors  individually  faced  a  ‘creditor  cartel’,  consisting  
of all their creditors with high levels of conditionality imposed through the IMF. This 
was the key process through which debtor countries were disciplined into restructuring 
in line with the needs of the world economy. This can be contrasted with the more con-
sensual approach proposed in the UNCTAD l978 and l980 resolutions, where debt 
would be dealt with treat debtors and creditors equitably in the context of international 
economic cooperation (UNCTAD 1978, 1980). The consistency in policy prescriptions 
in the absence of a central authority can be seen as a manifestation of the consensus 
forming mechanisms of the debt nébuleuse through which the internationalisation of the 
states operates. An important thread in the weaving of the debt movements is how con-
crete  targets  were  drawn  from  this  ‘nébuleuse’  and  the  understandings  of  global  powers 
underpinning these decisions. 
Resistance to the debt crisis in the 1980s involved debtor governments as well as 
the emerging transnational debt campaigns, and they mutually influenced each other. 
This took place against the backdrop of major ideological shifts, and changes in the re-
lationship between the national and international arenas as the internationalisation of the 
state continued. Over the course of the l980s, neoliberalism became increasingly em-
bedded as the new orthodoxy. Statements that no-one was in charge helped neoliberal-
ism’s  self-promotion as a natural force with no alternative. This led to significant shifts 
in the north/south balance of power over the decade. Southern proposals for a new in-
ternational economic order (NIEO) adopted by the UN in l974 and the Brandt Commis-
sion proposals based on south/north mutual interests, were sidelined (Mittelman and 
Pasha 1997; Adams 1993). 
 
Debtor Government Resistance 
 
A range of governments in Latin America and the Caribbean - Argentina, Brazil, Peru, 
Ecuador, Bolivia, Dominican Republic - suspended payments and or suspended rela-
tions with the IMF at different times. In Argentina, under the brutal military regime 
which terrorised the country from 1976-1983, debt increased from $7bn to a massive 
$43bn (Keane 2007). The first democratically elected president after the fall of the mili-
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tary, Raúl Alfonsin made an election promise not to repay debts which were found to be 
illegitimate. Argentina therefore suspended interest payments in March 1984 in order to 
assess the legitimacy of the debts (Keane 2007), but after standoffs between Argentina 
and the IMF led to the fear that an Argentine default might affect their own creditwor-
thiness, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico made a loan to Argentina to pay off 
its arrears (Tussie 1988).  A US banker speaking after a meeting with Argentine debt 
negotiators made it clear, however, that  in  creditors’  view  economics  and  politics  were  
totally separate spheres: 
  
We expected to get facts and figures, a detailed picture  of  the  country’s  
medium to long term economic plans. All we got were some platitudes 
about  Argentina’s  new  democracy. (Burns 1984)   
 
The most high profile action was taken in 1985 by newly elected President Gar-
cia of Peru who limited debt servicing to 10% of export earnings. Garcia’s   call   for   a  
united Latin American debtor front was rejected.Peru was declared ineligible for new 
loans  and  declared  a  ‘high  risk  country’, and by 1989 was forced to reopen negotiations 
with the IMF (Pastor and Wise 1992). There were two attempts to unite Latin American 
debtors. The first was through the Cartagena Group, which consisted of Argentina, Bra-
zil, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and the Do-
minican Republic (Potter 1988). As Brazil, Argentina and Mexico each posed a serious 
threat to the US banking system (Lawson 1992; Whitehead 1989), the group raised fears 
among bankers and hopes among civil society groups that it constituted a debtor cartel. 
But the Cartagena Group sought to reassure their creditors that they were not a debtor 
cartel and failed to support Argentina and Peru’s  actions. Tussie’s (1988) assessment is 
that for debtors the Cartagena group was a bargaining chip to be traded for concession 
at the negotiating table on a case by case basis but did not alter the overall balance of 
power. The second initiative was the Havana Debt conferences 1985, which was con-
vened by President Castro with a view to creating a radical Latin America response and 
involved trade unions, churches,  business,  military,  women’s  groups,  students,  academ-
ics lawyers, rural groups, guerrilla leaders, political parties and government representa-
tives. The difficulty of getting consensus for a radical solution such as debt repudiation 
was highlighted by the Argentinean government representative who had been instruct-
ed: 
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…not  to  subscribe  to  any  moratorium  …  because  this  type  of  measure  will  
only cause an increase in interest rates and create an inadequate climate 
for negotiations with creditors. (Associated Press 1985) 
 
In contrast a young guerrilla fighter from the Colombian M-19 reflected the hope that 
revolutionary change was on the horizon: 
  
 We say to imperialism: Prepare yourselves, because it is us with whom in 
the 21st century you are going to have to discuss the future of this conti-
nent. (Gedda 1985)  
 
Some participants supported repudiation and others the capping of debt payments but no 
formal agreement was reached. While no concrete progress was made on Latin Ameri-
can unity, the conference resonated beyond the event – part of the intangibles which 
make up the memories and motivations of activists and help create continuity across 
time and geography. A debt conference took place in Havana in 2005, with the coopera-
tion of the Cuban government marking the 20th anniversary of the earlier conference 
bringing together debt activists from south and north.  
Unlike  Latin  America,  Africa’s  debt  while  a  huge  burden  on  the  people  of  the  con-
tinent, did not pose a threat to the international financial system as it was largely owed 
to individual government and multilateral institutions. Among resistance from individu-
al   governments   was   President   Kaunda’s   break   with   the   IMF   following   food   riots   in  
Zambia in 1986 (Situmbeko and Zulu Jones 2004) At a collective level African gov-
ernments dealt with the crisis through the OAU seeking a solution within the frame 
work of south/north cooperation for development, stressing the need for constructive 
dialogue and shared responsibility. They proposed an international conference in 1988 
of African debtor countries and creditors referring to UN General Assembly and 
UNCTAD resolutions to legitimise their position (OAU 1987). President Kaunda, 
chairperson of the OAU, was mandated to bring the OAU position to the international 
community,   calling   for   an   international   conference   on   Africa’s   external   debt   (OAU 
1987). The OAU lobbied the World Bank, EU and the G7, but creditors were not recep-
tive, maintaining their position on a case by case approach.  
The OAU was seeking to mobilise discourses (south/north mutual interests) and 
institutions (UN system) which were being increasingly sidelined during the 1980s. 
Broome (2009, p.77) refers  to  the  “strategic  use  of  frames’  by  actors  who  do  not  have  
more coercive forms of influence”. He is referring to NGOs, but this can also apply to 
less powerful state actors. At a rhetorical level, Tanzania  President  Nyerere’  question  
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when addressing the OAU in 1985 “do we have to starve our people to pay debt?”  re-
verberated through the subsequent decades of debt campaigning contributing to the cre-
ation  of  a  ‘collective  memory’  on  debt  activism. 
 
Civil society resistance  
 
Two key questions for civil society during this period were the discourses within which 
to situate explanations of the debt crisis and how to operate across the nation-
al/international interface. In terms of discourse, the ability to shape public debate 
whether through framing to resonate with current values (Tarrow 2005) or by introduc-
ing counter-discourses  to  shift  the  public  to  a  new  ‘good  sense’  (Gramsci 1971) is fun-
damental to the power of civil society. The struggle over how to define the debt prob-
lem was central to the development of transnational civil society. Resisting dominant 
ideologies, like neoliberalism, involves introducing new discourses and/or maintaining 
existing ones which are being undermined. Civil society counter-discourses fell largely 
into the second category with the emphasis on the NIEO as a framework to critique un-
equal south/north relations underpinning the debt problem, anti-imperialism and libera-
tion theology. NIEO provided an alternative framework against which debt could be 
situated as a symptom of the unjust economic order particularly for southern groups 
(AITEC 1986, 1989, African TU conference 1987, Osorio 1987, Mujica 1988, CAFOD 
no date). For some European groups, however, the NIEO was not a major influence. A 
German debt activist did not remember much focus on NIEO. For him, it was a matter 
of looking for practical solutions (Interviewee Germany No. 1).  A Dutch interviewee, 
however, recalls that many European NGOs held positions close to those of the G77 on 
the international economic order (Interviewee Belgium No.1). It would appear that the 
NIEO provided the broader framework against which those seeking change need to 
place their case rather than as a concrete framework for how debt was contested and that 
this framework also had greater resonance for southern groups.  
Liberation  theology,  with  its  call  to  confront  ‘sinful  structures’  (Donnelly  2002) 
that contribute to poverty, was a key influence in Latin America from the 1960s. One of 
the earliest references to north/south solidarity on the debt issue relates to US missionar-
ies returning from Latin America influenced by liberation theology in the late 1979s, 
and setting up Peru Solidarity (Donnelly 2002). According to Osorio (1987, p.126), 
Christ was mentioned more often than Marx at the Havana debt conference l985. The 
Biblical Jubilee message that every 50 years right relations should be restored including 
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debt cancellation provided a specific religious/justice frame and was referred to fre-
quently during the l980s – at the 1985 Havana conference , the Africa TU conference 
1987, the international civil society conference in Lima 1988. In response to concern 
expressed within the church, the Pope raised the debt issue in two of his encyclicals Sol-
licitudo Rei Socialis 1987 and Centesimum Annus 1991 (Donnelly 2002). In 1990 the 
All  African  Council  of  Churches  called  for  a  Jubilee  year  on  Africa’s  debt.  The  Jubilee 
message can be seen as a new discourse based in the Old Testament rather than on the 
liberation theology mix of New Testament and Marxism. The Jubilee message proved to 
be a unifying frame which was taken up across Christian churches, including the reli-
gious right in the US, as will be seen in chapter 6. It differed from liberation theology 
which brought the struggle for justice and equality to the heart of Christian churches. 
The prevalence of unifying religious counter-discourses was reflected in the emergence 
of Christian churches as one of the central social movements within debt activism. In 
the face of the growing dominance of neoliberalism  civil  society’s  counter-discourses 
weakened towards the end of the 1980s, with many activists losing hope in the prospect 
of major change in existing power relations. “We had our dreams that the world could 
be different...but we were…  more  pragmatic,  incremental  in  our  approach” (Interviewee 
Germany No. 1).   
Traditionally civil society had engaged mainly with national governments. The 
debt crisis, however, with its roots in both national and transnational policies and ac-
tions called for an engagement across the national/international interface both in terms 
of the scope of civil society networking and the levels of decision making to be ad-
dressed. While civil society struggled to emerge as transnational civil society by devel-
oping a transnational practice, there were also factors which kept hopes centred on the 
national level as the key zone from which change might result. Solidarity with revolu-
tionary governments and movements continued to be a major framework for south/north 
civil society links.  Hope in the possibility of revolutionary change was fed by success-
ful revolutions in, for example, Nicaragua and Mozambique, and the struggles in El 
Salvador and South Africa. In the case of Nicaragua, Oxfam and Fondad provided ad-
vice to the Sandinista government on how to deal with debt (Interviewee UK No. 2; In-
terviewee Netherlands, No. 2). These bilateral solidarity relations represented the view 
that revolutionary transformation of governments was the central path to achieving fun-
damental change. More specifically as a result of debtor government resistance, particu-
larly in Latin America, debt movements looked to those governments as potential major 
actors in forcing a solution to the crisis. Peru’s  partial  default  became a cause celebre 
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among civil society debt campaigns internationally. Looked at retrospectively, debtor 
government resistance might seem to provide little to raise civil society hopes. Lived 
time, however, is different from historical time and hopes which today may seem un-
founded, can and do fuel the wheels of activism at particular times. Throughout the 
l980s, the possibility of unilateral action by debtors appears in the analysis and solutions 
put forward by civil society (Potter 1988; UN-NGO 1987; Clark 1986). By the 1990s, 
the focus had shifted, with demands being made on creditors for action to resolve the 
crisis. 
5.3 The making of transnational civil society: debt activism  
According to Keck and Sikkink (1998, p.27), in order to campaign effectively, groups 
must establish who bears responsibility and “the causal chain needs to be sufficiently 
short and clear to make the case convincing”. Part of the challenge to the emerging debt 
movements was to find such a clear target and short causal chain within the multiple 
and interconnected bodies which managed– and contributed to the creation of - the debt 
crisis. Reviewing the limited civil society material available for the 1980s,5 the overall 
impression is that civil society groups were struggling to understand the crisis and how 
best to contest it. There were multiple challenges: gaining a technical understanding of 
the crisis and solutions being proposed by creditors and developing alternatives; map-
ping the social impact; generating and coordinating action at the multi levels needed to 
tackle the debt crisis; and the struggle to define different but equitable south/north civil 
society roles. As the decade advanced, a web of national and transnational level groups 
which provided the framework for debt campaigning for the following two decades be-
gan to emerge. As a detailed history of debt campaigning has not yet been written, the 
following sections map the different methods used in order to capture how transnational 
civil society created itself but do not provide complete coverage of actions nor of the 
range of countries involved. Among the activities through which transnational civil so-
ciety created itself as national and transnational actors were: analysis and information 
exchange nationally and transnationally; national popular mobilisations against austerity 
programmes; mobilisations in relation to international financial institutions events; di-
                                                 
5 Examples of this material are: Clark 1986; Ekins 1986; Africa Trade Unions Conference on External 
Debt 1987; Osorio 1987; UN-NGO Workshop on Debt, Adjustment 1987; Conferencia de las Organi-
zaciones No Gubernamentales 1988; Mujica 1988; Arruda1993 and 2000; CAFOD no date; Cleary 
(1996); Donnelly 2002;, ; and archival material consulted in the New Economics Foundation (London); 
Christian Aid UK, Oxfam UK; Jubilee 2000 Archives held in Newcastle University. 
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rect engagement with the international financial institutions (IFI); and the beginning of 
national campaigning. Donnelly (2002) who provides the most detailed narrative of civ-
il society action on debt from the 1980s focussing mainly on the US charts how a range 
of actors formed networks on debt, which subsequently dissolved - partly because major 
actors move on to new issues but also because of ideological disagreements with new 
networks emerging later with an overlap of actors. Donnelly’s  paper highlights both the 
central role of core activists in building movements and also how common cause can 
wax and wane. 
   
Popular Protest  
 
Protests, often  referred  to  as  ‘IMF  riots’  (Tarrow 2005, pp. 64-5) against austerity 
measures took the form of demonstrations which sometimes turned violent (Chile, Tur-
key, Sudan, Venezuela), food riots (Haiti, Brazil, Morocco and Zambia) and strikes 
(Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador) (Nkinyangi 1991; Walton and Ragin 1990). Between 1976 and 
1986 more than half the major countries in Latin America and the Caribbean registered 
57 separate protest events mainly precipitated by IMF policies (Walton 1989). 146 riots 
took place in 39 of 80 debtor countries between 1976 and l992 (McMichael 1996).  Alt-
hough  referred  to  as  ‘riots’,  the  protests  in  Latin  America  were organised responses by 
those hardest hit by IMF programmes, the urban poor who were organised in neigh-
bourhoods, churches, political associations and TUs (Walton and Ragin1990). Students 
were identified as significant actors in protest in Africa (Situmbeko and Jones 2004; 
Nkinyangi 1991). Protests were directed at governments and indirectly at the IMF, and 
led to governments withdrawing or modifying these programmes – albeit sometimes 
temporally - or introducing compensatory programmes (Walton 1989). Some govern-
ments took more confrontational positions in relation to the IMF for example in the 
Dominican Republic, Peru, and Zambia. In some cases, popular unrest contributed to 
the fall of governments (Peru 1980 and 1984, Argentina 1983, Brazil 1984) (Walton 
1989, p.321). The most serious protests were in the Dominican Republic and Venezue-
la.  Following the doubling of the price of basic foodstuff and a 200% rise in the price 
of medicine in the Dominican Republic in 1984, riots resulted in 112 dead and 500 
wounded. Riots in Venezuela broke out in February l989 following increases in the 
price of oil and food, and hundreds died, with estimates varying from 300 to 1,500. As 
will be seen later in this chapter, these riots contributed to the introduction of a debt ini-
tiative in 1989, the Brady Bonds. The impact of the protests can be detected in G7 
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communiqués albeit in a very veiled manner.  In its1987 communiqué, G7 recognises 
that the crisis is of economic and political concern as a: 
 
….threat to political stability in countries  with   democratic   regimes’   and  
they  ‘salute  the  courageous  efforts  of  many  of  these  countries   to  achieve  
economic growth and stability (G7 1987).  
 
As will be seen later, the Brady Bonds 1989 deal was partly motivated by the unrest in 
Venezuela. By 1990, banks are being told by the G7 that they should take realistic and 
constructive  approaches  given  the  ‘courageous  reforms’ being adopted by debtors (G7 
1990).  
Are the seeds of subsequent anti-globalisation protests  to  be  found  in  these  ‘IMF  
riots’? Tarrow (2005) argues that the debt protests of the l980s did not represent the 
transnationalisation of protest as there was no cross border coordination between the 
episodes in different countries. Walton and Ragin (1990, p.87), however, point to the 
continuities in how the protests were framed from Latin America to Africa: “out  with  
the  IMF”;;  “we  won’t pay the debt – Let  the  ones  who  stole  the  money  pay”. The pro-
tests in aggregate had an impact on global awareness as seen in the coining of the term 
‘IMF  riots’  and fed the mobilisation against meetings of the IMF, World Bank and G7 
in northern countries in the 1980s (see below). 
 
Understanding the Debt Crisis  
 
Analysing a problem and how to contest it is a cornerstone of the making, maintenance 
and renegotiation of the common cause which holds activists together both at national 
and transnational level. Analysis of the debt crisis was carried out by a range of academ-
ics in the south and north, by civil society think tanks, and by NGOs. Work started in 
Latin America involving Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Nicaragua and Mexico and Ar-
gentina (Arruda 2000). Peruvian economist Oscar  Ugarteche  was  studying  Peru’s  debt  
from the mid l970s (Tagle and Patomaki 2007).  Early debt activists in the Philippines, 
based in universities, used debt “as a potent tool in exposing the corruption and profli-
gacy of the Marcos regime” (Ariate and Molmisa 2009, p.29). A number of northern 
think tanks and NGOs were also analysing the debt including AITEC, a research group 
set up in Paris in 1983 and the North South Institute in Canada.  In terms of NGOs, 
Fondad, Novib, Christian Aid, the Swiss Coalition for Development and Oxfam UK 
were active on debt. Support organisations for churches in the Netherlands and Sweden 
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were also providing information to the churches in order to promote church action on 
the debt crisis (Interviewee Netherlands No. 2; Interviewee Sweden). These fed into 
transnational civil society events informing the analysis and information exchange 
which was a major focus of activity. 
 
Campaigns at national level  
 
Campaigning was mainly targeted at national level – at governments and, in the north, 
at the very accessible high street banks. One of the earliest national campaigns – and 
now the longest running debt campaign in the world - the Philippines Freedom from 
Debt Coalition (FDC) was set up to campaign for freedom from the illegitimate debt 
accrued by the Marcos regime. The roots of action on debt in the Philippines can be 
found during the Marcos regime when academics, opposition politicians and civil socie-
ty groups campaigned against dependency on foreign loans because of the loss of inde-
pendence involved and the huge corruption these loans involved (Pineda-Ofreneo 1991, 
p.77). As the Philippine debt crisis deepened in the early 1980s, academics organised 
workshops and disseminated publications on the crisis (Ariate and Molmisa 2009).  
With the fall of Marcos in 1986, FDC emerged as a coalition of progressive groups 
which had opposed the dictatorship including political blocs,  people’s  organisations and 
academics. (Grageda 1994, p.59-60)  
 
 FDC is in many ways a coalition of coalitions; it is a coalition of all the 
cause-oriented coalitions ranging from the liberal religious to the progres-
sive, radically oriented groups. (Leonor Briones interview 1990) 
 
The battle lines in relation to debt were set early in the post Marcos regime. While ini-
tially   President   Aquino   committed   to   renegotiate   the   country’s   debt   and   to   prioritise  
domestic needs over those of foreign creditors (Grageda 1994, p.156), addressing the 
US Congress soon after her election, she stated that  while   the  debts  were  unjust  “We 
fought for honour, if  only  for  honour,  we  shall  pay” (Grageda 1994, p.158). In addition 
to assuming responsibility for the massive debt run up by the Marcos regime, a further 
mobilising factor for FDC was the institutionalisation of a decree from the Marcos re-
gime mandating the automatic appropriation of debt payments from the budget giving 
absolute priority to debt servicing.  
The FDC was formally launched in 1988 and adopted  three  ‘minimum  unities’  
at its founding congress: a moratorium on debt service payments until better terms were 
negotiated; disengagement from loans that did not benefit the people, particularly those 
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tainted with fraud; a cap on foreign debt service at 10% of export earnings. The adop-
tion of selective rather than total repudiation of debt was to enable the broadest possible 
coalition (Grageda 1994). FDC had strong links with parliamentarians from the start, a 
number of whom attended its founding congress and many of whom signed the FDC 
Congress Declaration (Grageda 1994, p.160). There was also some support within 
Aquino’s  cabinet  for  the  FDC  position, with  the  government’s  chief  planner  supporting  
selective debt repudiation (Arias and Molmisa 2009, p.36).  
 
While FDC was a strong member of the developing transnational debt movements, the 
focus of their campaigning was on national debt policy. They supported bills introduced 
into the Philippine Congress proposing a cap on debt servicing, including organising 
marches to parliament (Pineda-Ofreneo 1991). Although a bill capping debt was ap-
proved by Congress in 1991, it was vetoed by President Aquino (Gersham 1997, p.96).  
FDC also campaigned against the IMF programme signed by the government in 1989, 
taking a different approach to the anti IMF protests which had been mounted in other 
debtor  countries.  FDC  set  up  the  People’s  Forum  against  the  Letter  of  Intent, which is 
the letter sent by governments to the IMF setting out the reforms they intend to intro-
duce in return for an IMF loan. The content of the Letter of Intent reflects the conditions 
demanded by the IMF in return for a loan. FDC ran an awareness campaign, targeted the 
media, picketed government offices, and organised rallies, setting off considerable de-
bate in the Philippine Congress (FDC 1989).  FDC opposed the government’s  Letter  of  
Intent, as the proposed policies would conflict with the government’s  goals  of  poverty 
reduction and employment creation, massive debt service payments would continue and 
it would result in a rise in the price of rice (Pineda-Ofreneo 1991).  
FDC became well known nationally and internationally for their campaigning 
against payment of the fraudulent loans taken on by the Marcos regime. Research car-
ried out on six such loans received extensive media coverage and led to an investigation 
by the Department of Justice to see if there were grounds for repudiation. FDC attended 
Congressional hearings and fraudulent loans were back on the legislative agenda (FDC 
1990a). The Bataan Nuclear Power Plant loan became the centre of campaigning against 
fraudulent loans and was used widely internationally as an illustration of illegitimate 
and fraudulent loan. There were allegations that bribes of $80 million were given by US 
Company Westinghouse to an associate of Marcos to win the contract. The Plant was 
deemed unsafe and not put into operation, but the government continued to service the 
loans taken on to build the plant. In 1988, the Philippine government sued Westing-
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house for bribery in a Jersey court. By 1992 the government was ready to agree a set-
tlement favourable to Westinghouse, but this was rejected by both Houses of Congress. 
The government continued to pursue the case (Beaver 1994), and it was finally settled 
in an out of court agreement in 1995 (WISE 1998). When a deal to securitise Philippine 
debt was underway, FDC joined with other groups in the No to BNPP (Bataan Nuclear 
Power Plant) campaign and opposed the inclusion of Bataan debt in the Brady Bonds 
scheme as this would legitimise the debt (Ariate and Molmisa 2009). The FDC pro-
gramme 1990-1992 was named PAID – meaning both that the debt has been paid but 
also it stood for People against Immoral Debt (FDC 1990a, b). 
Among   FDC’s   strengths   was   their strong expertise due to the significant in-
volvement of academics. This gave them credibility, which resulted in extensive media 
coverage e.g. for their case on fraudulent loans (FDC 1990a). An issue for FDC in its 
early days was their relationship with the Aquino government – should they work with 
or bypass the government (Mendoza 1988). They also had credibility with politicians – 
the  Senate  President  addressed  FDC’s  1990  annual  Congress   - and with some govern-
ment officials including some from the key Finance and Budget departments (FDC 
1989, 1990a). FDC were invited to Congressional hearings on debt and helped members 
of Congress to develop their legislative agenda on debt (FDC no date a). While  FDC’s  
was strongly oriented towards national government policy, they were also actively in-
volved in the emerging transnational debt movements. Their orientation towards the in-
ternational arena was partly to publicise the Philippines’ huge debt, much of it corrupt, 
and to gain transnational allies which could pressure the Philippine government to 
change its debt policy e.g. on the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant loans, in addition to put-
ting pressure on international creditors. They worked with the Swiss NGO, Berne Dec-
laration, on the role of Swiss banks in fraudulent loans and presented a study together 
with concerned shareholders to the annual meeting of the Union Bank of Switzerland 
outlining  the  bank’s  role as a creditor and as a repository of flight capital from the Phil-
ippines (FDC 1990a).  They also aimed to take part in broad transnational actions seek-
ing solutions to the debt crisis, for example, FDC took part in setting up the Debt Treaty 
Movement 1992 (see Chapter 6). A further aim was to support campaigns in other third 
world countries struggling against unjust debt and unequal economic structures. FDC 
became an anchor of the international debt movement taking part in Fondad, sending 
speakers to a wide range of events from the 1988 debt conference in Lima, the counter-
events in Berlin during the IMF and World Bank AGMs, Eurodad meetings and various 
events in the US.  
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Campaigning in other countries was also mainly targeted at national level. Cam-
paigns to pressure commercial banks were run in a number of countries - Belgium, 
Britain, Holland and Germany. These were a mixture of NGO led campaigns using rou-
tine methods like letter writing, lobbying and more popular contentious campaigning.  
An  example  of  the  first  is  War  on  Want’s  campaign  launched  in  1986  against  the  role of 
British banks in the debt crisis stating that “if they continue, will implicate Britain in 
human suffering on a vast scale” (Rodgers 1986). In contrast to NGO led campaigns, 
the Lloyds and Midland Boycott campaign was led by students and focussed on direct 
action. Students bought shares in the banks and disrupted shareholder meetings and 
were physically removed. They also occupied banks – “once we went to Leicester and 
closed down all the banks in a day” (Interviewee UK No. 1). A powerful weapon was to 
get students unions to ban the banks from fresher days. Radical actions against com-
mercial banks were also carried out by students in Belgium (Interviewee Belgium No. 
1). The  Dutch  debt  campaign  also  targeted  shareholders’  meetings  using  less  adversarial 
methods. They bought shares in ABN-Amro Bank, brought debt activists from Brazil to 
input on environment and debt at shareholders’ meetings. Similar action took place in 
Germany in relation to Deutsche Bank, with debt campaigners addressing shareholder 
meetings  and  shareholders  getting  ‘het  up’  and  putting pressure on the bank to explain 
its involvement in the crisis (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1).  
In the UK, the WDM started campaigning on debt in the early 1980s focussing 
on   Latin   America’s   bank   debt crisis,   under   the   slogan   ‘Can’t   pay,   won’t   pay’.  The 
strategy was to raise public awareness and mounted pressure on the banks (Interviewee 
UK No. 5). Oxfam UK ran its first debt campaign in 1986, which prefigured subsequent 
northern debt campaigns: framing the issue in stark terms; putting pressure on decision 
makers through direct mobilisation of public opinion via petitions; letter writing, which 
resulted in scores of parliamentary questions; the involvement of celebrities to gain me-
dia  interest.  The  central  storyline  of  the  campaign  was  ‘the  scandal of the money Africa 
gives  us’:  for  every  £1  given  in  famine  aid,  £2  came  back  in  repaying  debt  (Clark  1986,  
2001).  A  booklet  ‘For  richer,  for  Poorer’  was  published  to  back  the  campaign.  The  sec-
tion  on  ‘the  fight  back’  focuses  on  action  by  debtor  governments – Brazil, Peru, Nige-
ria, Philippines and Mexico - and among the proposed solutions is “being sympathetic 
to developing countries who decide to set a ceiling on their debt payments” (Clark 
1986, p. 88). This reflects the hopes placed by civil society groups on debtor govern-
ment resistance. A postscript to the campaign is the comment of a treasury official - that 
the campaign was well placed but shameful, simplifying the issues (Clark 2001, p.22). 
 115 
Public pressure of this kind was clearly in its infancy. A decade or so later the UK 
treasury was receiving 300,000 communications a year on the debt issue - a quarter of 
its entire correspondence was on debt (Mayo 2005a, p.181). 
A campaign in 1989 by a coalition of Swiss development NGOs and church 
groups can be seen as prefiguring the Jubilee 2000 campaign of the late 1990s. The 
Swiss   group   leveraged   the   symbolism   of   Switzerland’s   upcoming 700th anniversary 
in1991 by calling on the government to mark the occasion by cancelling debt. The pub-
lic was mobilised through a petition which collected 280,000 signatures (4% of the 
population). The petition also called for more equitable economic and financial relations 
with the south. In response, the Swiss government set up a debt reduction programme in 
1991 involving Swiss NGOs. A condition of debt reduction was that civil society in the 
debtor country should be involved in the process (Arruda 2000). 
The role of the German Green Party in the 1980s illustrates the organic links 
which can exist between political and civil society – with political parties growing out 
of civil society groups and then pursuing issues from that alliance through parliamen-
tary procedures when elected. The Green Party grew out of a number of social move-
ments including third world solidarity groups, and first won parliamentary seats in 
1983. The link between structural adjustment and environmental degradation was a key 
concern for the Greens in relation to debt (Donnelly 2002). In fact the German Green 
Party was one of the first environmental groups to focus on the debt crisis (Potter 1988). 
They worked with well-known left-wing  academics  in  order  to  initiate  a  number  of  ‘ma-
jor enquiries’(whereby  questions  could  be  put  to  government, the answers to which had 
to be passed by cabinet) on the role of the IMF and World Bank. The subsequent par-
liamentary debates generated considerable media interest and this work laid the ground 
for the Green Party role in mobilising in relation to the BWI AGM in Berlin 1988 (In-
terviewee Germany No. 1).  
A number of national debt networks were set up bringing together NGOs 
churches and others. The US Debt Crisis Network was set up in 1985, consisting of 
church groups, students, community organisations and other groups (UN-NGO 1987). 
This network dissolved in 1990, partly because of key people moving on and partly be-
cause of differences as to whether to call for modifications of structural adjustment or 
denounce it as an imperialist intervention (Donnelly 2002). The UK Debt Crisis Net-
work was set up in l986 with an active core of 12 to 14 organisations to enable groups 
to exchange information and this developed into active collaboration (Denham no date). 
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The network reconsolidated in the 1990s and was one of the major groupings from 
which Jubilee 2000 emerged.  
All of these campaigns directed themselves at national governments—and only 
indirectly through national government at international bodies—but these national cam-
paigns were simultaneously aggregating up into transnational civil society by engaging 
in a range of transnational civil society discourse events and transnational actions, as 
outlined below. 
 
Mobilisation to transnational events – IMF/World Bank and G7 
 
The 1980s saw the start of civil society focus on IMF, World Bank and G7 events with 
the debt issue as one of the major concerns. Action included both alternative summits 
(The Other Economic Summit – TOES) and a number of mass demonstrations. The first 
TOES took place in London in 1984, parallel to the G7 Summit also taking place there. 
These were transnational events with alternative thinkers from across the world taking 
part. The 1985 TOES was co-sponsored by the WHO and the European Parliament. 
“People in both organisations are evidently sufficiently disillusioned with official eco-
nomics to try the opposition”  (Swartz 1985).  
While public demonstrations and other events (e.g. prayer vigils) accompanied 
all IMF/World Bank AGMs in Washington from 1986 (Scholte 2001a), the first major 
mobilisations took place during the 1988 AGM in Berlin. Preparations for the counter 
IMF and World Bank events took place over a two year period involving radical ‘au-
tonomist’  groups  who  aimed   to  disrupt   the  conference  and  a   large  coalition  aiming   to  
protest peacefully made up of peace activists, left-wing unions, Third world solidarity 
groups, faith-based groups, NGOs and the Green Party which provided major finance 
for the coalition (Interviewee Germany No. 1).  The Berlin events were highlighted in 
advance as a key moment for debt activists by AITEC 1988, Conferencia de las Organi-
zaciones No Gubernamentales in Lima 1988 and the UK Debt Crisis Network. 
Three major activities took place: a counter-congress, decentralised protest ac-
tivities and a mass demonstration (Interviewee Germany No. 1; Days of Dissent no 
date). Among the organisers of the ‘counter-congress’ in which 4,000 people participat-
ed were a number of political parties—the youth wing of the Social Democrats, the 
Greens, West Berlin’s   Communist Party. Discussions included whether the IMF and 
World Bank could be reformed or should be abolished (Colitt 1988a). The German mo-
bilisation also provided a space for groups from outside Germany to organise events. 
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An International  Citizens’  Conference  on  the  World  Bank,  Environment  and  Indigenous  
People with five hundred participants from around the world blamed the debt crisis for 
creating pressure to exploit Amazonia to generate export earnings (Bank Information 
Centre no date). A Permanent Tribunal of the Peoples was convened with a jury which 
included two Nobel prize winners and an ex-IMF economist acting unofficially as the 
defence. The IMF and World Bank were accused of "grave violations" of their original 
goals and the principles of international law (Colitt 1988b). The Tribunal took the posi-
tion that the institutions should be abolished (Budhoo 1994). 80,000 people demonstrat-
ed against the impoverishment of the developing world by IMF policies in what was 
one of the biggest mobilisations in post war Berlin. (Days of Dissent no date) Smaller 
radical and grass roots groups kept up a barrage of direct action throughout the meet-
ings,  including  a  demonstration  at  Tegel  airport  as  a  ‘welcoming  ceremony’  for  bankers  
and officials arriving for the meetings (Financial Times 1988). The IMF and World 
Bank were on the defensive with IMF managing director, Michel Camdessus, pleading 
to journalists not to make the IMF a scapegoat in the Third World's economic crisis. 
World  Bank  president  Barber  Conable,  borrowing  temporarily  from  the  protesters’  dis-
course, told a West German newspaper that “his agency is no agent of colonialism try-
ing to keep the Third World in bondage to the rich” (Crane 1988). The level of mobili-
sation in Germany went far beyond the expectations of the broad coalition which organ-
ised the events  and  was  seen  as  “a new type of critical civil society response to the debt 
crisis and Bretton Woods Institutions” (Interview Germany No.1).   
The 1989 G7 summit in Paris was timed to coincide with the bicentenary of the 
French revolution with both the French government and civil society groups leveraging 
the symbolism of the anniversary. On the official front, Mitterand invited the leaders of 
twenty developing nations to celebrate the bicentenary of the revolution in addition to 
his G7 colleagues (Phillips 1989a). The Other Economic Summit attracted 1000 partici-
pants (TOES USA 2004) and was organised by a broad coalition, including Tribunal 
Permanent des Peuples, CEDETIM, Agir Ici, CIMADE, Terre des Hommes, Justice et 
Paix (La Otra Bolsa de Valores 1990). 
 In contrast to the G7 summit of the richest countries, the alternative summit 
dubbed  itself  the  P7,  the  summit  of  7  of  the  world’s  poorest  countries  – Burkina Faso, 
Bangladesh, Haiti, Amazonian Indians, Mozambique, Philippines and Zaire, chosen for 
their levels of poverty and to provide a geographic spread. Le Monde captured the sym-
bolism  in  an  article   titled  ‘Two  International  Encounters   in  Paris,   the  Summit  and   the  
Abyss’  (Lebaube  1989). Echoing  the  OAU  and  the  Berlin  People’s  Tribunal  on  interna-
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tional debt, the final declaration called on the UN to convene a special international 
conference of debtors and creditors to find a political solution to the debt (CEDETIM 
1989).  In addition fifteen   thousand  people   demonstrated   against   ‘debt,   apartheid   and  
colonialism’  under  the  slogan  ‘Ça suffit’, and a hundred thousand took part in a concert 
in the Place Bastille. Celebrities involved were the writer Gilles Perrault, and singer Re-
naud (Le Monde 1989, Phillips 1989b). While some of the French organisers had partic-
ipated in the 1988 counter-events in Berlin, the 1989 events were mainly French. Some 
delegations came from other countries but this was limited (Interviewee France No. 1). 
The 1989 events had transnational impact as they inspired the setting up of CADTM, 
which was started in Belgium in 1990 by people who had participated in the French 
events (Interviewee Belgium No. 2).  
 
Engaging with Multilateral Organisations 
 
While global governance with its norm promoting civil society participation was not 
embedded during the 1980s, policy engagement with the World Bank began through the 
World Bank NGO Working Group (WB NGO WG) which was set up in 1981. The aim 
was to develop collaboration between NGOs and World Bank at project level, com-
posed of 26 NGOs from different regions and Bank officials (Arruda 1993). Under 
pressure from more radical organisations, in 1984 NGO members decided to organise 
separately from the World Bank and to take part in dialogue within the Bank from this 
position of autonomy (Cleary 1996). Three major policy issues were highlighted by the 
NGO committee - structural adjustment, popular participation and disclosure of infor-
mation (Covey 1998; Arruda 1993). A fundamental question raised by the committee 
was whether it was possible for NGOs to collaborate with the World Bank while main-
taining a critical position, and whether it was possible for the Bank to take criticism 
from NGOs with which it collaborated (Arruda 1993). Covey (1998) defines the NGO 
Working Group on the World Bank as an example of critical cooperation, relationships 
within which there are high degrees of both conflict and cooperation, an approach which 
is appropriate to pursue incremental but not structural change. Criticism of the WB 
NGO WG continued with a view among some organisations that NGOs on the working 
group “…were serving the Bank as a fig leaf of respectability by providing public rela-
tions cover through which the Bank would be able to dissipate criticism” (Cleary 1996, 
p.72).   
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5.4 Making common cause transnationally 
In addition to the transnational mobilisations paralleling international financial 
summits outlined above, which provided opportunities for networking between debt 
groups, a number of autonomous civil society regional and transnational events were 
organised. These were key events creating the trust and understandings which held 
transnational activism together.  
 
Latin American regional events 
Trade Unions (TUs) played a key role in regional networking on debt in addition to in-
volvement in popular protest against IMF policies at national level. Eight continental 
TU conferences on debt took place between 1984 and 1988. These took place in Cuer-
navaca, Mexico in August 1984, Madrid in June 1985, Havana in July 1985, Bogota in 
August l985, Buenos Aires in November 1986, Lima in March 1987, Campinas, Sao 
Paolo in May 1987, and Lima in September 1987 (Mujica 1988). In addition to the 
south/north divide, TUs were bisected by cold war divisions and conferences were or-
ganised by TUs affiliated to both the western allied ICFTU and the eastern linked 
WFTU and by those which were unaligned. A common theme, however, was the need 
for the broadest consensus within a united Front going beyond ideological alignments.  
The various proposals from the conferences reflected the strong emphasis in Latin 
America during the l980s of a solution initiated by debtor governments   including   ‘no 
pago’ (‘don’t  pay’).  Mujica (1988) sums up the proposed solutions emerging from the 
conferences as threefold: (a) solving the debt crisis involving a number of solutions - 
identify and repudiate illegitimate debt; put a cap on payment of the remaining debt; 
 (b) reform the international economic order; (c) radical change to the national econom-
ic order to first pay the social debt owed to impoverished people.  His assessment was 
that the most significant progress had been made in analysing the debt problem but that 
there had been little progress in terms of joint action although days and weeks of action 
were  decided  on  with  1988  declared  an  ‘International  Year of Struggle against Payment 
of  the  Foreign  Debt’  (Potter  1988  p164).  In  particular, Mujica highlights the lack of ac-
tion to get the support of northern trade unions in industrialised countries.  
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Regional Africa 
 
 
The first African TU meeting on debt took place in 1987 in Ethiopia, organised by the 
WFTU and the Organisation of African TU Unity (African TU Conference 1987).  TU 
leaders from twenty eight countries participated together with two regional TU organi-
sations s and representatives of the OAU, ILO and African Development Bank. It was 
linked to the OAU heads of state meeting on debt mentioned above (OAU 1987), which 
took place a week earlier. The TU conference took note of the outcome of that summit, 
showing that civil society and states were interacting, rather than staying as parallel 
worlds. Blame was laid on transnational corporations, rich governments and their agen-
cies the IMF and World Bank and on African governments because of their unsustaina-
ble policies, economic mismanagement and corruption. The illegitimacy of much of the 
debt was highlighted – some loans were not properly documented, some were fraudu-
lent, money was stolen with the collusion of the lenders. Among the solutions were that 
debt should be cancelled by creditors, or else collectively repudiated. The right of the 
people carrying the debt burden to participate in the solution was stressed. The Cartage-
na Group was interpreted as a Latin American debtor cartel and the OAU was urged to 
form an African debtor cartel linked with Latin America debtors and face the creditor 
cartel with a debtor cartel. If debts were to be repudiated, education and mass mobilisa-
tion would be needed, so   that   the  ‘broad  masses’  could  protect governments that took 
progressive nationalist positions on debt from attacks from imperialists.  
As in the case of the Latin American TUs, the need to build broad unity was 
identified. They envisaged popular alliances at local and national level, coming together 
on a continental basis and both south/south and south/north. This was a mammoth job 
and in the l980s there seemed to be limited mechanisms to pursue such an ambitious 
programme. Latin America and Africa TUs tried to define different roles for govern-
ments and for TUs, nationally, regionally and transnationally but it was difficult to iden-
tify what the next steps beyond the conferences would be. The making of transnational 
civil society was a struggle in itself, apart from the struggle over the debt crisis. 
 
Regional Europe 
Fondad in the Netherlands was the first European organisation to start international 
networking on debt with Latin America and the Philippines. In l989 Fondad organised 
the first European conference on debt, with the participation of Jan Timberged author of 
the original NIEO report.  Fondad’s  aim  was  to  strengthen  European work on debt and 
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share the costs of networking with other NGOs. From this, Eurodad emerged involving 
INGOs, NGOs and national debt networks.  As will be seen in the next chapter, Euro-
dad became a major transnational actor on debt during the 1990s.  
 
South/north civil society events 
A number of south/north civil society events led by NGOs took place during the 1980s 
and two of these on which reports were available, are outlined below. 
A workshop on debt and adjustment took place in Oxford in 1987 co-organised 
by Oxfam UK, Queen Elizabeth House, and the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service 
(UN-NGO 1987). There were fifty eight participants from southern and northern NGOs, 
six representatives of the UN system (including the World Bank) and CIDA. An aim of 
the conference was to explore how south and north NGOs could work together on pub-
lic education and campaigning. Notable was the emphasis on the need for adjustment in 
northern countries involving a reduction in northern consumption rather than focussing 
exclusively on the need to tackle the impact of adjustment on southern countries which 
subsequently became the focus of civil society campaigning.  The proposals for action 
were very broad and reflected the complex situation activists /NGOs were facing – debt 
to banks, individual governments and international financial institutions. The conclusion 
laid out a multi-layered strategy aimed at each of these bodies. To enable this to happen, 
south/north coordinated action, from information sharing to developing a common 
agenda for simultaneous international lobbying, was needed. Efforts were made to clari-
fy complementary roles for southern and northern groups respectively. The conclusions 
recognised debtor governments’  resistance with NGOs urged to support debtors who put 
a ceiling on debt servicing, as Peru had the previous year, and to campaign for a man-
date  for  the  International  Court  of  Justice  to  judge  responsibility  in  the  case  of  ‘repudi-
ated’  loans.  
In 1988 a coalition of Peruvian NGOs and the network of EU NGOs organised a 
transnational meeting in Lima with two hundred and forty nine delegates from thirty-
three countries (Latin America, the Caribbean, USA, Europe and Asia). There were rep-
resentatives from thirty Latin American TUs and rural organisations; representatives of 
four governments (Peru, Sweden, Cuba and Nicaragua); of five international organisa-
tions, including UNICEF, UNDP CIAT and CEPAL); and of 21 south /north NGO net-
works. This conference was originally proposed by a Peruvian NGO to support to the 
Peruvian government which was under pressure following the 10% cap it had placed on 
debt servicing. As the organisation of the conference developed, it became independent 
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of the Peruvian government. The conference, however, was addressed by the Peruvian 
Minister of Economics and Finance (Conferencia 1988).  
At the level  of  discourse  this  conference  made  a  clear  option  for   the  ‘no  pago’  
(‘don’t   pay’)   position   based   on   delegitimising   the   debt   and   creating   a   popular  move-
ment  ‘debtor  cartel’  and  stressed   that  any solution to the debt problem must be a step 
towards an NIEO. The focus was on how to achieve common action – horizontally 
across popular movements and also south/north. In relation to south/north engagement, 
it was recognised that they had different needs of each other and that they operated 
within different domestic contexts presenting different constraints. Priorities were to 
strengthen Latin American NGO networks and information sharing south/north with 
northern NGOs supplying the necessary resources. As in the case of the Oxford confer-
ence, how to coordinate transnational action remained a challenge, including the devel-
opment of appropriate south/north relations.  
 
South/north 
 
More structured European/Latin American engagement was started in 1987 through 
Fondad, supported by the major Dutch NGOs and economists such as Robert Triffin and 
Jan Tinbergen. Fondad had a secretariat in The Hague, and membership in Brazil, Nica-
ragua, Peru and Chile. The purpose of the network was to promote debate on debt poli-
cies, working together to influence international decision makers and to engage with 
Ministries of Finance and other decision makers at national level. Debt was seen as a 
signal of a malfunctioning system, not as an issue in itself. Illegitimate debt was a 
strong concern in Latin America, but it was difficult to make progress on the issue. 
When the Sandinistas came to power, they chose the legitimate route of negotiating and 
getting better terms of payment, rather than confront the creditors and refuse to pay.  An 
aim of the work by Latin American groups was to raise public awareness and put pres-
sure on politicians to take a stronger role with creditors and not to accept adjustment 
programmes (Interviewee Netherlands No. 2). Tensions arose within the network over 
the respective roles of Latin American and European Fondad, including differences over 
policy, and also ownership. Issues included Latin American groups seeking a greater 
role in decision making (Donnelly 2002) and whether priority should be given to 
strengthening the work of individual organisations or developing joint work. As always 
in south/ north relations the fact that the northern (Dutch) partner in the network was 
also the funder impacted on relationships (Interviewee Netherlands No. 2). Fondad’s 
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work was also affected by the adoption of the Brady Bonds in 1989 which created the 
perception that the Latin American debt problem had diminished. (Donnelly 2002). Fi-
nally, at a meeting between the Dutch organisations and Fondad Latin America, the sit-
uation was resolved with an agreement that the European and Latin American organisa-
tions would operate independently of each other (Interviewee Coordinator Eurodad 
No.1). 
 
Fault lines within common cause 
 
Common cause arrived at by campaign groups are always fragile and subject to ten-
sions, negotiations, splits or the dissolution of groups. The main cleavages in the debt 
movement were based on conditionality and south/north imbalances of power which 
were reflected in transnational civil society.  
Discussion took place in south /north fora and in southern fora about the kind of 
south/north joint working needed to deal with issues like debt which went beyond coun-
try to country solidarity. There were calls from gatherings of southern NGOs for north-
ern NGOs to focus  on  changing  their  governments’  and  multilateral  organisations’  poli-
cies which negatively impacted on southern countries and to support southern NGOs to 
carry out development work at country level:  
 
Non-African NGOs should strengthen their advocacy work internationally and 
in their home countries and with regard to bilateral donors and the multilateral 
system, closely monitoring their response to the African crisis and holding donor 
governments and agencies accountable for their policies and actions. (Arusha 
Declaration 1990) 
 
Discussion took place also at south/north events on debt as to how this division of la-
bour would work. Speaking at the Oxford l987 debt conference, a member of the Third 
World Network suggested a complementary relationship with mobilisation in the south, 
where the impacts are felt, with the results then transferred to the north which are in a 
better position to lobby as this is where power lies (UN-NGO 1987). An underlying 
question was who was to decide on priority issues and on the solutions to press for. 
While the principled position may be that southern groups should lead, there was recog-
nition that northern groups had their own challenges to face.  One southern contributor 
at the 1987 conference suggested that the south should provide a set of issues to the 
north, based on evidence from the grassroots. Reading their own publics, northern 
groups should decide which issue they could best promote domestically. Issues which 
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might be crucial to Peru or Ghana might not lead to effective mobilisation in the north. 
A speaker from the Netherlands at the l988 conference in Lima stated: 
 
In l968 we acted on behalf of the south; in l988 we must act with southern 
NGOs responding to their demands. (Conferencia1988, p.152) 
 
 But she went on to outline the difficulties in responding to southern calls for greater 
action in the north. The massive European campaign against cruise missiles in l983 had 
diverted attention from poorer countries and according to her, the European solidarity 
movements had not yet recovered (Conferencia 1988). While southern and northern 
groups were groping towards a modus operandi, issues of leadership, of autonomy of 
action and the direction of accountability remained grey areas as was manifested in ten-
sions within the first on going south/north network, Fondad. 
As debt was a lever which opened the door to the imposition of neoliberal poli-
cies of liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation on debtor countries, conditionality was 
a major source of tension. Should conditions be attached to loans or debt deals and if so, 
who should set them? Was this a breach of sovereignty which should be opposed or was 
it an opportunity to ensure better use of resource in southern countries to tackle poverty 
given the misuse of much of the borrowed  money?  War  on  Want’s  1986  campaign  sup-
ported conditionality to rein in southern elites:  
 
War on Want makes the irrefutable case that conditions attached to World Bank 
and other loans should discourage the atmosphere in which Latin America's 
wealthy enrich themselves on borrowed money. Instead the conditions should 
encourage social and development programmes, and link lending to the redistri-
bution of wealth. (Rodgers 1986) 
 
The Oxford 1987  conference  called  for  “an alternative adjustment policy that responds 
to the needs of the  poor  and  promotes  development” (UN-NGO 1987, p. 4). Condition-
ality was a major source of contention for Latin America and Philippines activists. 
While everyone wanted to see increased resources going to, for example, health, the 
southern groups' position was “we’ll make those decisions, not  you” (Interviewee Ire-
land No. 1). The TU Conference in Bogota 1985 denounced the imperialist policies 
which damaged sovereignty and self-determination (Mujica 1988). Divisions on condi-
tionality were not confined to the south/ north interface but arose also from different 
ideological positions. One of the reasons for the dissolution of the US Debt Crisis Net-
work was disagreement over whether they should call for a revision of SAP similar to 
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the one which emerged from the Oxford conference or condemn it as an imperialist in-
tervention (Donnelly 2002). Parallel to analyses critiquing the substance of adjustment – 
whether from a reformist or radical perspective – activists pinpointed the Achille’s  heel 
of global governance: the lack of an accountability mechanism to those who were af-
fected by adjustment programmes. Numerous calls were made for the participation of 
poor people themselves in the decision making process on adjustment but there were no 
proposals as to a process whereby this could take place. 
5.5 Creditor action 
Two international debt deals were adopted towards the end of the 1980s, The Toronto 
Terms 1988 and the Brady Bonds 1999.  The l988 Toronto Terms were introduced by 
Britain, and a parallel proposal was brought forward by the French government ,with 
the final Toronto Terms a compromise between the two proposals (Attali 2005; IMF 
1999; Lawson 1992). The deal provided limited relief on the debt owed by low-income 
countries to bilateral creditors, but represented  a   shift   in  creditors’  perception  of   low-
income country debt as one of temporary liquidity to recognition that some debt reduc-
tion was necessary. The inadequacy of the Toronto Terms, however, became quickly 
clear with Adedeji (1990) estimating that the Toronto Terms would deliver a mere 
$500million over a ten year period. In a report to World Bank Development Committee 
1990, World Bank president highlighted that by the end of the century only an estimated 
11 per cent of the countries' long-term debt would be relieved by the Toronto Terms 
(Fidler 1990). The terms  were  continually  ‘enhanced’  throughout  the  1990s. Seeking to 
establish the strength of the relationship between civil society action and creditor re-
sponses is difficult. While he describes the process through which the Toronto Terms 
were pursued in his memoirs, Lawson (2002) does not explain his motivation other than 
recognition that poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa could not repay their debts and a 
wish to steal a march on the French. Nor does Evans (1999), who at the time worked in 
the international finance side of the British Treasury, give any clear account of what 
prompted the initiative. One possible motivation was that the UK was not going to take 
a progressive position on aid or trade at that time, and action on debt would not be very 
costly for the UK, but Britain could be seen as taking action on a high profile issue (In-
terviewee UK No. 5). What is difficult to assess is the influence of the calls from the 
OAU for action on Africa’s  debt  or the domestic support mobilised by the Oxfam and 
other campaign. Overall, there is little recognition of the role of civil society campaign-
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ing in the 1980s in the literature. Some suggest that that no significant NGO pressure 
was involved in the emergence of the Toronto Terms (Scholte 2002 fn56). Yanacopulos 
(2004, p.723), however, refers to how NGO campaigning on debt in l980s influenced 
the British government and how this translated into pressure on the World Bank Board 
of Directors.    
Brady Bonds introduced in 1989 on the initiative of the US aimed at easing 
commercial debt, particularly in Latin America and are named after the architect of the 
scheme, then US Treasury Secretary, Nicholas Brady. The scheme represented some 
recognition that debt reduction was needed and IMF and World Bank resources were 
used to encourage banks in this direction. The scheme involved swapping existing loans 
for low interest bonds backed by the US Treasury. There were a number of reasons for 
the change in US policy. When Bush was inaugurated as president in January 1989 he 
made a commitment to reviewing the debt strategy. According to International Banking:  
 
The prospect that debt problems could contribute to the end of the democratic 
process in a number of Latin American countries, or trigger regional econom-
ic instability with severe consequences for the whole of the western hemi-
sphere, appears to be the reason for the swiftness of the action. In other words, 
in US eyes, the crisis has moved more definitely from the financial and eco-
nomic sphere, to the political. (International Banking Report 1989) 
 
The serious rioting in Venezuela in March 1989 against the austerity programme intro-
duced, which left hundreds dead, is recognised as increasing the pressure for action 
(Boughton 2001; Miles 1999; Kilborn 1989; Main 1989). Further, it was clear that the 
continuous rescheduling over the l980s were not resolving the debt crisis, with massive 
net transfers from debtors to creditors continuing. A net transfer of resources from debt-
or governments to creditors in 1988 of over $40 billion seriously reduced living stand-
ards. Average incomes in Latin America were a tenth below those of the previous dec-
ade (Huhne 1989). There  was  also  ‘debt  fatigue’, with banks reluctant to lend new mon-
ey as part of restructuring deals (Edelman and Hart 2003). But as the health of commer-
cial banks had improved, they were able to substantially write down debt. Geopolitical 
factors may also have come into play as Japan had introduced a debt reduction plan at 
the 1988 G7 in a bid to get a larger role for itself in the world financial system (Green-
house 1988). The Brady plan introduced by the US in 1989 was very similar to the Jap-
anese plan. The scheme did not result in significant debt reduction, but contributed to 
restoring investor confidence in Latin America, and therefore there was a perception at 
the end of the 1980s that the systemic debt crisis was over. However, while private fi-
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nance returned to Latin America, this was disproportionately speculative finance laying 
the basis for future financial crises starting with the Mexican crisis in 1994. The Brady 
Deal, therefore, can be seen as the result of a number of factors - the interaction of the 
interests of banks suffering debt fatigue, the people of Venezuela resisting an attack on 
their livelihoods and how these impacted on US interests – financial because of the ex-
posure  of  US  banks  and  security  because  of  the  US’  perception  of  radical action in its 
near neighbour as a threat.  
Both the Toronto and Brady deals were conditional on countries following 
IMF/World Bank programmes which  copper-fastening neoliberal policies. This meant a 
further contraction of the space at national level for debtor country civil society groups 
to influence   their   government’s   policies   – providing further impetus towards transna-
tional civil society action focussing on the IMF and World Bank and G7. While both 
deals emanated from IGOs – G7/IMF-World Bank – the immediate catalyst in terms of 
civil society involvement was national level action which had an impact because of the 
positioning of both countries in question. Venezuela’s   geographic   positioning meant 
that any social instability was perceived as a threat to the US. In the case of the cam-
paign   on  Africa’s debt, the impact arose from the fact that situated in a G7 country, 
Oxfam was able to impact on the G7 through influencing the British government. Re-
flecting on this, the then Oxfam campaign manager commented:  
 
Nowadays it is so much easier for civil society to campaign internationally, to 
network   internationally;;   in   those  days…,   it  was  much  more  difficult...It   took  a  
long time to send a letter to an NGO in another country and get a response..  it 
was ironically easier to press the British government to do something and the 
British govt made it an international issue. (Interviewee UK No. 2) 
5.6 Conclusion 
Debt campaigning developed in the 1980s against the backdrop of the ‘neoliberal coun-
ter-revolution’. The impact was particularly acute in southern countries, where the debt 
issue was used as an opportunity to restructure the southern state through programmes 
which adjusted government priorities away from domestic welfare and economic needs 
to the requirements of the world economy. Civil society, however, did not adopt un-
problematically to the changing world order, but rather held on to the alternative dis-
courses – of the NIEO, liberation theology – and maintained faith that the emergence of 
revolutionary governments such as in Nicaragua would help rebalance unequal power 
relations in world order.  
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Developing transnational civil society power 
An emphasis during the 1980s was on reaching the shared understandings of the debt 
issue and how to contest it, which would enable transnational debt campaigning, and 
this was the aim of the discourse events organised regionally and transnationally. Two 
major areas of knowledge were involved: understanding the dominant powers govern-
ing debt; and developing a technical understanding of the issue. As regards dominant 
power  relations,  dispersing  the  fog  of  Cox’s  nébuleuse in order to identify the responsi-
ble agents was complicated due to the intermeshing of both the national and the transna-
tional arenas, and the governmental and market sectors within the debt issue. Rather 
than a clear target and short causal chain (Keck and Sikkink 1998), a wide range of dis-
parate targets were identified: market actors (international banks and MNCs), national 
governments (creditor and debtor governments) and international organisations (IMF). 
Sometimes these bodies were linked as principal/agent, for example, the African OAU 
TU conference saw rich governments and the IMF and World Bank as agents of MNCs. 
This resulted in very  broad  analyses  which  didn’t  lead  easily  to  action, as highlighted by 
Mujica (1988) or in very complex proposed programmes, as at the Oxford and Lima 
Conferences (Conferencia 1988; UN-NGO 1987).  
In terms of the national/international interface the focus in the 1980s was more 
on the creation of the transnational linkages between debt groups rather than on active 
campaigning across the national/international divide. Rather than set up a centralised 
international campaign, looser forms were developed whereby activism from national 
and regional fora could aggregate up into a transnational practice within decentred co-
ordination. New structures which emerged towards the end of the 1980s were either re-
gional such as Eurodad, or national groupings FDC, UK Debt Crisis Network, but there 
was no overarching transnational formation.  
As regards the south/north relationship, this research conceptualises it as a dy-
namic one driven by solidarity and conflict. The roots of this relationship can be seen at 
the various transnational debt discourse events where efforts were made to define ap-
propriate  south/north  relationship  within  a  solidarity  framework,  playing  to  each  other’s  
strengths. The seeds of the conflict can found in the 1980s, when the first organised ef-
fort at south/north solidarity on debt through Fondad foundered due to tensions over de-
cision making and agenda setting. This reflects the breakdown in advocacy networks 
because of tension between those advocating on behalf of those who are affected and 
direct involvement of those directly affected (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Reitan 2007).  
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There were also conflicts over adjustment conditions applied by creditors. Sov-
ereignty was a very strong theme for southern groups (Keck and Sikkink 1998), with 
debt and adjustment programmes seen as undermining both sovereignty and the fragile 
democracies which had recently replaced military regimes or dictatorships in many 
debtor countries. Some northern groups, however, were prepared to bypass that sover-
eignty, seeking improvements for impoverished people through conditions imposed on 
debtor governments by northern powers. While the cleavage over conditionality did not 
fit a simple south/north divide, the importance of sovereignty meant that conditionality 
became a particularly sensitive issue across the south/north interface.  
 
Exercising Power 
 
Leveraging knowledge to challenge debt policies had two levels. As described above 
the NIEO, anti-imperialism and liberation theology provided a broad backdrop against 
which to position debt. The other level was the more detailed technical knowledge, and 
many groups struggled at the technical level throughout the 1980s, unsure how to inter-
pret developments such as the G7 Toronto Terms. Challenging the unequal relations 
which had generated the debt crisis and seeking alternatives - the  NIEO  or  ‘economics  
as if people mattered’  (Ekins 1986) - was a strong aim of many groups including TOES, 
FDC and southern TUs. Structurally based discourse appears to have been particularly 
linked to the major mobilising events such as in Berlin 1988 with more focussed lever-
aging of public understandings by national campaigns. Oxfam framed African debt to 
generate public shock at resources flowing from Africa to rich countries when many of 
these were suffering famine and drought. FDC leveraged public opposition to repaying 
the illegitimate debt from Marcos regime. The Swiss campaign used the symbolism of 
the Swiss 700th anniversary to mobilise public support for debt cancellation. Overall 
there was a strong structural element to challenges to the debt in the 1980s, as alterna-
tives still appeared possible – from revolutionary governments or because socialist al-
ternatives had not yet been written off with the fall of the Berlin Wall. With the growing 
entrenchment of neoliberalism, however, there was a shift, although not universal, to-
wards seeking reformist solutions to the crisis rather than focussing on major change in 
power relations.   
In terms of operating across the national/international interface, protests and 
campaigning were mainly aimed at the national level – at banks and governments.  
When concrete opportunities presented themselves, however, in the form of major 
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summits these were leveraged, as in the IMF/World Bank AGM 1988, discourse events 
at G7 summits, and the more significant mobilisations at the Paris G7 in 1989. While 
national campaigning prevailed, the fact that civil society groups do not have the same 
leverage within a hierarchically structured internationalising state is reflected in the dif-
ferent ways national campaigns targeted their governments. From a debtor country, 
FDC pressured their government to stand up to its creditors, especially in the case of 
fraudulent loans. In a non-G7 country, the Swiss campaign focussed on cancellation of 
debt  owed  to  Switzerland  while  Oxfam’s  campaign  targeted the British state both as na-
tional government and as a member of the G7 in order to achieve action from all official 
creditors.  
While there was a strong adversarial dimension in how debt groups engaged 
with national and international bodies, targeted campaigning geared towards long term 
struggle, as illustrated by the Philippines Freedom from Debt Campaign, was also being 
developed. This involved concerted and sustained struggles with national governments 
and banks. The nature of the relationship between civil society and the state-
internationalising state was largely implicit, with civil society groups keying off posi-
tions taken by states, e.g. capping of debt service by debtor governments and the OAU 
call  for  an  international  conference  on  Africa’s  debt.  There  is  evidence  of more explicit 
alliances operating within particular contexts: for example, the linkage between the Af-
rican TU debt conference and the OAU Summit on debt. Also the Philippine Freedom 
from Debt Coalition maintained close relations with parliamentarians from its earliest 
days with some support also within the government arising from links made during the 
struggle against Marcos.   
Against this background two separate approaches began to emerge. The Lima 
conference  proposed  a  ‘popular  movement  debtors’  cartel’  involving  awareness  raising,  
strengthening Latin American NGO networks and south /north information exchanges. 
The Oxford conference focussed on putting pressure on commercial banks and northern 
governments.  Both  supported  debtors’  right  to  cap  debt  payments. The underlying di-
chotomy between building social movements as the basis for a fundamental challenge to 
power and campaigning for shorter-term reforms is a tension which ran through many 
movements. The significance for the debt movements was that this difference corre-
sponded broadly to the south/north divide.  
Neither of the 1980s debt deals (Toronto Terms 1988, Brady Bonds 1989) 
brought about significant change. But the process of campaigning is a dialectical one – 
winning solutions which throw up new contradictions which are then pursued by further 
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bouts of campaigning. Campaigners can win the argument and get issues on the agenda, 
but they seldom win their preferred solutions (Leipold 2002). 1980s debt campaigning 
can be seen as unfinished business, laying the foundation for the common cause from 
which more coordinated campaigning took off in the 1990s. The next chapter takes the 
story on to the next phase, when campaigning became more coordinated transnationally 
and took place in the context of a different world order following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. 
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Chapter Six: Campaigning for debt cancellation in a uni-polar 
economic world order   
 
6.1 Introduction                  
This chapter moves the story of debt campaigning on to the changed landscape 
of the post-communist world. The two broad campaigning approaches to the debt issue 
which emerged over the course of the 1980s – building social movements to pose sys-
temic challenges and pressing creditors for debt reduction in the shorter term– rolled 
over into the 1990s. While radical social movement approaches continued, however, 
coordinated campaigning with a more technical focus became the dominant approach of 
in the first half of the 1990s. This involved moving away from more radical analyses 
and demands such as the NIEO, which had been supported by civil society groups in the 
1980s, towards technical analysis, more direct engagement with power brokers includ-
ing the G7, IMF and World Bank, and the emergence of debt campaigners as visible 
transnational actors. This shift in debt campaigning coincided with the triumph of ne-
oliberalism and the move to a uni-polar world economy with the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the reduction of space for alternative economic and social frameworks. A further 
change for 1990s campaigning was the move from commercial debt to official debt 
(owed to the IMF and World Bank and to creditor governments). This change followed 
adoption of the Brady Bonds in 1989, which dealt with commercial debt and represent-
ed a shift from Latin American to African debt. As a result the hopes of 1980s cam-
paigners that debtor government resistance would be a significant factor in resolving the 
debt crisis disappeared, as African governments did not have the same leverage as Latin 
American governments, given that African debt posed a human but not a systemic 
threat.  
While this chapter covers the two approaches taken by civil society groups out-
lined above, it focusses in particular on the more technical campaign for debt cancella-
tion. This is because this approach became dominant in the 1990s, and it is from within 
groups using this approach that the Jubilee 2000 campaign emerged in the second half 
of the 1990s. The focus is also particularly on European campaigning as a new actor, 
Eurodad, emerged in 1990 and quickly became a leading group within transnational civ-
il society debt campaigning. As action on debt had decreased in Latin America and the 
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US at the end of the 1980s, partly due to the adoption of the Brady Bonds, debt groups 
were in the process of emerging in Africa at that time.  
The aim of this chapter is to identify how civil society debt groups sought to ex-
ercise power to achieve cancellation of official debt – in particular multilateral debt - in 
this new context. The chapter first sets the scene by providing an overview of the emer-
gence of the new debt initiative of the 1990s, the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initia-
tive (HIPC). It then examines how transnational civil society – mainly European debt 
groups – made common cause. An analysis is then provided of how this common cause 
was used to leverage the geography of power and an examination of the modes of en-
gagement used by debt groups with national and international decision makers. The 
conclusion sets out the findings of this case study in relation to these dimensions.                
6.2 Emergence of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative: an over-
view 
This section provides an overview of the struggle for cancellation of official debt, in 
particular debt owed to the IMF and World Bank which was the focus of debt cam-
paigning during the first half of the 1990s. Cancellation of multilateral debt was strong-
ly resisted by the IMF and World Bank and action for reduction of multilateral debt was 
pushed by both transnational debt groups and elements within the debt nébuleuse. From 
the  end  of  1993,  encouraged  and  supported  by  a  number  of  key  members  of  the  ‘epis-
temic  community’,  multilateral  debt  became a major focus for Eurodad. In spring 1994, 
Eurodad and two of its members, the Berne Declaration (Switzerland) and WEED 
(Germany), drafted a position on multilateral debt which was signed by 200 NGOs 
worldwide. But some NGOs wanted more a more nuanced position on the IMF/World 
Bank creditor position. The issue was resolved by a proposal that the IMF and World 
Bank should be preferred but not exempt creditors (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator 
No. 1). This would give the two institutions priority as creditors but their debt would not 
be exempt from any cancellation. The adoption of this nuanced position on the 
IMF/World Bank creditor position demonstrates the technical level at which some Eu-
ropean NGOs were already operating. The Eurodad campaign for multilateral debt can-
celation was launched in October 1994 at the IMF and World Bank AGM (Bokkerink 
and Van Hees 1998).  
In addition to pressure mounted by debt networks such as Eurodad and its mem-
bers, a range of European social democratic countries, UN bodies, southern government 
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bodies (NAM, G77, G24 ) and G7 members, notably the UK, were also pressing for ac-
tion on multilateral debt. The issue was put on the agenda of the 1994 IMF and World 
Bank AGM in Madrid and the 1995 G7 Summit called on the two institutions to devel-
op a comprehensive approach to the problem (G7 1995). A shift occurred within the 
World Bank in favour of some multilateral debt cancellation, following the appointment 
of Jim Wolfensohn as President in June 1995 (Broome 2009). In September a World 
Bank draft proposal for a Multilateral Debt Facility was leaked to the Financial Times 
and received very hostile responses from the IMF, making public the divisions between 
the two organisations (Holman 1995). The case for multilateral debt reduction was con-
tested over the following year at various transnational fora, - IMF and World Bank 
meetings, Paris Club and G7. The HIPC initiative was finally adopted by the September 
1996 IMF and World Bank AGM. It purported to be a comprehensive approach to the 
debt  of  42  heavily   indebted   low  income  countries  giving   them  an  ‘exit’   from  the  debt  
crisis by bringing their   debt   to   a   ‘sustainable   level’,   defined   by   the   IMF   and  World  
Bank as a level which could be serviced without the country falling into arrears, needing 
rescheduling or compromising growth. The initiative involved countries carrying out six 
years of structural adjustment before receiving debt reduction. The division between 
campaigners on the initiative – whether it was a first step or further copperfastened 
SAP—corresponded to a division between those who saw debt in terms of its impact on 
finance for development and those who saw it as a tool to maintain unequal south/north 
relations through SAP. HIPC remained the framework for dealing with low-income 
country debt into the new millennium and became the focus of further challenge from 
the Jubilee 2000 campaign.  
6.3 Making common cause transnationally 
This section examines how common cause was made across the national, regional (Eu-
rope), transnational and south/north interfaces. Common cause at European level and 
wider was woven through loose regional coordination leaving autonomy for national 
networks6 reflecting the emerging organisational mode for NGOs. Eurodad emerged 
                                                 
6 Networks/coalitions on debt and development issues existed in a range of European countries although 
not all of these survived: in Austria; Belgium (with 20 NGOs); Denmark (coordinated by Danchurchaid); 
Germany (set up in 1992 with 25 NGOs), Ireland (50 NGOs, churches, solidarity groups and TUs); Neth-
erlands (with 27 development and environmental organisations); Norway (SLUG a student’s  network  was  
set up in early 1994 with the support of 20 aid, church, youth and left wing organisations); Sweden (coor-
dinated by Development Forum of Swedish Churches); UK (with 42 members). (Eurodad 1990-1991, 
1994b). 
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from the Fondad network which linked Latin American and Europe debt groups during 
the 1980s. Following the appeal from southern participants at the 1988 debt conference 
in Lima (Eurodad 1993-1995a), Dutch NGOs involved in Fondad organised a confer-
ence for European NGOs in 1989 to encourage greater cooperation and sharing of fi-
nancing of debt work. Eurodad emerged from this conference and from 1991 received 
EC funding. In its early years Eurodad had representatives from thirteen countries (Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK), and a number of networks had observer status 
(CIDSE, Aprodev, Eurostep, World Council of Churches and International Workers 
Aid). The strength of the involvement fluctuated with the European south/north divide 
emerging as a particular fault line. While there was strong participation from Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, 
there was limited exchange with Italy, Portugal and Luxembourg (Eurodad 1994b). In 
terms of debt power relations, three of the four European members of the G7 were in-
volved. There was tension within Eurodad, however, on the appropriate division of la-
bour between national groups and the Eurodad secretariat. The question was: should 
Eurodad provide a service to national members in terms of information and opportuni-
ties for transnational exchanges with other debt activists, or should members concede 
some autonomy to Eurodad to enable it to directly target governments and international 
financial institutions? For national members, Eurodad’s  main  role  was as a service pro-
vider, rather than as a new transnational actor, as members did not concede any sover-
eignty by participating in Eurodad. The German debt network considered itself an au-
tonomous national campaign and did not see Eurodad as providing guidelines for action 
(Interviewee Germany No. 2). This point was reinforced by a member of the UK DCN: 
“Eurodad should promote common policies by member but it is not a policy making 
body itself” (Eurodad 1993-1995b, p.16).  
There were a number of underlying reasons for this. Firstly there were logistical 
problems in running European wide campaigns aimed at public opinion using common 
symbols and activities, as was initially envisaged. An early  campaign  ‘Time  is  Running 
Out’   called  on   governments   to   support   the  Trinidad  Terms (proposed by John Major, 
the then British Chancellor, to increase debt reduction for low-income countries), using 
an egg timer as the campaign symbol. Seven of the eleven country groups reporting on 
national action between 1990 and 1991had taken part in this campaign (Eurodad 1990-
1991).  
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We produced a giant egg timer to go all over Europe but it turned out to be too 
difficult to transport. It was used in Britain…. Some cartoons we produced and a 
number of recommendations we used at European level. And that was the…last  
attempt at a European campaign. (Interviewee Belgium No. 1) 
 
Organisational exigencies made European-wide campaigning unattractive to large 
NGOs who: 
were not interested in one European-wide  campaign…  all  had  some  experience  
of running campaigns with  other  stake  holders  and  couldn’t  come  easily   into  a  
common campaign. Big  organisations  planned  campaigns  over  a  long  period…  
they knew what works with their constituencies with their media targets and 
didn’t  necessarily  want  one  coordination  based  outside the country to design the 
campaign (Interviewee UK No. 3)  
Cultural and historical differences were also a factor in privileging national campaign-
ing.   
In France it was always tricky as French NGOs had a more philosophical radical 
approach; in Britain, Netherlands, Scandinavia , Switzerland Germany we had 
more pragmatic approach (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 1)   
 Historical factors defined national symbols or events which could be leveraged as was 
demonstrated by the huge response to an advert in the German press marking the 40th 
anniversary  of  German’s  1953  debt  deal when all  of  Germany’s  creditors  came together 
in London and agreed significant debt reduction. German debt campaigners contrasted 
the generous terms of that deal with the denial of debt reduction to poor countries. Pub-
lic response was such that the German campaign was able to employ a coordinator (In-
terviewee Germany No. 2). In the context of the variety of cultural and political contexts 
across Europe, producing campaign material at European level, was considered of little 
value - echoing the point made by Tarrow (2005) that global slogans do not necessarily 
adapt well to national political contexts (2005). Eurodad’s  campaigning  role  was subse-
quently   expressed  as  a   “common denomination’  of  national   interests” which could be 
adapted to national level contexts (Eurodad 1993a).  
In  relation  to  influencing  decision  makers,  the  emphasis  was  also  on  Eurodad’s  
role in strengthening national campaigns by providing research, information and policy 
advice, recognising that in most countries NGOs had frequent contact with decision 
makers on debt and had direct access to international institutions and international con-
ferences (Eurodad 1996-1998a). Although a transnational campaigning role for Eurodad 
was  dropped  at  an  early  stage,  Eurodad’s  role  in   lobbying  decision  makers  remained a 
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major issue (Eurodad 1993-1995b). While some wanted a stronger role for Eurodad in 
lobbying the IMF/World or the Paris Club:  
 
People wanted to make their own contacts with decision makers as we were 
learning a lot which we could feed back to partners. We were representing our 
own partners’ point of view. (Interviewee UK No. 3) 
 
There was also wider motivation because  “the impact of 10 different national platforms 
lobbying individually was more effective than subsuming us under one network” (Inter-
viewee UK No. 3).  
 The emerging division of labour with Eurodad providing advice and support to 
action taking place at national level worked well in relation to the production of the 
World Credit Tables, produced by Eurodad in 1995 and in 1996, mirroring the World 
Bank’s  annual  Debt  Tables (Eurodad 1994b; 1996). Creditor country profiles were pro-
vided by national civil society groups. The project was coordinated and launched by 
Eurodad at IMF/World Bank meetings and launched by national groups to their national 
media gaining coverage in UK, Germany, France, Switzerland and the Netherlands (Eu-
rodad 1996).  
As time went on members were more supportive of direct involvement in lobby-
ing and Eurodad emerged as a transnational actor (Broome 2009; Callaghy 2002). There 
were two main reasons for this: because the secretariat spoke for a large network and 
this added weight to its standing with the IMF/World Bank; and its mastery of technical 
issues enabled it to engage officials in serious debate. Eurodad lobbying, however, was 
still seen by its members as complementing and strengthening national lobbying by 
members (Eurodad 1996-1998b).  
While Eurodad was a regional network, its target was not the EU, but interna-
tional financial institutions, and therefore the need to organise to the scale of global de-
cision making (Evans 2008), was recognised from early on (Eurodad 1990-1991, 
1994b).  “In the early 1990s Eurodad had a lead internationally as there was no strong 
debt body in the US, Fondad was less active and Afrodad was just emerging” (Inter-
viewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1) 
 Involving civil society from G7 countries was a priority, and Eurodad sought 
greater involvement from French NGOs (Eurodad 1994a) and supported the emergence 
of German debt network (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1).  Establishing rela-
tions with Japanese NGOs proved difficult, as debt was not a priority for the Japanese 
(Eurodad 1993-1995b). Eurodad/US networking was loose and informal, with some 
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strong alliances emerging between Eurodad and the Washington-based Centre of Con-
cern and later with Oxfam International (OI) which was set up in 1995 (Bokkerink and 
Van Hees 1998). 
Overall, global networking and action on debt tended to be ad hoc and conjunc-
tural in relation to specific issues and events, often taking the form of joint press releas-
es during G7 Summits7, IMF/World Bank meetings or joint letters to decision makers 
(Inter-Church Coalition 1993). A parallel initiative to Eurodad, the Debt Treaty Move-
ment (DTM), illustrates the difficulty of generating a global network on debt. The DTM 
was set up by a loose network of NGOs at the UNCED conference in Rio 1992. Those 
signing the treaty made a series of pledges including to work for massive debt reduction 
starting with the repudiation of illegal debts, and ending structural adjustment. The aim 
was to set up a coordinating committee and, in contrast to Eurodad, it was envisaged 
that joint positions on debt issues and joint campaigns would be undertaken (Debt Trea-
ty 1992). The level of global coordination aimed at was probably too ambitious, and the 
movement had faded out by 1994. In terms of more formal networking, regional and 
national civil society organisations have proved more long lasting.  Eurodad and Af-
rodad, both of which emerged in the first half of the 1990s, and the FDC, set up in 1988, 
all still exist.  
 
South/north  
 
Following on from the dissolution of the Fondad network which linked Dutch and Latin 
American groups working on debt, south/north relations during the early 1990s were 
loose and related to particular issues and events. Eurodad campaigning in the early 
1990s may be seen as representing an example of the south/north division of labour 
emerging at the end of the 1980s, within which the role of northern NGOs was to chal-
lenge the policies of northern governments and financial institutions which impacted 
negatively on southern countries. It is difficult, however, to define an equitable division 
of labour between groups placed unequally within the hierarchical internationalising 
state – any division labour is likely to reflect those inequalities. As pointed out by 
Grenier (2003) the problem for southern debt groups was the lack of channels through 
which they could access powerful northern decision makers. The division of labour set 
out above, while made in good faith appeared to lock in these inequalities, with northern 
                                                 
7 Examples are: a statement issued by CBRM, 50 Years Is Enough, Eurodad, Halifax Initiative at the 
1994 Lyon G7 Summit (Nutting 1996); a statement issued during the G7 Summit in Halifax 1995 by 
TWN, 50 Years Is Enough, Eurodad, Halifax Initiative, Mexican Action Network (Umoren 1995). 
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groups being the access point to creditors. While major south/north tensions did not 
emerge during this period, the contradictions thrown up by northern groups taking this 
role came to a head later in the Jubilee 2000 campaign. 
The Debt Treaty Movement presupposed that there is a north in the south and a 
south in the north and did not distinguish between the roles of southern and northern 
organisations. In the more operational relationships which developed within debt cam-
paigning in the 1990s, southern groups played particular roles in transnational cam-
paigning. Creditor country debt groups needed links with groups from their countries’  
debtors (e.g. Germany with Nicaragua, Belgium with the Congo and Rwanda). Southern 
groups provided expert information and legitimacy through their contribution to north-
ern conferences and public events. Eurodad invited southern debt experts to the TOES 
at the London 1991 G7 Summit including Leonor Briones, from the FDC, Dr. Alvaro 
Diaz from Chile, Dr. Allast Mwanza from Zimbabwe and Reinaldo Goncalves from the 
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, all of whom were closely involved in 
grass-roots organisations (Nduru 1991b). Groups from Africa, Central and Southern 
America and Asia participated in a major conference on multilateral debt in 19948. Eu-
rodad organised consultations with southern groups as part of its annual conference but 
these were limited – in 1993 the aim was to invite two participants from each of Africa, 
Asia and Latin America (Eurodad 1993f). Southern groups also introduced their priori-
ties into transnational debt campaigning with the issue of illegitimate debt highlighted 
by FDC and budget monitoring, responsible lending and borrowing raised by UDN (In-
terviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1). 
Although   some   southern   groups   did   not   agree  with   Eurodad’s  moderate   posi-
tions, the radical/reform spectrum did not correspond to a simple south/north divide as 
there were radical groups within Europe (CADTM) and in the US (50 Years Is Enough), 
as well as in the south. A different potential source of tension was that northern NGOs 
might develop autonomous relationships with southern governments, bypassing south-
ern civil society. Although as a matter of principle northern NGOs did not engage di-
rectly with southern governments, but worked through southern NGOs (Eurodad 
1993d), when Eurodad published its World Credit Tables this resulted in good working 
relations with some governments – Bolivia and Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania. This was a 
potential source of tension, as Eurodad had direct relations with southern government 
which southern NGO sometimes did not have (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1).  
                                                 
8 Those attending came from : Dette et Investissements Senegal, Afrodad, Recursos Externos Nicaragua, 
FDC, representatives of the Asian Coalition on Debt and Adjustment, the Coordinator of the NGO WB 
WG, and a representative of Fondad Latin America (International NGO conference Report 1994). 
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In terms of the common cause developed, the mechanism of the global campaign 
was mainly discursive. Eurodad (1994b) gives eight examples of action involving Euro-
pean and global network, seven of which were discourse events for transnational debt 
groups. Activities involved sharing information/research and identifying joint action to 
be carried out by national groups or by short term conjunctural alliances. There is no 
sense that European NGOs felt the need for a strong centralised campaign within which 
they would pool some of their autonomy. “Overall, while Eurodad was very important 
to its members, for most of them national priorities are seen as more important” (Euro-
dad 1993-1995b).  But much is masked by the simple definition of national level used in 
NGO documents. NGOs, the backbone of debt activism, while based in particular na-
tional territories, operate within a complicated geography – as part of national civil so-
ciety, engaged in transnational alliances through networks like Eurodad and working 
through their funding/solidarity partnerships with southern groups which includes a 
commitment to represent the views of those partners within transnational advocacy.  
In terms of south /north relations, debt campaigning in the first half of the 1990s 
comes between the tensions between Latin America and Dutch groups within Fondad 
during the 1980s and the south/north contradictions which arose during the Jubilee 2000 
campaign. The difference was that there were no formal south/north structures during 
the early 1990s. As pointed out by Keck and Sikkink (1998) networks tend to break 
down when they include those acting on behalf of and those directly affected by the 
problem being tackled.  
6.4 Debt nébuleuse in action 
Debt campaigners faced a debt nébuleuse consisting of a web of actors involving alli-
ances and conflicts between governments, within governments and within and between 
the IMF and World Bank. The G7 were lobbied by UN organisations, by the G77 and 
NAM and by non-G7 creditor countries: 
 
[A]…loosely  knit  and  floating  group  of  countries’  working  together  on  debt  is-
sues - including Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria and Swit-
zerland – lobbied the major creditors for more generous debt reduction” (Cal-
laghy 2002, p.24).  
 
New approaches to debt emerged from these coalitions of like-minded governments fa-
cilitated by the fact that countries are not totally internally unified and may follow dif-
ferent policies in different transnational fora. At the Paris Club creditor countries were 
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represented by their Export Credit Agencies for whom debt collection was the major 
concern while countries are represented by their aid agencies at Consultative Group 
meetings  which  bring  together  a  country’s  donors  and  the  World  Bank. Operating with-
in different discourses, the government development cooperation sections often have 
different   interests  and  agendas   from   their  country’s  Export  Credit  Agencies (Callaghy 
2002, p.24). Early movement on multilateral debt emerged from an initiative taken by 
Uganda’s   Consultative Group, rather than from the central organisations of the debt 
nébuleuse (Callaghy 2002). 
France had a particular national interest in maintaining the status of the Paris 
Club, which was threatened by the shift of the centre of gravity of the debt nébuleuse 
from Paris to Washington, with the emergence of the HIPC initiative. France insisted 
that the debt problem could be dealt with via existing mechanisms, the Paris Club (Cal-
laghy 2002, p.29), and strongly opposed a significant role for the World Bank (op cit 
p.32). As regards a possible role for the EC in the debt issue, the limited initiatives pro-
posed were blocked by Britain (usually a proponent of debt reduction), Germany and 
France, who argued that there were other fora to deal with debt and that writing off the 
debt would undermine the overall debt strategy (Leen 1995, Eurodad 1993 c). As mem-
bers of the G7, these three countries were dominant actors in those other fora. 
As regards the World Bank and IMF there were differences between member 
states on the boards of these institutions, conflicts between staff within the World Bank 
and also conflicts between the two institutions. While some World Bank board members 
supported debt reduction (UK, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland), others had con-
cerns (U.S., Canada, Australia, China India and Indonesia) with others opposed (France, 
Japan, Italy, and Germany) (Callaghy 2002, p.28). There were also major divisions 
within World Bank management and staff with strong proponents of debt reduction re-
ceiving support from the new president from 1995, Jim Wolfensohn. Wolfensohn’s  
support for debt cancellation is presented by some analysts as a new external variable, a 
new political opportunity for debt campaigners (Busby 2007, Broome 2009). Wolfen-
sohn, however, was influenced by those already pressing for multilateral debt cancella-
tion. As a new comer to the World Bank he was “casting  around” for an issue on which 
to make his name (Interviewee UK No. 4), and  there  was  a  “war  for  his  ear” within the 
World Bank ((Interviewee UK No. 5). He was influenced by a range of pro multilateral 
debt cancellation actors including NGOs and the Dutch and Uganda governments ( In-
terviewee UK No. 4). The IMF board was also divided between supporters and oppo-
nents of multilateral debt reduction (similar to those at the World Bank board, as both 
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boards have the same membership), and IMF staff were strongly opposed. (Momani 
2010). As the World Bank shifted to supporting multilateral debt reduction, partly influ-
enced by civil society arguments (Callaghy 2002, Fogarty 2003, Momani 2010), divi-
sions opened up between the IMF and World Bank as illustrated by this quote from a 
World Bank insider at the time :  
 
Wolfensohn had just arrived at the World Bank and he was determined to do 
something about low income country debt and he had asked for the International 
Finance  Dept   to  come  up  with  some  workable  strategy  ….  .[Debt   team  leader] 
came up with this paper which was essentially rapid debt reduction.. she argued 
for sweeping debt reduction.... the proposal was shared with Larry Summers 
whether because he was the US treasury secretary or had been the Bank chief 
economist– it had also been shared informally with the IMF and the IMF had 
gone ballistic about it saying this is an intolerable proposal. Larry Summers sent 
it  to  Jim  Wolfensohn  saying  we  can’t  have  you  institutions squabbling. We need 
you to come up with a united Bank /Fund proposal. (Interviewee UK No. 2)   
 
The leaking to the Financial Times of the draft World Bank proposal brought divi-
sions with the IMF into the open. “The Fund would not get involved (in such a plan),” 
one IMF official said yesterday.  “Writing off debt is not our business”’. He described 
the World Bank document as “ideologically  unsound”  (Holman 1995). 
UN organisations formed a ‘soft’   part   of   the   debt   nébuleuse   and  had a stronger 
debtor country voice than existed at the harder end. A range of UN bodies, UNCTAD, 
UNDP and UNICEF, all pressed for action on debt. Encouraged by the significant re-
duction of Polish and Egyptian debt in the early 1990s, the UN General Assembly 
called upon creditor countries to write off the official bilateral debt owed by the least 
developed countries (Salih 1994). Southern government networks NAM and G77 were 
also actively pressing the G7 for action on debt. Indonesia, which held the presidency of 
NAM, organised conferences on debt to prepare NAM lobby position, and sought a 
hearing at the G7 Meeting in Tokyo 1993 (Eurodad 1993b). 
Against the backdrop of adversarial relations within the debt nébuleuse, in Sep-
tember, a year after the draft proposal was leaked, the HIPC initiative was adopted at 
the IMF and World Bank AGM.  
6.5 Debt campaigners’  understanding  of  the  debt  nébuleuse 
As the campaign target was cancellation of official debt, the G7, as the body which 
dominated the IMF, World Bank and Paris Club, were the key decision makers. Given 
this, promoting debt campaigning in European G7 countries and linking with debt cam-
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paigns in G7 countries beyond Europe were priorities for Eurodad. As national cam-
paigning was the bedrock of action, could it then be argued that campaigns in G7 coun-
tries might have been able to do most of the heavy lifting to achieve debt cancellation? 
Not so, according to the Eurodad coordinator at the time, as dominant power structures 
such as the G7 were paralleled by other sources of power for less significant countries. 
There was the power of initiation – the Swedish, Dutch and Swiss governments took 
early initiatives on multilateral debt, organising a conference for creditors and debtors in 
June 1994 and therefore they became important interlocutors for transnational civil so-
ciety at that point. Another source of leverage for less powerful government was their 
demonstrated commitment to international action, as in the case of the Netherlands 
which had a huge development budget in relation to the size of its economy and which 
was a major funder of the World Bank in the l990s. This made the Netherlands a signif-
icant player alongside the G7. The Scandinavians, who operated as a constituency with-
in the World Bank and the IMF (again, as significant funders of these institutions) also 
had a key voice. Less powerful countries held important positions within the IMF and 
World Bank from time to time, and this increased their significance for transnational 
civil society, for example the Belgian Minister for Finance was the chair of the IMF key 
committee, the International Monetary and Financial Committee, and a fairly low pro-
file country like Finland became significant when the Finns held the chair of the Scan-
dinavian constituency at the World Bank. Given the shifting terrain within the nébule-
use, even countries which may not have held significant power, could operate as brokers 
and were important in shifting the balance of power (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator 
No.1). 
In relation to the international financial institutions in the early 1990s, the World 
Bank was more accessible to civil society as it already had a civil society liaison officer 
(in the 1990s the position was held by an ex-debt campaigner from Britain) and the 
World Bank NGO Working Group had been in existence from the early 1980s, albeit 
not always a harmonious arena. The deep divisions within the World Bank on debt (In-
terviewees UK No. 2 and No. 5) created  fertile  ground  for  ‘outsider/insider’  coalitions  
between World Bank supporters of debt cancellation and transnational civil society debt 
groups. For  Eurodad  the  World  Bank  was  “partially  an  ally  …  there  were  many  World  
Banks” (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1). The IMF, however, continued as a 
closed institution into the 1990s and only opened up somewhat towards the mid-1990s. 
This led to a reluctance on the part of debt groups to focus on the IMF as highlighted 
when the UK DCN encouraged German groups to challenge the Bundesbank on IMF 
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gold sales to fund debt cancellation. German campaigners argued that they were con-
centrating on the World Bank and that getting involved with the IMF would raise organ-
isational capacity issues (Eurodad 1994c).  
6.6 Transnational debt groups in action 
6.6.1 Operating across the national/international interface 
As can be seen from the section on common cause, the national arena was central to ac-
tion for debt cancellation. This meant identifying major national angles which linked a 
country to the debt crisis and also leveraging international opportunities available to na-
tional governments. National angles divide broadly into: a) tackling the bilateral debt 
owed to creditor countries; b) opposing national financial contributions to the debt man-
agement programmes of international financial institutions; and c) seeking to influence 
national policy pursed at the IMF, World Bank and Paris Club.  
Pressing for cancellation of bilateral debt was a major focus of campaigning in 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the UK. Influenced by the earlier Swiss cam-
paign, a major church and NGO led campaign was launched in Austria in 1996 calling 
for cancellation of debt owed to Austria. A petition was used, 67,000 signatures were 
gathered and the campaigns was given a further boost by a visit from ex-President Ka-
unda of Zambia, who raised the profile of the campaign by meeting the Austrian presi-
dent, the chancellor and MPs. Following this action ODA debt owed to Austria was 
cancelled in 1997, partly because these were old credits as Austria had moved from 
making to loans to providing grants. The  debt  campaign  “gave them the final kick” to 
cancel this debt (Interviewee Austria).  In Ireland, which held very little low-income 
country debt, as aid had been given as grants rather than loans, the debt campaign suc-
cessfully opposed a government  contribution  to  the  IMF’s  programme  for low income 
indebted countries, ESAF, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, later renamed 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (Irish Mozambique Solidarity et al 1997). 
This involved Ireland breaking the international consensus  on  debt  of  which  the  IMF’s  
ESAF was a key part. In both the Austrian and Irish cases, parliamentarians were key 
supporters (Austria, Irish Mozambique Solidarity et al, 1997). As regards influencing 
the policy pursued by national governments in the IMF and World Bank and the Paris 
Club, this was not generally subject to legislation so there were limited opportunities to 
insert the debt issue into adversarial political processes. MPs were therefore called upon 
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more often to use their voice rather than their vote in supporting more progressive na-
tional policies on international debt.  
In addition to focussing on how individual countries were embroiled in the debt 
crisis, national campaigns and NGOs also leveraged international opportunities which 
presented themselves nationally, for example when a country held the EU presidency or 
chair of the G7. In the case of the EU presidency, efforts were made to get governments 
to take an initiative on the debt crisis while they held the presidency, for example, 
groups in Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland (Eurodad 1990-1991, 1993b, 1996). For cam-
paigns in G7 countries where the national and transnational can be seen as fused, influ-
encing national government policy within the G7 was of central importance (Interview-
ee UK No. 3). G7 summits taking place in the country holding the chair of the G7 gave 
national groups a significant opportunity to have an impact, through the media, lobby-
ing or mobilisation. While in the UK lobbying was an important approach, for French 
groups the G7 was a key moment to influence the media (for example at the 1996 G7 
summit in Lyons) with little if any government lobbying happening before the emer-
gence of Jubilee 2000 at the end of the 1990s (Interviewee France No. 2). While groups 
from the different G7 countries took part in the counter-summit events, TOES, (Hou-
ston 1990; London 1991, Munich 1992), these groups did not   form   a   ‘G7 NGO sub 
group’. “We  weren’t prepared to give legitimacy to G7 by having a group of NGOs 
from G7 countries. It was ideological” (Interviewee France No. 2). 
While  the  focus  on  national  action  outlined  above  may  appear  to  refute  Dryzek’s  
(1999) argument that the dominance of discourse in making transnational policy provide 
greater opportunities for civil society to engage transnationally, there were some direct 
engagements at international fora which took three main forms: 
a) Counter-nébuleuse gatherings at G7 summits and IMF/World Bank annual meetings 
bringing together groups from different countries active on debt and providing opportu-
nities to network, strategise and for mutual education. 
b) Demonstrations involving wider publics against G7/ IMF/World Bank 
 policies such as at the IMF/World Bank AGM Madrid 1994.  
c) Fora for direct engagement between civil society groups and IMF and World Bank 
which took place  at   those  organisations’  spring  and  autumn  meetings.  These  fora  cov-
ered a wide range of issues with debt an important agenda item throughout the 1990s. 
These events were attended mainly by those involved in technical discussions and pro-
vided an opportunity to get information on IMF/World Bank thinking and to seek to in-
fluence the staff who were working on debt initiatives. Such established fora did not 
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exist for the G7 or the Paris Club, because of the unevenness of the linkages between 
civil society and different institutions of the internationalising state, leaving demonstra-
tions and counter-summits as the main civil society action in relation to these events. 
This resonates somewhat with  Drainville’s  (2005b) formulation that while a war of po-
sition is carried out at national level, in the absence of social hegemony at international 
level, a war of manoeuvre is pursued. 
The understanding of the national/international interface and how this could best 
be leveraged from different national arenas strongly emphasised the national as the 
prime area for action. Different national contexts – historical, political, and cultural – 
meant that a single campaign focus would not resonate equally in different countries. 
Different positioning within the internationalising state also influenced the opportunities 
open to different national debt groups. For civil society groups in G7 countries where 
the national and transnational were fused, influencing their governments also meant in-
fluencing the G7. For other civil society groups their governments were seen as the 
gateway to international policy. An option for civil society groups from countries weak-
ly positioned within the internationalising state was to press their governments to break 
the international consensus on debt as in the case of Irish campaign against a contribu-
tion to the IMF’s  ESAF. Overall at a European level, while Eurodad emerged as a sig-
nificant transnational actor (Eurodad 1996-1998b, Callaghy 2002, Broome 2009), na-
tional autonomous action was still the central focus of European civil society action on 
debt – but this action was based on understandings arising from discussions within the 
Eurodad network. It would appear that while elements within the debt nébuleuse may 
have found it convenient to engage with Eurodad as a transnational network, its member 
groups saw national groups operating through their national governments as the main 
channel for action. European debt groups did not, therefore, move with the contours of 
the internationalising state towards the international arena but by focussing on national 
governments they worked counter to this process, seeking to draw states back towards 
domestic societies.  
6.6.2 Engaging with the debt nébuleuse: institutional advocacy 
Debt campaigning during this period is an early example of the NGO shift to institu-
tional advocacy which started towards the end of the 1980s (Eade and Ligteringen 
2001). Institutional advocacy takes place within "internal structures and relationships 
between third sector organisations, governments and institutions” (Onyx et al 2010, 
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p46). A central question is the nature of the space within which civil society engages in 
institutional advocacy - to what extent is this part of the  government’s/international  or-
ganisation’s “machinery of participation”   (Onyx   et   al   2010), invited spaces (Gaynor 
2010) or ‘won  spaces’  through contentious struggle (Bendaña 2005). Keet (2002, p.472) 
analyses the processes through which engagement could lead to a weakening of the civil 
society position. Campaigners get drawn towards the positions of decision makers, re-
sulting in their shifting their arguments so they can operate within the dominant frame-
work and language, and  this  draws  campaigners  into  their  adversaries’  logic  rather than 
challenging it. Partial concessions made by decision makers are then exaggerated by 
these to the public with a view to demobilising those supporting the debt campaign.  
A conflict which broke out between the World Bank and Oxfam UK at the IMF/World 
Bank AGM in 1994 gives an insight into the understandings of institutional advocacy 
held respectively by those organisations. The Bank, claiming that a study by Oxfam UK 
on structural adjustment was biased, warned that if Oxfam wanted: 
 
…   to sit at the table and be our partners" then it had to show "similar 
…responsibility in the use of facts" that it demanded from the Bank. (Inter Press 
Service 1994)  
 
Responding via the Guardian letter pages, Oxfam stressed the joint problem solving ap-
proach which should underpin their relationship and called for a return to dialogue: 
 
 The cause of poverty reduction in Latin America...is one which should unite 
non-government organisations and the World Bank, rather than divide us. None 
of us has all the answers. But we share a joint responsibility to engage in con-
structive dialogue aimed at finding workable solutions to difficult problems. 
(Bryer 1994) 
 
 For the Bank, transnational civil society is clearly  occupying  an  ‘invited  space’  access  
to which is conditional. Oxfam, renegotiating its   access   to   this   ‘invited   space’, offers 
engagement in a consensual problem-solving approach.  
Institutional advocacy is usually backed by other more challenging activities by 
civil society in the public sphere via media and public mobilisations, with the different 
approaches sometimes taken by different sections of transnational civil society. Even 
while engaging closely with the state (national or internationalising), however, civil so-
ciety usually wishes to clearly delineate itself as an independent sector. The advantages 
of public contestation for civil society groups are two fold. One is that argumentation in 
the public arena has to be framed in terms of a common good and this increases the 
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power of transnational civil society. This is because of public perception that civil so-
ciety groups are not pursuing their own self-interest unlike powerful decision makers 
and therefore it is more likely that civil society arguments will receive public support 
(Risse 2000).  Following on from this, contestation in the public sphere can lead to civil 
society  groups  ‘winning’  spaces  of  negotiations  as  “the fruits of the  people’s  struggle”  
(Bendaña 2005, p.83) rather than relying on invited spaces (Gaynor 2010).  
To gain access to  ‘invited’ spaces, debt groups needed credibility with the debt 
nébuleuse, and this was gained through bringing knowledge and expertise and a will-
ingness to work within the limits of what was perceived as possible at that time. The 
campaign for multilateral debt cancellation represented “a qualitative leap forward, in 
terms of the quality of lobbying work” for European groups based on developing tech-
nical expertise.   
  
From the beginning of the 1990s, maybe end of the 1980s, we started to be so-
phisticated,  in  terms  of  analysis,  e.g.  Mathew  Martin’s  booklet  for  Eurodad  on  
bilateral debt was one of the turning point in having serious documents you 
could lay on the table...of  your  ministry  …  this  was  useful  in  creating  credibility. 
(Interviewee Belgium No. 1) 
  
 
Technical expertise was available to debt groups from ‘think  tank’  NGOs  (Weed,  Sud-
wind and Oxfam) and through the relations Eurodad maintained with experts, academ-
ics, and staff of the World Bank, UNCTAD, UNDP, NAM/South Centre, government 
officials’  and  the ACP (African Caribbean Pacific countries) secretariat and committee 
of ambassadors (Eurodad 1996-1998a). This reflects the bridging role played by the ep-
istemic community between the debt nébuleuse and NGO debt networks in bringing 
about HIPC:  
 
When conjunctural conditions permit, they [epistemic community members in-
side the debt nébuleuse who are sympathetic with parts of the NGO discourses 
on debt] form  important  network  connections  with  “outsiders”  of  the  epistemic  
community and with the more sophisticated NGOs that have helped to move 
things along. In part they help to do this by legitimating new ideas, knowledge, 
and approaches in their own institutions and delegitimating existing one. (Cal-
laghy 2002, p.22)   
 
As a result of these insider/outsider contacts, information was shared with NGOs some-
times before even government representatives had received it: “I went to my minister of 
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finance here and sometimes  I  had  documents  which  he  didn’t  have  at  that  time”  (Inter-
viewee Belgium No. 1). 
This technical expertise was leveraged by Eurodad in favour of multilateral debt 
cancellation as they matched IMF and World Bank arguments with technical counter- 
arguments at every stage in the process of the development of HIPC. Eurodad made 
eight responses to the IMF/World Bank and G7 between March 1995 and September 
1996 (Bokkerink and Van Hees 1998). This discourse contestation demonstrates the 
depth of the technical engagement involved.  The HIPC proposal aimed at achieving a 
sustainable debt defined mainly in terms of the net present  value  (NPV)  of  a  country’s  
debt to its exports with a ratio above 250% was considered unsustainable. Eurodad crit-
icised the threshold as arbitrary and questioned the use of NPV as investors work from 
nominal value and, moreover, the discount rate for NPV was too high (Bokkerink and 
Van Hees 1998, p.328). It might appear that this demonstrates the depth of the capture 
of debt campaigners by the dominant discourse, but in technically challenging IMF and 
World Bank analysis, NGOs were challenging their authority (Broome 2009) which is 
based on the respect in which governments hold their expertise (Momani 2010a; Barnett 
and Finnemore 1999; Evans 1999). 
Gaining credibility as a technically competent interlocutor meant not just having 
technical expertise but also aligning analysis and solutions with debt nébuleuse perspec-
tives. According to the IMF, if NGOs want to be listened to they have to provide the 
expert analysis of problems the IMF was trying to  solve’  (Yanacopulos 2005, pp.103-4). 
This led to debt groups sometimes throwing their weight behind what they saw as the 
most progressive proposals from within the debt nébuleuse such as the  ‘Time  is running 
out’ campaign in the early 1990s which promoted the Trinidad Terms, a British debt 
proposal. National campaign groups and NGOs also pressed their governments for im-
provements to the proposed HIPC (Belgium, Sweden, Norway, and Ireland) (Eurodad 
1996). The call for specific levels of debt cancellation was dropped in favour of a case 
by case approach. Previously, the call was for 90% cancellation for Severely-Indebted 
Low-income Countries, and 50% for Middle-Income Severely-Indebted Countries (In-
terviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 1). Further, debt groups accepted the preferred 
creditor status of the IMF and World Bank (Bokkerink and Van Hees 1998). These 
shifts meant they were taken more seriously by the debt nébuleuse but some groups, e.g. 
CADTM, (Comité  por  l’Annulation  de  la  Dette du Tiers Monde), a radical Belgian debt 
group, saw this shift in position as a move closer to the IMF and World Bank, as a shift 
to a reformist position (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1). 
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The broad range of arguments for debt cancellation can be divided into two cat-
egories: human development and rights; and anti-systemic arguments based on the na-
ture of the power relations within which debts arose and were dealt with (Tagle and Pa-
tomaki 2007). The dominant frame in the early 1990s was human development rather 
than the more adversarial power analyses. This   is   reflected   in   Eurodad’s first project 
proposal to the EC 1991-1992, which was  titled  ‘Debt  and  Resources  for  Development’  
and subsequent proposals took the same approach (Eurodad c, f).  Framing involves en-
suring an issue resonates with current cultural meanings (Tarrow 2005 p.61; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998 p.2), giving campaigners the opening to expose the failure of decision 
makers to implement policies which fit with these meanings. The human development, 
finance for development approach fitted closely with contemporary development dis-
courses.  UNICEF’s  report  Adjustment with a Human Face (Cornia et al 1987) brought 
human development into the neoliberal frame, as did the human development index pi-
oneered by UNDP in the early 1990s. The World Bank while promoting neoliberal ad-
justment programmes maintained a discourse on   ‘poverty   alleviation’. Campaigners 
leveraged the human development approach, by exposing the contradictions between 
the creditor and donor roles of countries and international institutions: 
 
 …of every $10 in bilateral aid provided to Zambia last year, $7 went out of the 
country to repay the IMF and other multilateral creditors, said Ted Van Hees of 
Eurodad…. In some cases, aid money is simply travelling from one office in 
Washington to another down the hall - never getting to the people in need. ..Van 
Hees said. (Canadian Press Newswire 1995) 
 
 More stark approaches were crafted for popular audiences highlighting the immorality 
of creditors prioritising debt payments over human development. “every day's delay in 
action is one more day of increased poverty of people malnourished” (Nduru 1991a). 
A human development solution would mean giving precedence to the right to food, 
shelter, work and health over debt payments (Northover 2008). Detailed proposals as to 
how such a human development approach could be implemented were developed in the 
second half of the 1990s by CAFOD, Oxfam, Eurodad and Afrodad (UNDP 1999). The 
political interests underlying decisions on debt cancellation were exposed contrasting 
the more favourable treatment of the debt of countries that were of strategic interest to 
creditors at a particular time. Examples used were the debt relief given to the Russian 
Federation (Aslam 1996) and the generous debt offered to Poland in  1991   to   “ensure 
free market reforms do  not   fail”   (Nduru 1991c). Highlighting the close alignment be-
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tween national creditor interests and loans further challenged the right of creditors to 
demand repayment: 
  
Christian Aid said that because many loans to poor countries were conditional 
on the purchase of British goods, Britain gained doubly. "We benefit from the 
increased exports, and then again from the interest on the loans given to buy 
these exports. (Thomas 1996)  
While there was less emphasis on the wider power imbalances underpinning the debt 
problem, there were exceptions as illustrated by the following quote from the Euro-
dad coordinator: 
…the Western countries are not prepared to cancel the debts of the African 
countries because they do not want to lose control over Africa. (Mantiri 1993)  
Debt groups which used counter-discourses framing debt as illegitimate (France) or 
odious (Belgium) found that their governments refused to acknowledge the concept 
of illegitimate or odious debt (Interviewee Belgium No. 2; Interviewee France No. 1). 
 Tensions in relation to the linking of debt reduction to structural adjustment 
rolled over from the 1980s. There was a growing body of evidence of the negative 
social impact of SAP, including UNICEF’s  Adjustment with a Human Face and stud-
ies by NGOs. One solution was to press for the link between debt reduction and SAP 
to be broken but this clashed with the need to stay in the credibility zone as SAP was 
central to the neoliberal consensus of promoting an open world economy. Another 
approach  was  to  seek  to  reform  conditionality  and  to  introduce  ‘positive  conditionali-
ty’: 
 
Conditionality was a major question, we had this debate about positive condi-
tionality or conditionality connected to accountability/transparency… we be-
came more sophisticated. This brought us to a position that particularly the 
World Bank began to take us seriously.  (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator 
No.1) 
 
The issue of positive conditionality – whether structural adjustment and democracy 
were compatible- was discussed at Eurodad consultations with Southern groups (Euro-
dad 1993e). While   there  was   some   support   for   ‘positive   conditionality’, the question 
could not be satisfactorily resolved, given the tension between an acknowledgement of 
the unequal world order and the conjunctural priority to maintain credibility with domi-
nant decision makers.   
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The arenas in which this knowledge contestation took place varied between for-
malised or semi formalised arrangements to implicit understandings of how access 
would be afforded. The Swiss Coalition of Development Organisations (Swiss Coali-
tion) appeared to have the strongest formalised institutional position with representation 
on a government consultation committee on development cooperation set up following 
pressure from civil society for inclusion in decision making. This group consisted of 
representatives of political parties, industry, banking and agriculture, churches, TUs and 
the Swiss Coalition (Interviewee Switzerland). When Switzerland joined the IMF in 
1992 sub committees were set up dealing with debt and the IMF and World Bank which 
provided a forum for the Swiss Coalition to raise issues.9 Again, the Swiss Coalition 
was the only group to  report  participation  in  their  country’s  Article  1V Review, which 
the   IMF   carries   out   annually   on   all   its  members’   economic   situation,   but this forum 
proved unfruitful. as   very   little   of   the   Swiss   Coalition’s   critique   of   Swiss   policy   ap-
peared in the published IMF Review (Interviewee Switzerland).   
Less formalised institutional access was afforded in other European countries. In 
Belgium the Ministry of Finance hosted two meetings per annum between NGOs and 
Belgian representative at the IMF and World Bank (Eurodad 1993e), following on from 
a public debate between the Minister for Finance and a representative of CADTM in 
1995 (Interviewee Belgium No. 2). An event in 1994 in Sweden brought together NGOs 
and officials from Nordic Ministries of Finance and of Foreign Affairs with the aim of 
agreeing how to share information and to allow NGOs to take part in formulating Nor-
dic/Baltic position in the IMF and World Bank. As a result the Swedish NGOs were 
asked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take part in preparing the Swedish position 
on IDA replenishment (Eurodad 1994b). In other countries there is a sense of implicit 
understandings that periodic access would be afforded. Regular meetings between offi-
cials and debt campaigners were reported from Austria, Denmark, Ireland and the UK 
(Eurodad 1994b, 1996). Engagement with parliaments was central to debt campaigning, 
involving submissions, contributing to parliamentary hearings/inquiries/debates, popu-
lar letter writing to MPs and petitions, parliamentary questions to get information and 
engaging MPs as one national actor among others at broad discourse events. Lobbying 
parliaments was cited by 9 of the 11 countries providing reports of national activities to 
Eurodad between 1993 and 1996 (Eurodad 1993e, 1994b, 1996). This process involved 
mutual exchange - parliaments relied on the expertise of NGOs to enable them to en-
                                                 
9 In 1994 Swiss Coalition tabled comments on 30 items due to be discussed at IMF/World Bank boards 
(Eurodad 1994 b).  In 1996 the issues included HIPC, poverty reduction, IDA 11 , the Inspection Panel 
and ESAF (Eurodad 1996). 
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gage with north south issues (Eurodad 1997) and this engagement with the democratic 
process established  debt   campaigners   as   a   “legitimate interest in society” Interviewee 
Italy). 
These processes were not confined to technical engagement between NGO ex-
perts and government officials. Meetings also took place with government ministers - 
and the nature of the government in power had an impact on these engagements. In Bel-
gium which generally had a coalition government, socialist ministers were usually sup-
portive  but  argued  that  because  of  their  coalition  with  the  liberals,  they  couldn’t  act  as  
they might wish (Interviewee Belgium No. 2). In Switzerland left, centre-left and green 
parties adopted  many  of   the  Swiss  Coalition’s  positions (Interviewee Switzerland). In 
France it was unusual for the administration to meet with NGOs on policies at this 
point. It was seen as a contradiction for a powerful state, like France where NGOs were 
considered illegitimate bodies with no democratic representation (Interviewee France 
No. 2). There were also reservations on the civil society side: 
 
We had discussion among NGOs, should we go into technicalities or is it a trap 
with discussion on % to be cancelled we would accept , or should we remain at 
the ideological and philosophical level; we ask for cancellation, it is up to ex-
perts and politicians to find solutions. (Interviewee France No. 2) 
 
In addition to the institutional access outlined above, a repertoire of action which 
became very prevalent during this period was cross-sectoral discourse events, some-
times organised by civil society groups, others co-organised by civil society and nation-
al/international institutions. These events brought together a range of relevant actors – 
NGOs south and north, officials from Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Develop-
ment Cooperation, IMF/World Bank executive directors, other IMF/World Bank offi-
cials and representatives of other international bodies (UN bodies, Commonwealth). An 
event in Dublin in 1994, at which the IMF managing director (Michel Camdessus) par-
ticipated, illustrates the web of cross civil society/internationalising state interactions 
which underlay such an event. Department of Finance officials informed DDCI that an 
invitation to the IMF managing director would be favourably received. As highlighted 
in Chapter 3, the IMF would not engage with civil society groups in a member country 
without government agreement (IMF 2003). DDCI decided to issue the invitation to Mr 
Camdessus to address a seminar in Dublin on the debt crisis because of the public pro-
file it would provide enabling them to mobilise their supporters. DDCI organised the 
seminar, sending out invitations and issuing press releases putting forward their critique 
of the role of the IMF in the debt crisis. Contact with Mr. Camdessus was handled by 
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the Department of Finance. Mr.  Camdessus’  opening  statement  at  the  event, “It  isn’t  so  
frequent for me to attend a meeting organised hand in hand by NGOs and a Minister of 
Finance showing that dialogue in your country on important issues is going on” 
(Camdessus 1994), demonstrated his perception of the joint civil society /state nature of 
the event. In addition to Mr. Camdessus, the event was addressed by the Irish Minister 
for Finance and three representatives of DDCI. Mr. Camdessus had a two-pronged mes-
sage: one for the civil society participants challenging their perceptions of the role of the 
IMF in the debt crisis; and the other was for the Irish Minister of Finance to support 
proposals Mr. Camdessus was promoting internationally. In his turn the Minister of Fi-
nance called for new initiatives from the IMF (Dáil Éireann 1994). Two things are strik-
ing about this example. One is the arms-length way the three sectors – national civil so-
ciety, national government and an IGO - collaborated on this event maintaining the 
formal independence of civil society from the state and IGO. The other is the multi-
directional nature of the lobbying – with all three sets of actors seeking to influence 
each of the others. It was not a simple engagement between civil society (DDCI) and 
Mr. Camdessus but Mr. Camdessus and the Irish Minister for Finance were also seeking 
to influence each other and DDCI was seeking to influence the Minister for Finance.  
Particularly significant among these cross-sectoral events which sought to influence 
policy on debt was one hosted by British Cardinal Hume as part of an African leaders 
(including Zambian ex-president Kenneth Kaunda) tour to Britain organised by DCN in 
1996. This closed session on multilateral debt, was attended by the IMF managing di-
rector, representatives from the World Bank, UK treasury officials, and MPs and 
“church leaders from three continents”   academics, and journalists (Donnelly 2007, 
p.125). The IMF managing director, an active Catholic, was faced with the strong criti-
cism from church leaders of IMF policy.                                                                                                        
Parallel to this national level institutional access, significant behind the scenes 
discussion on the development of what emerged finally as HIPC took place between 
Eurodad and World Bank officials at different stages of the process – unmediated by 
national government:  
 
The first time was in 1994 in Madrid at the IMF/World Bank AGM, we [Euro-
dad core group] had a meeting with a vice president, as we had done some cal-
culations of the problems on multilateral debt. We said you will have at least 26 
countries who will have problems. The Vice President said this is just a problem 
of  4/5  unmanageable  countries  like  Congo,  Zaire…If  we  get  into  repayment  
problems we will find – he  didn’t  say  naive  but  almost  - donors , Scandinavians, 
Dutch to pay for it. “You NGOs are good at drilling wells and raising capital but 
not economics”. (Interviewee Belgium No. 1)   
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Following the shift at the World Bank to a more positive position on debt cancellation, 
Eurodad developed a close relationship with the World Bank official leading the debt 
team. 
I  remember  a  very  long  meeting…  about  3  hours,  sitting  with [World Bank offi-
cial leading debt team] going through the politics and technicalities, of the solu-
tion they were working on. It sounded very promising, she wanted to know from 
our end where we were and she gave us a 'glance in her kitchen'. It was technical 
and political.. as well as the technical exchange we had, she was aware of what 
we could mobilise in capitals and finance and development ministries. (Inter-
viewee Eurodad Coordinator No.1) 
 
A further feature which demonstrate the enmeshed nature of the civil society/debt 
nébuleuse relationship at this time was that it is not a one way process with civil society 
as  ‘invitees’  but  they were also as objects of ‘reverse  lobbying’  (Donnelly  2002).  There  
can be two objectives to this reverse lobbying – one is to change civil society organisa-
tions’  policies  and  perceptions;;  the  other  to  engage  civil  society   in a chain of lobbying 
in order to draw oppositional governments into an emerging policy consensus. An ex-
ample of the former was a request from IMF Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer 
for an opportunity to explain the IMF position to DDCI members when that organisa-
tion was campaigning against an Irish  contribution  to  the  IMF’s  programme  in  low  in-
come countries. In terms of  the second process mentioned above, European NGOs 
were the object of reverse lobbying:  
 
Individuals inside World Bank and British government use NGOs in Eurodad to 
put pressure on   other   governments   or   decision  makers   inside   the   institutions’ 
(Eurodad 1993-1995b p14)   
 
The UK government, in particular, used the strategy of engaging UK civil society in 
lobbying other national civil society groups in order to influence oppositional govern-
ments. The UK government encouraged NGOs like Oxfam and Christian Aid to put 
their arguments in Germany and Japan whose governments were hostile to debt reduc-
tion (Evans 1999).  When the HIPC was finally adopted, Kenneth Clark, Chancellor of 
the UK Exchequer wrote to the director of the DCN: 
 
You will by now have heard the very good news that the HIPC was launched 
successfully at the IMF/World Bank AGM this week…it only remains for me to 
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thank DCN for your encouragement and support over the last 2 years. I am 
grateful for your help in getting the initiative off the ground. (Clarke 1996) 
 
The UDN had a parallel experience – as a result of its participation in transnational debt 
campaigning, the government sought their support in pressing for accelerated debt re-
duction. Government officials shared a letter from the government to the IMF and 
World Bank which UDN in turn shared with local media, increasing pressure on the 
World  Bank  to  speed  up  Uganda’s  debt  reduction.  (Collins  et  al  2001).   
Civil society campaigning on debt at this time consisted of a move to deep tech-
nical engagement, reconfiguring campaign demands and discourses to fit better with 
decision maker preferences. The extent of institutional advocacy together with the re-
verse lobbying, led to the enmeshing of civil society with the internationalising state 
making it difficult to separate their different contributions to the change in international 
policy on multilateral debt. 
6.6.3 Adversarial / conflictual/popular action  
The shift to institutional advocacy in the 1990s did not completely replace more conten-
tious approaches. Adversarial activism and advocacy can be seen as different points on 
a spectrum: 
 
 If you see advocacy as a spectrum, you start where no one is listening, to where 
you are sitting around table writing policy with your target. The method of cam-
paigning depends on where you are in the continuum. (Interviewee UK No. 3) 
 
 or competing strategies difficult to combine. Belgium, for example reported a  
 
...relatively high level of technical lobbying   and   ‘riots   in   the   streets’   making  
‘difficult’ [the] combination of radical analysis, mobilising public action and 
their pragmatic lobbying. (International NGO conference Report 1994, p.50) 
 
 The  ‘riots  in  the  streets’  manifested  as  throwing stones and blood at banks embroiled in 
the debt crisis, however, led to a place at the negotiating table for Belgian NGOs with 
commercial banks, the national Export Credit Agency and government which came to 
an agreement on debt reduction for 14 low-income countries. The NGO negotiators 
were able to put pressure on the banks to come to an agreement because of the threat of 
further demonstrations against the banks (Interviewee Belgium No. 1). Popular actions 
reported by national NGOs networks, however, were generally fairly muted and includ-
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ed petitions, letter writing to national and international decision makers, symbolic 
events, street events and use of the media 
There were two other sources of adversarial action, one from more radical debt 
groups and the other from direct action by environmentalist against World Bank funded 
projects. Parallel to the establishment of Eurodad, the more radical group, CADTM, 
was set up in Belgium in 1990 inspired by the counter-summit events and  “the Bastille 
appeal”   launched at the1989 Paris G7 to “All popular forces throughout the world to 
unite   for   the   immediate   and   unconditional   cancellation   of   the   so   called   “developing”  
countries debt” (CADTM 2009).  Those involved in CADTM continued in the tradition 
of solidarity with left-wing governments and movements: They had links with Brazil’s  
then left opposition, workers party, with the Lavalas movement in Haiti and later with 
the Zapatistas in Mexico. While CADTM had these solidarity links, in the early 1990s 
they were primarily a Belgian debt campaign demanding full and immediate cancella-
tion of debt owed to Belgium. They focussed in particular on ex-Belgian colonies DRC 
and Rwanda, and organised a major campaign on Rwanda debt which they declared was 
odious. They got huge public support but the issue was “too  hot” and the government 
refused to engage or accept any responsibility (Interviewee Belgium No. 2). They also 
promoted wider left-wing discourse on debt putting it in the context of neoliberal ex-
ploitation at events which drew up to 1,000 attendees (Eurodad 1994b).  
Nor did Eurodad and more radical groups like CADTM operate in completely 
parallel worlds or in total conflict with each other. In spite of having different perspec-
tives CADTM collaborated with Eurodad, organising public events in the Netherlands 
on debt when CADTM invited Lula da Silva of the Brazilian Workers Party to Europe 
around 1992. They also took part in meetings with the Belgian delegate to the IMF and 
World Bank on HIPC although CADTM was opposed to the initiative while Eurodad 
was more supportive and trying to influence it (Interviewee Belgium No. 2). French or-
ganisation CRID (Centre de Recherche Informatique et Droit) active on debt from the 
early 1980s were initially part of Eurodad. While they found Eurodad’s  work  useful, 
they felt it was too technical. While they were not against negotiations or discussion 
with decision makers, they had a different answer to the question of what was the “equi-
librium between demonstrations  and  negotiations”  and  “The French tradition is to be 
more confrontational and more principled positions, inclusion in lobbying, this came 
late” (Interviewee France No. 1).  
The other relevant major site of contention was direct action by environmental 
groups against controversial World Bank projects, such as the Narmada dams, which 
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rolled over from the 1980s (Keck and Sikkink 1998). A UK activist who later became 
coordinator of British and European networks described his early involvement:  
 
I cut my campaign teeth on Narmada not the same as the multilateral debt cam-
paign but one of the main demands was to kick World Bank out of the project 
which was going to be destructive for 1 million people, building a reservoir 120 
miles long. You could categorise this as an illegitimate debt case; there was in-
credible mobilisation going on, people threatening to drown themselves if they 
were  moved  out  their  land  … We organised a fax block of ODA as it was called 
at that time in the UK [now DYFID]; we chained ourselves to the front door of 
ODA and built a fake dam and occupied the World Bank London of-
fice…..people  were  not  saying  we’re  in  the  debt movement but it did link up. 
(Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.2) 
  
The focus on the World Bank by both debt and environmental activists coupled with the 
fact that loans for environmentally damaging projects could accumulate as unpayable 
and illegitimate debt provided a link between the two groups but there is little evidence 
of joint action during the early 1990s. Debt and environmental groups intersected, how-
ever, at the IMF/World Bank AGM in Madrid 1994, the first time this event was held in 
Europe since Berlin 1988 when there were major counter-mobilisations. Debt and envi-
ronmental movements were involved in organising what had become an established 
transnational civil society repertoire from the 1980s, an alternative Summit The Other 
Voices of the Planet involving 2,000 people from across the world (Vivas 2008). This 
provided a joint discourse space for those involved in institutional advocacy, and those 
taking more radical approaches and members of both groups participated in the march 
of 10,000 in opposition to IMF/World Bank policies (Vivas 2008, p.42). Conflict arose 
in relation to the different tactics used. While some NGOs took an insider approach, 
meeting with IMF and World Bank and government officials within the area of the offi-
cial conference, other movements came inside the meetings in order to take direct ac-
tion. The most dramatic action was when Greenpeace members climbed on to the rafters 
in the conference hall, unveiled a banner as King Juan Carlos of Spain was making his 
opening speech to the AGM, and scattered fake dollars with the inscription "No dollars 
for ozone destruction" over the audience (Gooch 1994). A divide opened up between 
those using direct action and those who worried they could lose their access to the 
World Bank (Gooch 1994). The cultural and political differences between some insiders 
and those taking direct action were expressed by a direct action activist (referred to 
above) who had attended the events:  
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I remember being a bit horrified at Madrid, the first international meeting of that 
type  I’d  been  to… we’d gone there a whole bunch of us, taken the ferry from 
Plymouth to Santander, and gone in a battered transit from Santander to Madrid, 
staying  in  squats,  feeling  very  gritty  about  our  activism  and  then  we’d  come  
across organisational, credit card wielding NGO professionals and I remember 
being very surprised at that whole  world  as  I  hadn’t  seen  activism  of  that  kind  
before. (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No.2) 
 
This highlights the heterogeneity of civil society and suggests that at times there can 
appear to be closer affinity between members of large NGOs and decision makers with-
in the internationalising state than between these NGOs and other civil society groups, 
such as direct action activists. While radical and more mainstream groups could partici-
pate together in counter-summits and demonstrations, action which threatened access to 
‘invited  spaces’  won  by  the  latter  was  the  serious  dividing  line. 
6.7 Conclusion 
Campaigning for debt cancellation in the first half of the 1990s took place in the context 
of a shift from commercial to official debt after the adoption of the Brady Bonds in 
1989. This represented a move of the main campaign target from high street banks to 
less accessible creditor government institutions such as their export credit agencies and 
remote international institutions like the IMF, World Bank and Paris Club. In this con-
text – and the wider changes in world order with the move to a uni-polar economic 
world order – there was a significant shift in campaign action towards institutional ad-
vocacy directed at governments and the other key organisations of the debt nébuleuse.  
The main change in international debt policy during this period was the adoption of the 
HIPC initiative which promised modest debt reduction for up to 42 countries once strin-
gent structural adjustment conditions were fulfilled. While winning the argument that 
multilateral debt could and should be cancelled can be seen as a victory, the strong con-
ditions were a poisonous sting in the tail. This double-edged outcome reflects once 
again that, while civil society may win the argument (or contribute to winning the ar-
gument as in this case), they  don’t  necessarily  win  the  solution, as the new policy con-
sensus is usually less radical than their original campaigning position (Leipold 2000).  
In this period the power of transnational civil society can best be understood in 
terms of how campaign groups situated themselves in relation to the debt nébuleuse at 
that particular historical moment, rather than in specific repertoires of action such as 
public mobilisations, or particular framings of the debt issue. This led to an intermesh-
ing of civil society with the internationalising state, making it difficult, if not impossi-
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ble, to fully disentangle or to quantify their respective contributions to the resulting pol-
icy change. A range of processes contributed to this intermeshing. Transnational civil 
society aligned its analysis and framing of the debt crisis with dominant debt nébuleuse 
understandings and aligned its proposed solutions with the most progressive parts of the 
debt nébuleuse, and so worked within the limits of what appeared possible at that point. 
The new repertoire of action – cross-sectoral events involving a range of civil society 
and debt nébuleuse actors – was an expression of this intermeshing. These intersectoral 
linkages were then leveraged by parts of the debt nébuleuse (notably the UK govern-
ment and parts of the World Bank) through the process of reverse lobbying, in order to 
draw civil society groups into their efforts to create a new policy consensus on multilat-
eral debt cancellation. 
This finding raises central questions about the nature of the relationship between 
civil society and the state/internationalising state. The consensual relationship which 
prevailed during this case study period can be set in the context of the post-1989 mo-
ment with strong pull/push factors bringing parts of civil society debt groups together 
with the debt nébuleuse. The pull factors include the emerging global norm of participa-
tion   and   consultation  which   provided   ‘invited   spaces’   to   civil   society (Gaynor 2010) 
and the push factors include the collapse of the ideological alternative which had creat-
ed distance between the two sectors before 1989.  The counter-forces which had created 
distance between civil society and states/internationalising state in the 1980s were pro-
vided by revolutionary states and the possibility of new revolutionary states emerging, 
socialism as an alternative ideology and the NIEO. There were, however, a number of 
rebalancing tensions within transnational civil society during the early 1990s. Those 
groups engaging closely with the state/internationalising state were linked back to pub-
lic constituencies for whom a discourse which established distance between civil society 
and the state was needed (Holzscheiter 2005) and which positioned civil society as an 
autonomous force. Further, there were debt groups which did not get drawn deeply into 
the internationalising state. For example, in France and Belgium, where campaigners 
used mobilisation rather than institutional advocacy, counter-systemic framing of debt 
as illegitimate, radical demands for total debt cancellation and placed the debt crisis in 
the wider context of neoliberalism rather than human development. The different ap-
proaches taken by debt groups did not represent totally separate worlds. There was peri-
odic collaboration, and both sets of groups participated in organising wider discourse 
events which can be seen as rebalancing spaces such as The Other Voices of the Planet 
1994 in Madrid, where groups deeply involved in institutional advocacy re-centred 
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themselves within a broader spectrum of civil society. This finding fits with the under-
standing of civil society (set out in Chapter 2) as a continuous dynamic process between 
civil   society’s   own   self-identity as autonomous, and its different modes of engaging 
with the state/internationalising state, ranging from consensual to conflictual.  While 
parts of the sector may get drawn into close cooperation with the state, there are a num-
ber of rebalancing forces within civil society.  There  is  civil  society’s  own  self-identify 
as autonomous, which operates as a rebalancing force when the boundaries between 
themselves and the state/internationalising state become blurred. Another rebalancing 
force is that there are usually groups within civil society that take a more adversarial 
approach – as there was in this case – and rather than these consensual and adversarial 
civil society groups being simply in conflict with each other, they also cooperate and 
this operates as another rebalancing force. 
In relation to the geography of power, while transnational civil society engaged 
with a range of bodies across the nébuleuse, the key focus was on national governments 
as the best avenue to influence international policy. The mechanisms through which civ-
il society groups sought to leverage their governments differed, however, depending on 
the power position of their country within the internationalising state. For G7 groups, 
where the national and transnational arenas are virtually fused, the focus was on press-
ing their governments towards a more progressive consensus on debt policy within the 
G7 which would then shape operational policy at the IMF, World Bank and Paris Club. 
While less powerful than G7 countries, other governments such as the Nordics and the 
Netherlands, could promote more progressive positions because of their leverage within 
the debt nébuleuse due to the level of funding they provided. Civil society groups in 
these countries pressed these states to leverage this power to achieve debt cancellation. 
A system depending on consensus is vulnerable to weak members exercising leverage 
beyond the weight of their nominal voting power by simply breaking the consensus, and 
this mechanism was used by Irish debt campaigners based in a country weakly posi-
tioned within the internationalising state, which never holds an executive directorship 
position at the IMF or World Bank nor is a major financial contributor. They successful-
ly pressed the Irish government, however, to break the policy consensus on  the  IMF’s  
programme in low-income countries, and this decision had an impact beyond the signif-
icance of the amount of money involved or the voting power of Ireland at the IMF.   
In the context of the shift of state accountability through the internationalisation of 
the state from domestic societies to the international arena, or to those domestic forces 
orientated towards the international arena, some theorists argue that the most effective 
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strategy is to overcome national constraints by organising at global level (Robinson 
1999, Evans 2008). It is significant, however, that European debt groups at this period 
were reluctant for Eurodad to emerge as a strong transnational actor, preferring it to 
play the role of strengthening national-level activism. This can be seen as part of the 
struggle over the state and its relation to the transnational arena, with states pressured to 
be more accountable to their domestic societies for their actions at international level 
rather than civil society following the contours of the internationalising state towards 
the international arena. Overall, while debt groups reshaped their discourse to enable 
within-the-system challenges in the context of the shrinking of ideological space after 
1989, discourse opportunities at transnational level did not provide the opportunities 
suggested by Dryzek (1999). The focus in terms of seeking change was on national rep-
resentative democratic mechanisms where there was a shorter chain of accountability 
from government to citizen than those which operate indirectly from the international 
arena back to citizens. 
Debt campaigning in the early 1990s represented a shift from the more adversarial 
approaches of the 1980s towards participative engagement with the 
state/internationalising state, involving greater focus on technical rather than counter- 
systemic discourse. The Jubilee 2000 campaign, subject of the next chapter, represented 
a different moment with debt groups leveraging the symbolism of the millennium to 
craft popular understandings of the debt on the basis of which mobilisation played a 
bigger part in how the debt crisis was contested. 
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Chapter Seven: Jubilee Campaign  
 
This chapter examines how, catalysed by the UK Jubilee campaign, debt coali-
tions/alliances emerged at national and regional level across the world to call for debt 
cancellation. The first section provides an overview of the campaign. The following sec-
tions examine, respectively, how common cause was made transnationally, and the ten-
sions which arose between southern and northern groups; how the campaign leveraged 
the national/transnational interface, the different ways the debt was framed and clashed 
with the debt nébuleuse; and finally the nature of the relationship between civil society 
and the state/internationalising state underpinning the campaign. The conclusion distils 
what the Jubilee 2000 campaign reveals about how civil society sought to exercise pow-
er at that particular moment.  
7.1 Overview of the Jubilee campaign  
The Jubilee 2000 campaign, first launched in Britain in April 1996, and relaunched as a 
broader British coalition in November 1997, rapidly achieved a very high international 
profile. The campaign was based on linking the biblical concept of a periodic Jubilee, 
whereby right relations are restored – debt cancelled, land redistributed and slaves freed 
- with the upcoming millennium as a new jubilee moment. The central campaign call 
was for the cancellation of unpayable debt of the poorest countries by the year 2000, to 
‘give  a  billion  people  a  fresh  start’. While linking debt cancellation to the biblical con-
cept of Jubilee had been part of debt discourse among southern debt groups from the 
1980s, Jubilee 2000 operationalised it as a campaign. The main tool was a petition to be 
handed in to the G7 Cologne Summit 1999 and human chains around G8 summits, most 
notably the 1998 Summit in Birmingham and the 1999 summit in Cologne. The biblical 
linking gave Jubilee 2000 a very strong base within Christian churches, and their mobi-
lising structures and global reach enabled the campaign to spread rapidly. Another fac-
tor in the high profile achieved was the number of international celebrities who support-
ed the campaign. The final petition count was 24,100,000 signatures coming from 166 
countries (Barrett 2000). At its peak, there were Jubilee groups in 69 countries (Barrett 
2000), although these were not all equally strong (Cox 2011). There were 16 campaigns 
in Latin America, 22 in Africa, 8 in Asia, and 23 in the global north (Barrett 2000). Re-
gional networks developed with 15 African Jubilee groups launching Jubilee Afrika, 
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and a Latin American and Caribbean network was set up with the participation of 16 
campaigns.   There was no transnational structure, campaigns were to be designed and 
owned at national level. The UK group operated informally as a transnational hub and 
catalyst.  
The campaign gathered momentum after the 1998 G7 Birmingham Summit, 
when 70,000 debt campaigners formed a human chain around the city centre. There was 
massive media coverage and British Prime Minster, Tony Blair, requested a meeting 
with Jubilee 2000 leaders that evening. The impact of the campaign could be seen in 
early 1999 when a  ‘norm  cascade’  (Yanacopulos 2004) started with G7 countries com-
peting in proposing new approaches to debt. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, 
host- to- be of the G7 summit in Cologne 1999, led the field with a new proposal in 
January 1999. This was particularly significant as Germany was traditionally a strong 
opponent of debt cancellation. While all the proposals fell far short of the Jubilee 2000 
call for cancellation of unpayable debt, the small shifts in policy by all G7 members 
showed they were feeling the heat of the campaign. This was significant, as the HIPC 
initiative adopted in September 1996 closed the debt issue for international decision 
makers. In the event, the G7 came up with a new debt initiative – the Cologne debt deal 
in June 1999 which became known as HIPC 11 or the Enhanced HIPC, and this in-
creased the level of debt reduction. The deeper cancellation under HIPC 11 released re-
sources into government budgets.  A further element of the Cologne debt deal was that 
in order to get debt cancellation countries were required to produce a poverty reduction 
strategy (PRS) in consultation with their civil societies, which had to be endorsed by the 
IMF and World Bank. Debt savings were to be directed towards implementation of the-
se strategies. This was meant to replace the process whereby structural adjustment con-
ditions were imposed by the IMF and World Bank. A major issue, in particular for 
southern debt groups, was that money released through debt reduction should be used 
for the benefit of people at community level, and evidence was gathered by debt cam-
paigns that social sector spending increased following debt reduction (Buxton 2004; 
Greenhill and Blackmore 2002).  
As happened following adoption of HIPC 1, Jubilee 2000 campaigners were di-
vided in their responses to the Cologne deal, with British and German campaigns giving 
it a qualified welcome as a first step. Others, in particular southern campaigns, rejected 
the deal seeing it as a continuation of the oppressive relations between north and south, 
and failing to recognise the illegitimacy of much of the debt. This led to serious tensions 
between southern and northern groups.  An autonomous Jubilee South network of 
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southern groups was launched in November 1999 with a radical analysis of debt as ille-
gitimate, questioning who owed what to whom, declaring that southern countries were 
the creditors, and calling for repudiation of debt. Two south/north dialogues were sub-
sequently convened by Jubilee South – at Dakar 2000 (Jubilee South no date) and Ha-
vana 2005 (Jubilee South 2005) and there were south/north engagements organised by 
Jubilee South at World Social Forums and the Social Forums which took place at global 
governance summits, for example, the Genoa Social Forum 2001. This led to northern 
campaigns focussing more on illegitimate debt. As a result, the Norwegian government 
cancelled some debt on the grounds of its illegitimacy in 2006, and Ecuador repudiated 
part of its debt in 2008. 
Jubilee 2000 was planned by the UK as a time limited campaign, which would 
disband at the end of the year 2000. Given the huge mobilisations generated and the 
high international profile gained, there was widespread opposition to ending the cam-
paign, particularly from southern groups, who argued that issues do not get resolved 
with the “flip  of  a  calendar” (Jubilee Zambia 2003). In the event, Jubilee UK separated 
into three organisations. The transnational role was temporarily placed within a new or-
ganisation, ‘Drop   the  Debt’ which continued until the Genoa G8 Summit 2001, after 
which it closed. Jubilee Debt Campaign was set up as a national British campaign and 
Jubilee Plus provided research and information to transnational debt groups. While the 
high profile Jubilee 2000 UK campaign closed, as did a number of others, many cam-
paigns continued, and were able to respond to the new opportunity for debt cancellation 
which presented itself in 2004/2005 through the Make Poverty History/the Global Call 
for Action against Poverty campaigns. At their summit in Gleneagles 2005, the G7 an-
nounced the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, which promised 100% cancellation of 
debt owed to the IMF, World Bank and African Development Bank for countries which 
had completed the HIPC initiative. While this was a significant step from the early 
1990s when multilateral debt cancellation was taboo, neoliberal conditionality stayed in 
place, and a limited number of countries benefited. 
7.2 Making common cause transnationally 
While Jubilee 2000 was a new and very dynamic moment in debt campaigning, it had 
roots within debt groups which had emerged during the 1980s and 1990s. The campaign 
was initially framed within biblical understandings linked to human development, and 
kept to a simple call for cancellation of unpayable debt by the millennium linked to the 
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biblical concept of Jubilee (Cox 2011; Pettifor 2006; Mayo 2005a+b). Given this fram-
ing, the backbone of the campaign was provided by the Christian churches (Cox B 
2011, Buxton 2004). Churches had both strong parish networks at national level, and 
dense transnational links, which operated as mobilising structures to promote the cam-
paign. Jubilee Peru, for example, gathered 1,850,000 signatures through national Catho-
lic Church structures (Donnelly 2002), and 10% of the signatures collected by Jubilee 
Bolivia came from transnational links with two German dioceses (Jubilee 2000. 1999).  
When it came to mobilising across the church/secular interface, there was some re-
sistance to the religious basis of the message. Even in Britain which initiated the cam-
paign,  the  idea  of  Jubilee  was  thought  of  as  ‘too  religious  and  corny’  when it was first 
being promoted (Pettifor 2006). In the Netherlands there were some concerns that there 
might be a perception of   ‘missionary zeal’, so they played down the biblical link for 
secular audiences (Interviewee Netherlands No. 1).  The dilemma was: 
 
 The   church   is   moved   by   Christianity   and   faith…. How do you express your 
faith when you work with secular organisations. There are people in the church 
who say, what has this to do with the bible and Jesus, but secular organisations 
won’t  join  with  that  kind  of  motivation.  How  Christian  can  you  be  before  people 
say, this is not for me. (Interviewee Sweden)  
 
As maximising collective power depends on uniting as many sectors as possible (Silva 
2009), Jubilee 2000 sought broad alliances, which in practice went beyond churches, 
increasingly involving secular community and solidarity groups, TUs, NGOs, youth and 
students, human rights, environmental and women’s  groups.  Indigenous  and  campesino 
groups participated in Ecuador (Molina Vera 2008) and the British Medical Associa-
tion, black and ethnic minority groups and comic relief in the UK.  
Although members of national Jubilee groups were overwhelmingly from civil 
society, there was no total discontinuity with political parties and governments.  In 
Germany political parties were allowed to affiliate at local but not national level (Inter-
viewee Germany No. 3). In the UK the Green Party joined Jubilee 2000 and Plaid Cym-
ru became a member of Jubilee 2000 Wales (Jubilee 2000, 1998). MPs joined the 
Ugandan Debt Network, which organised Jubilee Uganda, as individuals (UDN 1998), 
and numerous government officials were members of Jubilee Guayquil in Ecuador (Mo-
lina Vera 2008).  In the Philippines, the main political blocs had always been the back-
bone of the FDC (Ariate and Molmisa 2009; Grageda 1994). 
Common cause was deepened and strengthened by transnational actions, such as 
the mobilisations at the G7 Summits in Birmingham 1998 and Cologne 1999, which 
 167 
situated Jubilee 2000 as a high profile transnational campaign. These actions both en-
gaged new groups because  “Jubilee had such momentum, and was such a famous thing 
that everybody wanted to be there” (Interviewee Netherlands No. 1), and maintained the 
commitment of those already involved. A particularly positive aspect was the strength 
of transnational exchange through Jubilee 2000:  
 
For me it was also the first time… to really have an international network and to 
get information from all parts and also from the south” (Interviewee Netherlands 
No. 1) 
 
While Jubilee 2000 achieved a broad coalition, both in terms of the social sec-
tors involved and its geographic reach, there were tensions. In Ecuador, the Jubilee 
campaign started in 1999 while Ecuador was experiencing serious economic, political 
and environmental crises. There were significant differences between groups working 
on debt with some continuing to hold to the radical positions of the 1980s, rejecting 
debt payments, and any conditions, while others took a more pragmatic approach. In 
this context, the campaign emerged as Jubilee Guayaquil rather than Jubilee Ecuador 
(Molina Vera 2008). In the UK campaign, which involved a range of major NGOs, 
there was a fear that the campaign would overshadow its members, and negatively im-
pact on their public profile and fund raising abilities (Cox 2011, Pettifor 2006, Mayo 
2005b). 
 
Leadership and Organisational structures: a transnational fault line   
 
In terms of organisation and leadership, there were no formal international structures, 
with Jubilee 2000 operating through sets of interweaving networks. National cam-
paigns, together with a number of regional networks, loosely aggregated up into the 
transnational campaign. Many members of these national networks were also engaged 
in their own transnational networks, leading to dense relationships within Jubilee 2000. 
Members of the French Platforme Dette and Developpement, for example, were also 
members of CIDSE, CADTM, Faith and Justice, Caritas and Eurodad (Merkaert 2005). 
An NGO could work on debt within its bilateral relationships with its southern partner-
ship, at the same time be a member of the national debt coalition of the country in 
which it was based , and also be a member of regional networks e.g. Afrodad, CIDSE, 
Eurodad, Latindadd. European Catholic NGOs for example were often members of both 
CIDSE and Eurodad. 
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 The UK group which initiated the campaign, operated informally as a transna-
tional hub and catalyst, with the petition to the G7 acting as a uniting mechanism. The 
obligations on groups who were members of Jubilee 2000 were light – to agree with the 
principles and aim. Beyond that, groups had autonomy, in terms of how they cam-
paigned (Cox 2011, Pettifor 2006). Jubilee groups transnationally were only convened 
once in the run up to the year 2000 – at Rome in November 1998. There were, however, 
a range of regional discourse events in Africa and Latin America, from which agreed 
positions emerged in the form of declarations. These included declarations from meet-
ings at: Accra 19 April 1998, Tegucigalpa 27 January 1999, Gauteng 21 March 1999 
and Lusaka 19-21 May 1999. Eurodad continued as a forum for discussion on debt by 
European debt groups, with its annual conference involving a range of southern groups 
also. While not having an international framework gave flexibility, it left the door open 
to  the  ‘tyranny of structurelessness’, the informal leadership of the best resourced cam-
paigns, which took strategic decisions without proper consultation (Buxton 2004). Part 
of the reason for this, was the fact that no-one could have foreseen that the campaign 
would reach such heights (Interviewee Austria). Jubilee 2000 UK was opposed to an 
international steering committee, believing that to try to build a “democratic, accounta-
ble global, borderless body, outside framework of the state was delusional and utopian” 
(Pettifor 2006, p.312). What was needed was to coordinate activities internationally on 
the basis of  agreement  by  national  coalitions.  Jubilee  UK’s  board  saw  itself  accountable 
only for UK campaign, and   “kept ambiguous its relations with other national Jubilee 
2000 Campaigns” (Pettifor 2006, p.301). 
While recognising the issues raised by the informality of the international coor-
dination, and the dominant role played by the British campaign, there was little enthusi-
asm in retrospect for a formally constituted steering committee:  
 
....because the British were much more dynamic, they already had the infrastruc-
ture, they had tons of people mobilised, they had so many more people working 
full time on these issues, so you always had the risk of being run over... Still had 
we set up an international whatever, I think it would probably have killed the 
motivation of many people, because this type of process is just a nightmare. (In-
terviewee Germany No. 3) 
 
Preferred solutions were based on dialogue:  
 
..if you tell the British that they are running  us  over,  it  won’t  go  unheard,  they  
are not a corporation who think, oh fine we are running you over ..where we can 
do something concrete together, go for it, and don't use your scarce resources in 
these processes. (ibid.) 
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What enabled the transnational dimension of the campaign was the network structure:  
 
We felt the network form was very good. You can do individual things, but you 
are calling for the same thing. And the Jubilee name… We all wanted debt can-
cellation…we  had  common  principles,  common  objectives…  There  are  always  
tensions…you need patience for this kind of work. (Interviewee Peru)  
 
South /north interface 
 
Jubilee 2000 marked a new stage in the dynamic relationship between southern and 
northern groups within debt campaigning. While tensions arose between south and 
north groups during the 1980s, contradictions became particularly acute within Jubilee 
2000, leading to the establishment of an autonomous Jubilee South, made up of the 
more radical groups from Africa, Asia and South America. This was seen by some 
northern campaigns as a split (Interviewee Belgium No. 1; Interviewee Britain No. 6; 
Interviewee Germany No. 3), but it can be argued that the setting up of Jubilee South 
represented a reconfiguration of south/north relations within the debt movements. The 
dynamic of the south/north relationship was driven by the interaction of solidarity and 
conflict. Solidarity between south/north debt groups was the bedrock of Jubilee 2000. 
The shift from a charity to a justice approach, involving NGOs in advocacy, called for 
more equitable relationships, as once NGOs claimed to reflect the views of their  ‘south-
ern  partners’,  their  legitimacy  depended  to  some  extent  on  those  partners.  While Jubilee 
2000 was a transnational campaign, in practice the south/north relationship took the 
form mainly of bilateral relationships between particular southern and northern organi-
sations. Groups largely chose to work with those with whom they had a fair amount of 
common ground. Radical groups like AITEC and CEDETM in France linked into paral-
lel groups in the south, while  Spain’s  Jubilee  group  worked  with  faith- based groups in 
Latin America, rather than with the emerging radical voices (Interviewee France No. 1; 
Interviewee Germany No. 2; Interviewee Ireland No. 4; Interviewee Spain). 
Exchanges of information, resources and support between south and north were 
mutually beneficial. While funding is often considered a key nexus between north and 
south, from early on for FDC “the partnerships we forge are not mainly to get assis-
tance. FDC is a major player  in  the  global  campaign” (FDC 1992). Funding, however, 
was also a major factor in many south/north relationships, for example, UDN had 33 
northern NGO funders in 1999, some funding specific projects, others providing core 
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funding (UDN 1999). Information exchanges are central to transnational campaigning, 
and a major way in which common cause is built, and maintained over time. INGOs 
provided briefs from IMF/World Bank meetings and information on how to engage with 
these institutions (Interviewee INGO Central America). Southern groups provided key 
analysis and information on the impact of debt to northern campaigns, for example, the 
role of FDC in relation to illegitimate debt10. Providing a platform in northern countries 
to southern groups was mutually helpful. It raised the profile of the debt problem of in-
dividual countries by giving southern campaigners access to decision makers, the media 
and the public within creditor countries. Southern visitors helped northern groups to 
mobilise their publics, giving the northern groups greater legitimacy with national deci-
sion makers, and helping them strengthen their constituencies, key to their fund rais-
ing11. But in spite of the strong solidarity, conflicts arose because of different priorities 
between south and north, as each is positioned differently within the internationalising 
state and specifically in relation to the debt crisis. These differences can be factored in, 
to some extent, within bilateral relationships, but not so easily at a wider transnational 
level. Loose transnational networking structures are based on an implied assumption of 
relatively equally positioned members, and lack a mechanism to rebalance inequalities 
of power (Surman and Reilly 2003), especially those which reflect wider power struc-
tures. A major problem arose in relation to northern leadership of Jubilee 2000 at trans-
national level (in particular the British campaign). Northern leadership resulted in the 
campaign structure and framing being better aligned with northern contexts than south-
ern ones. A particular fault line was that INGOs need “short term deliverables for fund-
ing reasons and this generates tension with those primarily coming from social move-
ments” (Interviewee Italy). A southern view highlighted issues thrown up by this:  
 
I worked in two campaigns – Jubilee and Make Poverty History. Many of us 
were invited when the strategy and method and form were already decided, in-
cluding the names, slogan, symbols, but we saw them as good opportunities and 
could make adaptations in both cases. (Presentation to Eurodad Conference 
2005) 
 
 But concerns were that: 
                                                 
10 The  importance  of  FDC’s  role  can  be  seen  in  the responses from e.g. Centre for Concern and Develop-
ment Gap in the US, the Social Justice Committee in Canada, PARC in Japan and Eurodad to an Evalua-
tion of FDC 1995 carried out by Christian Aid (Christian Aid Archives). 
11 For example, Christian Aid invited a speaker from TASOET to Britain in 1998 to participate in Chris-
tian Aid week – a major annual awareness raising and fund raising series of events - to give talks to 
church groups and supporters. The TASOET speaker got a speaking slot at the high profile Jubilee 2000 
events at the Birmingham G7 Summit 1998. (Documented in Christian Aid Archives). 
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All effort is channelled through a formula – sometimes this formula is not what 
captures people as they live in different social and political situations, they have 
different politics and visions. (ibid.) 
 
 While the short time line arose from the symbolism of the year 2000, this was in line 
with NGO practice of moving to new campaign issues every couple of years. The 2000 
deadline, however, was central to the dynamic of the campaign, as it enabled organisa-
tions to commit for a short period (Pettifor 2006). For the south, however, issues were 
“goal bound not time  bound”  (Jubilee 2001b) and: 
 
 There was a hullabaloo in Africa who said no this campaign can’t  stop, these is-
sues are still here… We   strongly   protested… Many people would be distrust-
ful...of campaigns coming from the north and two years action. (Interviewee 
Uganda)  
 
Further, many southern campaigns were only getting off the ground by the millennium, 
and, given the particular resource and physical and communication infrastructures limi-
tations faced, they needed time to build popular campaigns. Information received by 
UDN via the Internet, for example, had to be simplified, translated into at least five lan-
guages before being disseminated (Buxton 2002).  In this context, the call was that the 
south should lead, given that they were the most seriously affected by the problem. The 
situation however is complicated by the fact that northern groups are not just working 
on behalf of the south, they are also speaking for themselves as citizens:  
 
The south is leading and we never understood that because we thought ...we 
don't want our government to be involved in what we perceive to be a very un-
fair practice, why would we need approval to target our governments? (Inter-
viewee Germany No. 3) 
   
The lack of a transnational decision making process proved to be a serious fault-line 
when some northern campaigns gave a qualified positive responses to the Cologne debt 
deal without discussion with southern campaigns. According to the Director of Jubilee 
2000 UK:  
 
...the package was a significant step which showed the power of the debt-relief 
movement. 'But we are not there yet,' she added. 'We are at stage one.’(Elliott 
1999). 
 
 This was seen as northern campaigns speaking for the south, and evoked serious anger 
among southern campaigners in Cologne. Jubilee Zambia articulated southern concerns  
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Supporters in the north ...must not be misled by claims made by G-7 leaders or 
officials of the World Bank and IMF that "major breakthroughs" have oc-
curred... Equally urgent is the need to listen to the voices in the south that flatly 
challenge the HIPC and ESAF approaches as unacceptable. (Henriot 1999)  
 
Plans to set up Jubilee South, an autonomous movement of southern groups, emerged 
from consultations among Latin American/Caribbean, African and Asia/Pacific groups 
at various southern meetings on debt: Tegucigalpa (January 1999), Gauteng (March 
1999), Lusaka (May 1999) and the Asia Pacific meeting12, and also from the 
south/south meetings which took place at the Jubilee Summit in Rome 1998.  Jubilee 
South was launched at a south/south summit in November 1999, to ensure southern per-
spectives were articulated, involving representatives of southern Jubilee campaigns and 
social movements (Jubilee South no date b). Jubilee South aimed to rearticulate 
south/north relations, rather than to break them. Regional south/north dialogues were 
organised to find common ground for mutual support and solidarity, and a south/north 
dialogue convened by Jubilee South took place in Dakar December 2000 (Jubilee South 
2000). A significant innovation was that northern groups were invited to co-convene the 
latter event, thus modelling a more equitable form of engagement. The south/north con-
flict can be seen as southern groups contesting the ‘second face of power’13 within Jubi-
lee 2000, that is, challenging the rules of the game within organisations, which deter-
mine whose priorities appear on agendas (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). This led to a re-
configuration of south/north relations, in terms of who spoke for the movement and how 
agendas were set, resulting in illegitimate debt14 becoming central to the agenda after 
2000. While the issue of odious/illegitimate debt had been highlighted by northern cam-
paigns, it had not been the central argument. Northern campaigns now taking up illegit-
imate debt, were not expected to take on the full Jubilee South position that all debts 
were illegitimate and should be repudiated, and that reparations were due (Interviewee 
Philippines/Jubilee South). The German approach, for example, was very pragmatic, “... 
away from this global call that all the debt is unjust and illegal into okay let's work on 
                                                 
12 No date could be found for this meeting.  
13 The first face of power is exercised through concrete decisions. It focusses on behaviour within deci-
sion making in relation to issues over which there is observable conflict of interests (Lukes 2005, p. 19).  
14 Odious debt arises from lending to oppressive regimes. Illegitimate debt is a wider concept including 
loans given to support dictatorships, loans that fuelled corruption, and loans for infrastructural projects 
that caused environmental and social damage. Debt linked to bad policy advice, failed projects and where 
private loans have been socialised under duress to bail out lenders has also been deemed illegitimate by 
campaigners (Hanlon 2006, p.218). 
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individual contracts and let us discern legitimate from illegitimate debt” (Interviewee 
Germany No. 2). 
This was not a simple south/north ideological division, as differences also exist-
ed between southern groups. Differences in Latin America led to the establishment of 
Latindadd parallel to Jubilee South America. Jubilee Zambia made common cause with 
Jubilee South on apartheid debt and the role of the IMF and World Bank, but “made it 
very clear that we would be inside as well, engaging with the IMF and World Bank, we 
would be engaging in the process of debt reduction (Interviewee Zambia). A number of 
efforts were made to mend the fractures. The World Council of Churches brought to-
gether J2000 UK, Jubilee South, CADTM and others to see if relationships could be re-
established (Interviewee Netherlands No. 1).  Eurodad also played a bridging role: 
 
I saw it [the south/north relationship] as dysfunctional and messy, when I first 
came to Eurodad …I  was really concerned about that....it was going to be a big 
weakness in the debt movement.. so I put time and energy into trying to bridge 
with some of key figures [in Jubilee South] ... we organised joint meetings to-
gether.  I  took  time  to… see how we could work together. (Interviewee Eurodad 
Coordinator No.2)   
 
Jubilee 2000 demonstrated the ability of transnational civil society to develop strong 
common cause through a decentred campaign with broad support among different social 
sectors, and significant global reach. At the level of mobilising, therefore, Jubilee 2000 
operated as a network of autonomous groups. When it came to the interface with inter-
national decision makers and the media, however, Jubilee 2000 became re-centred with 
the UK, the strongest campaign and the initiator of Jubilee 2000, being sought as 
spokesperson. This poses challenging questions about organising transnational civil so-
ciety campaigns. The network structure is the easiest formation within which civil so-
ciety groups can make common cause transnationally, as it calls for a minimal level of 
negotiations and agreements between members. Problems arise, however, when more 
diffuse civil society groups as part of ‘globalisation-from-below’ meet the more united, 
homogenous   ‘globalisation-from-above’   (Falk   1997). While the tensions which this 
generated within Jubilee posed serious difficulties, and were very painful for many, the 
intensity of the debate about the respective roles of southern and northern groups re-
flected the success of the campaign in engaging strongly across the south and north, and 
also diverging political positions. The fact that these tensions led to a reconfiguration of 
power within debt movements, rather than disengagement, can be seen as a significant 
development along the south/north interface.  
 174 
7.3 Geography of power  
As a transnational campaign made up of a wide range of national groups and without 
any international organisational structure, how did Jubilee 2000 seek to leverage the na-
tional/international interface? Formally, the G7 was the main body targeted, but there 
are discontinuities between where major power lies in the internationalising state and 
where campaigns in different countries have the most leverage, and this affected where 
campaigns put most of their efforts. For campaigns in G7 countries, the fact that the na-
tional and transnational were fused meant that their national based campaigns were di-
rectly channelled into the most powerful transnational decision maker on debt For the 
German debt campaign: 
 
 …because Germany was the centre of the G7 in 1999…we never had to decide 
whether we wanted to lobby the German government or the G7, it was basically 
the same. So, we never made a deliberate decision to be an international thing or 
a German thing, we were a German campaign definitely. (Interviewee Germany 
No. 2) 
.  
 
While groups from G7 countries were involved in mobilisations at the G7 meetings dur-
ing the 1990s, they did not form a ‘G7  NGO  sub  group’, as this would give legitimacy 
to the G7 (Interviewee France No. 2). After the year 2000 the French campaign took a 
lead role in facilitating transnational engagement with the Paris Club, which was virtu-
ally fused into the French state in institutional terms. In November 2004, for example, 
when  Iraq’s  debt  was  before  the  Paris  Club,  the  French  campaign  operated  as  a  “privi-
leged interlocutor for a meeting  between  ‘Bercy’  [seat  of  the  French  Treasury  where  the  
Paris Club is based] and international networks working on the debt” (Merkaert 2005).  
Inevitably, the debt nébuleuse power relations were replicated within the debt 
campaigns. It was more important, for example, to get the Germany government on 
board than the Irish government: 
 
It is not because we like it but because it is like that  … Maybe it has importance 
in its own right to do things differently, ...but that is may be not the most effec-
tive political campaign because our campaigns are related to the official power 
politicking. (Interviewee Germany No. 3) 
 
But the G7 country campaigns, on their own, would not have been sufficient: 
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 We needed all the creditors in the deal. For example Holland was kept out of 
the G7 debate but they had a lot of debt and they were very difficult about the 
G7 decision, saying who are you to decide to cancel debt on our behalf; we 
aren’t  going   to  go  along  with  you…  Holland  and  Scandinavia  were   important; 
they did start to put sand in the wheels, so it was important to have it [Jubilee 
campaigns] beyond the G7. (Interviewee UK No. 6)  
 
 In terms of mobilising, the G7 was not so central in non-G7 creditor countries. The G7 
was not “appealing  to  the  Dutch  public” (Interviewee Netherlands No. 1), nor for Aus-
tria (Interviewee Austria).  Indirect leverage could be exercised by joining a transna-
tional network which contained members from G7 countries. By joining Oxfam Interna-
tional, Spanish NGO Intermon felt that this would increase the impact of their advocacy 
(Vivas 2008).  
The G7 was not privileged as a central target by southern groups. Notably two 
key Jubilee 2000 declarations, the Accra Declaration issued at the launch of Jubilee 
2000 Afrika, and the Tegucigalpa Declaration issued at the launch of Jubilee 2000 Latin 
America, did not mention the G7. A key nexus linking debtor countries to the interna-
tionalising state are IMF and World Bank adjustment programmes. For UDN, IMF and 
World Bank “loan conditionalities under SAPs have undermined the decision making 
processes and capacity of government”   (Gariyo   1999,   p.127). In the Philippines the 
pressure from the IMF meant  that  “the government wants Fund approval more than ap-
proval  of  people  …..they  are  prepared  to sacrifice people’s  interests, do anything to get 
seal of approval” (FDC 1994a). While southern declarations generally denounced debt 
as the mechanism which enables the continuation of imperial pillage and plunder into a 
post-colonial age, they also recognised that the internationalising state had its allies at 
the heart of southern states: 
 
Likewise, these forces [rich countries transnational corporations, international 
financiers, IMF, World Bank, WTO] have instruments in the South; namely 
some of our own technocratic, political and commercial elite who are in the tiny 
minority of Africans who continue to promote the Washington Consensus. (Lu-
saka Declaration 1999) 
 
Re-articulating national governments  
 
In spite of the vastly differing power positions of debt campaigns in relation to the in-
ternationalising state, they all sought to re-articulate their governments towards their 
domestic societies,   “reclaiming power at national level” (Interviewee Italy). Northern 
campaigns pressed their governments to cancel their bilateral debt, and also to position 
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themselves internationally in favour of debt cancellation (e.g. Sweden, Spain, and Neth-
erlands): 
 
 ..for us it was mainly a national campaign to reach the public and we used the 
transnational to get information, to learn positions, to have a network but mainly 
we saw our focus on the Swedish public and politicians. (Interviewee Sweden)  
 
 The Italian campaign pressed the government to delink the Italian position from the 
existing G8 consensus at the Paris Club. As a result a law was passed by Parliament in 
July 2000, under a centre-left government, and strongly influenced by the Vatican, 
agreeing to cancel debt covering more countries than HIPC, and with less onerous con-
ditions (Gerbaudo and Pianta 2012, Interviewee Italy). Spanish groups campaigning on 
debt (DEDE, RCADE and Intermon), pressed for national legislation on debt following 
the socialist party electoral victory in 2004, and this resulted in the adoption of a Span-
ish debt law in 2006 (Vivas 2008). Jubilee 2000 UK urged its supporters to call on the 
British government to unilaterally cancel debt of poor countries to Britain if the G8 
failed to agree on debt cancellation (Jubilee 2000, 1999a). In January 2005, Britain took 
unilateral  action  agreeing  to  write  off  Britain’s share of the multilateral debt of a num-
ber of countries (BBC News 2005).   
Action at national level in northern countries involved calling governments to 
account for their actions internationally –as bilateral creditors and as members of the 
IMF and World Bank. Southern campaigns also saw their governments as a central tar-
get:  
 
We are very clear that our power and credibility can only come from how strong 
we are in our own countries, and in our movements. Our main audience is our 
governments – and through the national to the international. …..very  radical   to  
say the extent to which we can influence the IMF is the extent to which we can 
influence our own governments. (Interviewee Philippines/Jubilee South)   
 
The declaration from the first Jubilee South Summit 1999 prioritises action by southern 
governments, for example, repudiation of odious and onerous debt; formation of a 
southern debtors' alliance; and allocation of freed- up funds to benefit people of the 
south. In terms of strategy, Jubilee South encouraged national campaigns to focus on 
challenging the policies of southern governments (Jubilee South 1999).  
Southern groups also looked to stronger regional action from their governments. 
There   was   recognition   that   the   lack   of   a   debtors’   coalition   weakened the bargaining 
power, and negotiating abilities of African governments on debt issues (Oxfam 
Mozambique 1998). The African Union was a specific target of Afrodad, which aimed 
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to get African leaders to come up with a position on debt (Interviewee Zambia). The 
Lusaka Declaration (1999) called for a new "Africa Consensus" on debt and sustainable 
development (to replace the bankrupt Washington Consensus). In Latin America, from 
the end of the 1990s there was a move to the left among South American governments 
15 keen to change the international financial architecture, for example, the introduction 
of Banco Sur (Rosales 2013), and there was support for civil society positions on some 
issues such as debt audits (Interviewee Peru). 
 
 Relationship between the national and transnational 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, in spite of the substantial national focus, Jubilee2000 was a 
high   profile   transnational   campaign   and   provided   significant   ‘transnational   space’   to  
debt campaigns. As mentioned above, much of the south/north relationship operated 
through bilateral relationships:  
 
We had some countries we would focus on more than others, Niger, Mozam-
bique, Ecuador, Nicaragua and then normally Bolivia. We would work face- to- 
face with people and this is how being part of a global movement materialised. 
(Interviewee Germany No. 2) 
 
 Regional networks – Latindadd, Afrodad and Eurodad - enabled the development of 
proposals  within  a  ‘united  front’  which  could  then  be  taken  to  the  IMF,  World  Band  and  
the Inter-American Development Bank (Molina Vera 2008, p.54). Information dissemi-
nated through Jubilee 2000 sometimes provided information on debt negotiations to na-
tional campaigns before their Ministers of Finance had this information - giving the 
campaigns greater power and credibility at national level (Reitan 2007, p.80).  Transna-
tional action to pressure key governments at critical times could be mobilised where 
campaigns within countries were relatively weak. Postcard campaigns to the Japanese 
government, host to the 2000 G7 Summit, were organised from the UK (Jubilee 2000, 
2000b), and weekly rallies were organised outside the Japanese Embassies in the UK 
(Holmes 2006). Zambians demonstrated at the Japanese Embassy in Lusaka, and pre-
sented a petition calling for total cancellation of  Zambia’s  debt  to  Japan  (Jubilee  2000.  
2000a).  
The discursive spaces at international level (Dryzek 1999) were leveraged alt-
hough these were not as significant as national level action. There were a range of cross-
                                                 
15 Chavez was elected in Venezuela 1999; Lula in Brazil 2003; Kirchner in Argentina 2003; Morales in 
Bolivia 2006; and Correa in Ecuador 2007. 
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sectoral transnational events involving Jubilee 2000 groups, other civil society debt 
groups, and representatives of different elements of the debt nébuleuse. Some took place 
in Washington as part of the World Bank and IMF annual meetings. An event at the 
1998 IMF World Bank AGM, for example, involved speakers from Jubilee 2000, Euro-
dad, the IMF, World Bank, the Paris Club secretariat and a representative from the Vat-
ican (Eurodad 1998). Events were also hosted by the softer end of the debt nébuleuse, 
such as the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the Commonwealth, involving 
Jubilee groups from the south and the north (Collins, Gariyo and Burden 2001). Other 
events were organised by civil society groups, for example, a conference in Maputo or-
ganised by the Mozambican Debt Group in 1998 in collaboration with Afrodad and Eu-
rodad. In addition to civil society groups from Mozambique, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and 
Uganda, speakers  included  the  president’s  wife,  government  officials  from  Mozambique 
and Uganda, the World Bank and IMF resident representative to Mozambique (Oxfam 
Mozambique 1998). The impact of these events are hard to measure; they are not exam-
ples of communicative action where each side is willing to hear the other’s  arguments, 
with a view to coming to a consensus based on the power of the better argument (Ha-
bermas 1984). As neither side enters in this spirit, the question arises, why do civil soci-
ety groups and representatives of the debt nébuleuse come together, what are their ex-
pectations of these events? As pointed out by Sikkink (2002), where power and norms 
are not fused, there is space for civil society influence. It is therefore likely, from civil 
society’s  point  of  view, that aspects of their knowledge and expertise which can be in-
cluded within the current model, leading to improvements, will be heard and have an 
influence.  
The Jubilee 2000 transnational profile impacted at national level, giving cam-
paigns greater credibility with their governments and the public (Interviewee INGO 
Central America, Interviewee Zambia, Interviewee Uganda). This arose partly from 
peer pressure between creditor countries. Spanish officials, for example, felt they had to 
dialogue with NGOs as colleagues from other countries were doing so: 
 
We would have been less in the political and media side if we only asked for 
Spain to eliminate all the debt from the poorest countries... we gained credibil-
ity.. because we were part of something which was happening globally. (Inter-
viewee Spain)  
 
 Jubilee  2000’s  profile  had  an  impact  also  on  southern  governments: 
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Governments would have been paying attention after Cologne, they suddenly 
woke up and saw that international civil society had links with their civil society 
groups, mounting pressure, the way they were able to mobilise citizens. (Inter-
viewee INGO Central America)  
 
Transnational campaigning also opened up contacts between civil society groups in 
debtor groups and creditor governments.  Facilitated by their links with creditor country 
campaigns, meetings were held by Jubilee Peru with the German, Swiss and Italian em-
bassies on debt reduction for social development funds: 
 
 These countries were more open to contact with civil society than the Peruvian 
government   itself.  …The   Peruvian   government,   however,   opened   its   doors   to  
conversation with civil society because of that international pressure. (Inter-
viewee Peru)  
 
There were also direct links between southern governments and the transnational 
debt movement. Debtor governments leaked documents to Jubilee 2000 UK (Buxton 
2004), and the Guyanese Minister for Finance accompanied Jubilee 2000 to their meet-
ing with Prime Minister Blair on the evening of the mobilisation at the Birmingham G7 
Summit (Interviewee UK No. 6).  The Ecuadorian Government invited advisers from 
Eurodad, Erlassjahr,CADTM and civil society experts from Argentina, Peru and Brazil, 
as advisers to its 2007 debt audit (El Universo 2007). Eurodad was encouraged by 
southern governments to raise issues which it was difficult for them to raise, such as 
illegitimate debt “as they may get ostracised from proper circles where debt is talked 
about not in those terms”. Eurodad was also able to articulate southern governments 
concerns on the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative adopted in 2005 (Interviewee Euro-
dad Coordinator No. 2). 
Rather than an example of global civil society in a post sovereign world, Jubilee 
2000 was a mosaic of national campaigns, regional networks and INGOs, which simul-
taneously aggregated up into Jubilee 2000 transnationally and disaggregated back into 
its largely national component parts. Rather than focus on the G7 (other than campaigns 
based in G7 countries where the national and international were fused), groups priori-
tised changing national level policy and practice, centring themselves where they saw 
they had most power, in their own states. Debt groups can be seen as struggling to 
rearticulate power within states towards domestic societies, demanding accountability 
from governments for the policies they pursued at national and transnational levels in 
their name. Rather than passively operating within the given world order, transnational 
civil society was actively seeking to reshape this order, confirming the argument that 
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the state is still a valid site for struggle (Panitch 1994). The main mechanism to operate 
across the national /international divide was to influence government policy within the 
debt nébuleuse. National government representatives brought the views of their national 
civil society groups to the debt nébuleuse, or were influenced by the engagement that 
their colleagues from other countries were having with civil society, and this led to an 
opening up of access to civil society at national level. From a debtor country civil socie-
ty perspective, the first step is to change national governments. “No matter how much 
we [FDC] globalise our struggles, if the government is not responsive, campaigns will 
never get anywhere”   (former FDC secretary general, quoted in Arias and Molmisa 
2009, p.54). The second mechanism was the major collective action at international lev-
el, with mobilisations at Birmingham 1998, Cologne 1999 and Edinburgh 2005. While 
it would be too big a leap to describe these as wars of manoeuvre at international level 
(Drainville 2005b), situating these within the development of the broader anti-
globalisation/global justice movements is a study yet to be undertaken. Transnational 
mobilisations captured the attention of international media, gained celebrity support and 
created Jubilee as a transnational actor. Thirdly, a weaker mechanism was the interna-
tional, cross-sectoral transnational discourse events organised by civil society groups, 
both central institutions of the debt nébuleuse (IMF and World Bank), and weaker 
members such as the Commonwealth and UN bodies.  
7.4 Knowledge, norms, frames 
This section examines how Jubilee 2000 framed the debt issue to win public support 
and challenge debt nébuleuse policy. Different levels of change were sought by differ-
ent groups within Jubilee 2000, and therefore there were different framings, in terms of 
human development/human rights or more anti-systemic framings, positing debt as ille-
gitimate and a tool of an exploitative system (Tagle and Patomaki 2007).  
Within the multiplicity of arguments run – moral, structural, technical – the 
moral authority of NGOs is identified as central to how Jubilee 2000 exercised power 
(Friesen 2012; Broome 2009; Busby 2007; Yanacopulos 2004). This relates to the call 
for cancellation of unpayable debt by the millennium, which was the basis of the high 
profile achieved by Jubilee 2000.  The moral argument was largely Christian, based on 
the central principle of the dignity of the human being which must take precedent over 
debt repayments (DEDE 2001).  This moral analysis calls for personal responsibility to 
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tackle factors which diminish the dignity of  the  human  person  “to be properly ourselves 
….our  own  integrity  calls  on  us  to  stand  up” (Interviewee Ireland No. 2) and that: 
 
[y]ou have to find ways of making this issue of global justice a full life involve-
ment for people. It is an existential issue: What kind of human being am I when 
I’m  neglecting how the world is run. (Interviewee Sweden) 
 
 NGO moral authority is seen as arising from public recognition of this   ‘other regard-
ing’  dimension  of  NGOs  (Broome  2009), and this is what gives them power in the pub-
lic arena (Risse 2000).  
The specific linking of the campaign message to the Jubilee principle set out in 
the Bible had historical resonance from the anti-slavery and US civil rights campaigns:  
 
When we went out with the Jubilee principle all those people of faith who had 
any understanding of their faith connected with it very well. So I think the 
churches were fundamental to picking it up across the world. (Interviewee UK 
No. 6)  
 
But the religious basis of the message did not resonate everywhere. In France, because 
the separation  of  state/church  still  had  ‘strong  salience’  (Josselin  2007), the secular slo-
gan “for the year 2000, let us cancel the debt”  was used although faith groups, such as 
CCFD, were major actors. In Japan, an alternative framing linked to a strongly held 
Japanese value, the country’s  good  international  standing (Busby 2007) was used: “To-
gether   let   us   cancel   the   debt” (Holmes 2006). As outlined in the introduction to this 
chapter, the religious message did not always resonate across the religious/secular inter-
face either.  
 
Meshing moral and structural arguments 
 
Moral arguments did not stand alone but were complemented by structural arguments. 
While moral discourse is based in general ethical principles which shape the rights and 
responsibilities of individuals, structural arguments relate more to the fate of collectivi-
ties of people, and are based on critiques of the ideological, institutional and material 
basis of power. While the dominant arguments originally were based on moral/human 
development arguments, a thread of structural critiques permeated the campaign. “Debt 
is the most dramatic manifestation of the subordination of the south to the international 
economy” (DEDE 2001) and “Africa’s  debt  problem  is  perpetuated  by  an  unjust inter-
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national economic system” (UDN 1998b). For those for whom structural arguments are 
central, debt was seen as an instrument of an oppressive system, providing a 
 
 ..prism through which to expose to wider public view the full spectrum of inter-
national financial relations, particularly North–South relations, the functioning 
of global financial institutions, and the global economic system. (Keet 2000, p. 
473)  
 
From this perspective structural change is needed otherwise even if the debt is can-
celled, it will recur (RCADE 2000). Moral and structural arguments meshed together. 
The Religious Working Group on the IMF and World Bank, which was set up in 1994 
in the US (Donnelly 2002), integrated a structural dimension into a moral analyse with-
in which sin is defined  as  ‘social and institutional, as well as personal’. Social sin is pre-
sent where there are growing economic disparities, increasing concentrations of eco-
nomic  power,  and  accelerating  environmental  abuse’ (Religious Working Group 1997). 
While Jubilee South takes an anti-systemic approach, debt is illegitimate also from a 
moral perspective and the call for repudiation is seen as the “appropriate moral and po-
litical response where justice is denied” (Jubilee South 2002).  
 
Renegotiated frames – frame slippage 
 
The original frame of  ‘unpayable debt’  was  renegotiated  at  the  Jubilee  2000  conference  
in Rome 1998, under strong pressure from southern groups to include a number of 
structural dimensions. Debt to be cancelled now covered:  
a) Unpayable debt, which is debt that cannot be serviced, without placing a burden 
on impoverished people.  
b) Debt that in real terms has already been paid.  
c) Debt for improperly designed policies and projects.  
d) Odious debt and debt incurred by repressive regimes. (Jubilee 2000. 1998b). 
 
This more radical framing can be seen in southern debt declarations:  
 
The debt is illegitimate because, in large measure, it was contracted by dictator-
ships.., as well as by governments which were formally democratic, but corrupt. 
Most of the money was not used to benefit the people who are now being re-
quired to pay it back. (Tegucigalpa Declaration 1999) 
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Prefiguring the tensions to come the declaration ends with an appeal to northern cam-
paigns not to propose solutions calling for less than southern groups were proposing 
(Tegucigalpa Declaration 1999). From an African perspective: 
 
We reiterate the call for total debt cancellation, and we insist that creditors and 
G7 countries cannot be allowed, anymore, to dictate the terms of cancellation. 
..We endorse the collective repudiation of illegitimate foreign debt payments. 
(Lusaka Declaration 1999) 
 
But there can be a fault line between agreed discourse and how this is actually 
operationalised. Keet points to slippage from more radical frames agreed at the Rome 
conference, to calls   for   ‘debt   relief’   and ‘debt   reduction’, which happens when debt 
groups  are  ‘grappling’  with  their  governments  (Keet 2000, p.462).  A particular slippage 
was  privileging   ‘unpayable’  over   ‘odious’  or   ‘illegitimate’  debt. Should the aim be to 
delegitimise the debt or focus on its terrible human impact? Where did the solution to 
the crisis lie – in debtors repudiating illegitimate debt or in creditors cancelling unpaya-
ble debt? While no Jubilee group rejected the unpayable debt argument, Jubilee South 
pointed out that this argument bypasses the question of how the debts were accumulated 
and who benefited (Nacpil no date). To focus solely on unpayable debt could lead cam-
paigns in the north towards a charity approach, while disempowering southern people 
who would have to plead for cancellation on the basis of their poverty, rather than assert 
their right to repudiate illegitimate debt (Keet 2000).  
In practice, the legitimacy of debt had been challenged in the south from the 
start of the crisis in the 1980s. For FDC, freedom from illegitimate debt was always 
central to their campaign, and they raised the issue within the transnational debt move-
ments from the 1980s (Mendoza 1988). In the early 1990s they documented the fraudu-
lent nature of some of their loans and opposed their repayment (Pineda-Ofreneo 1991). 
Jubilee South Africa delegitimised both the debt run up by the apartheid regime and that 
incurred by neighbouring countries, as a result of aggression from the South African 
regime,  as  ‘apartheid  debt’ (Rustomjee 2004). Given the heavy price paid by Zambia, as 
the leader of the front lines states, in the struggle against apartheid, Jubilee Zambia 
asked:  
 
Is it ethically acceptable to expect Zambia to pay back debts entered into be-
cause of a moral fight against apartheid? ….should  not  some  form  of  reparations 
be expected from those who profited from investments, trade and political sup-
port that maintained the Pretoria regime in power for so many years? (Jubilee 
Zambia 2003a)  
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In Argentina a court decision in 2000 recognised the illegitimate nature of much of the 
debt dating from the military regimes. The case had been initiated by journalist A. Ol-
mos in 1982 (Pettifor, Cisneros and Olmos-Gaona 2001). Nicaraguan and Honduran 
Jubilee campaigns were fuelled by the odious/illegitimate nature of their debts – in the 
case of Nicaragua, debt from the Somoza era and in the case of Honduras a massive 
debt arising from a mismanaged mega infrastructural project. This motivated: 
 
…a wider variety of organisations for whom technical issues on debt… normally 
been   something   they  would’ve   disengaged   from. Something so complex, with 
the locus of power around it so far away. (Interviewee INGO Central America)  
 
Creditor country campaigns also questioned the legitimacy   of   their   country’s  
claims. They pointed to the use of export guarantee agencies to promote lending in the 
interest of the creditor country.  The French campaign highlighted that almost half of 
debt cancelled by France resulted from “irresponsible if not criminal” export guarantees 
by COFACE to countries at war, notorious dictatorships such as Iraq, Nigeria and Zaire 
(Merkaert 2005). 95% of British debt was also run up through its Export Credit Guaran-
tee  Department  most  of  which  “aggressively promoted British exports particularly arms. 
This is part of creditors’ instrument in their competition  against  other  OECD  countries” 
(Pettifor 1998, p.119).  
 
Jubilee 2000 and the debt nébuleuse: clashing frames  
 
While the moral and structural arguments resonated strongly in the public arena, the 
need for technical capacity to back up moral arguments was called for when engaging 
with the debt nébuleuse. For the German campaign, it was imperative to develop strong 
technical capability   in  order   to   avoid  being  “pushed into a moral corner”, with moral 
discourse lower down the hierarchy than economic discourse. At a debate the campaign 
organised between a number of Catholic bishops and the president of the Bundesbank, 
the bishops “struggled for the right to have moral imperatives” against the Bundes-
bank’s   economistic   arguments (Interviewee Germany No. 2). This hierarchy operated 
also in other countries:  
 
For those talks [with the Minister for Finance and Parliament] to be fruitful, with 
only ethical arguments, what we could get was, yes, people you are nice but you 
don’t understand so thank you for your asks. It was through knowledge and this 
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mixture of senior economists and more detailed analysis, and showing that we 
had good proposals and that they were supported by others, that we gained this 
space. (Interviewee Spain)  
 
 Strong research capacity became a bedrock of the campaign with many national cam-
paigns producing technical reports such as The Role of Parliament in the Management 
of External Debt in Uganda (UDN 1999), and Social and Economic Implications of 
HIPC in Zambia (Jubilee Zambia 2001a). One point of leverage for the Irish campaign 
was  research  highlighting  the  impact  of  debt  and  SAP  on  Ireland’s  Aid  programme in 
Tanzania, as this was a sensitive issue (Interviewee Ireland No. 2). According to ODI, 
the success of the popular pressure of Jubilee 2000 arose from the fact it was based on 
credible evidence, and this forced decision makers to respond (Pitt et al no date). 
Jubilee 2000 arguments – whether focussing on unapayable or illegitimate debt - 
clashed  with  the  debt  nébuleuse  key  concept  of  ‘sustainable  debt’, which was central to 
the HIPC initiative. This concept was mainly operationalised in terms of debt-to-export 
ratios16, that is a ratio of over 200/250% was considered unsustainable in the 1996 
HIPC. Moral issues for the debt nébuleuse were the sanctity of contracts and moral haz-
ard.  For  the  IMF  the  “sanctity of contracts was a key component of a secure economic 
environment” (IMF 1997, p.11). There were also concerns about the moral hazard of 
cancelling debt as it  might  provide  ‘perverse  incentives’  to  debtors  to  run  up  more  debt  
in the hopes of also getting this cancelled.  
Jubilee   2000’s   counter-frames of unpayable debt and illegitimate/odious debt 
were pitted against the debt nébuleuse’s  economistic  concept  of  ‘sustainable debt’. The 
Jubilee concern with the sanctity of life came up against the debt nébuleuse’s  privileg-
ing of the sanctity of contracts: moral arguments based on the dignity of the human per-
son clashed with concerns about moral hazard (Broome 2009, p.71). A human devel-
opment approach to debt cancellation was developed by a number of organisations in-
cluding CAFOD, Afrodad, and Eurodad (UNDP 1999). CAFOD’s  approach provided a 
bridge between the moral arguments of Jubilee 2000, and the technical HIPC frame-
work. Within this approach, the criteria used to determine the amount of debt reduction 
was the financing of basic social needs. The expenditure to meet these needs would 
have first call on government revenue. After adoption of the Millennium Development 
Goals in 2000, the finance gap for meeting these goals was used by debt campaigns to 
highlight the need for further cancellation (Northover 2008). While the G7 Cologne 
                                                 
16 While the main indicator is debt to exports, for countries which are very open in terms of trade, a fur-
ther indicator was added but this was less central: the ratio of debt-to-government revenues exceeded 
280%. The test of openness was the an export to GDP ratio of at least 30% (Gunter 2002). 
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debt deal accepted that there should be further debt cancellation, this was achieved by 
lowering the debt-to-export criteria from 200/250% to 150/200%, rather than integrating 
the moral case for cancellation at the centre of the HIPC framework.  
Illegitimate debt fell even further outside the debt nébuleuse’s   regime of truth 
than did the concept unpayable debt, making it difficult to be heard by decision makers 
(Foucault 1980). The perception of the Swedish  churches  was  that  the  “don’t  owe  won’t 
pay position is unrealistic and if you put this demand forward, you  won’t  be  invited  to  
parliament or government, and then you are out” (Interviewee Sweden). The then Nor-
wegian Minister for International Development advised debt groups working on illegit-
imate debt that they ran the risk of “not being heard.. of becoming  irrelevant” with an 
official describing working on illegitimate debt as “shouting in the woods with a high 
risk of getting one’s mouth filled with cones” (Abildsnes 2007, p.6). According to the 
Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, “that is pulling on a dead horse asking to 
do something about odious debt; it is so far away and it is no use asking these kinds of 
things” (Interviewee Netherlands No. 1).  
Progress was eventually achieved on illegitimate debt. Influenced by Jubilee 
South, debt campaigners in Norway convinced their government to cancel debt arising 
from a lending programme deemed illegitimate (Abildesnes 2007).  Norway also made 
funds available to UNCTAD and the World Bank to research the concept of odious debt 
in international law (Jubilee USA 2008), bringing the issue of illegitimate debt to the 
heart of the debt nébuleuse. Following a debt audit set up by the government to deter-
mine the legitimacy of their debt, Ecuador repudiated part of its debt in 2008 (Molina 
Vera 2008).  This shift on illegitimate debt led the Dutch activist quoted above to con-
clude: 
 ..you see it has become a very normal issue and is part of the official policies 
and that is wonderful to see.... and next time ... nobody can tell me it is pulling a 
dead horse when I have new items to put on the agenda. (Interviewee Nether-
lands No. 1) 
  
While there is an emphasis in the literature on the moral framing of debt used by Jubilee 
2000, a range of approaches were actually used – moral, structural and technical. The 
illegitimacy of debts had a particular resonance across debtor countries and there were 
discourse struggles between Jubilee 2000 groups and the debt nébuleuse, and within Ju-
bilee 2000. The outcome was some progress on both fronts. Resources for human de-
velopment were achieved through policy change by the central forces of the debt 
nébuleuse, the G7. Some progress was also achieved on illegitimate debt, through action 
by individual governments more weakly placed within the internationalising state which 
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broke the dominant consensus on debt as a technical, economic and to some extent hu-
man development issue, by taking unilateral action on illegitimate debt.  
7.5 Engaging with the state/internationalising state   
This section examines the repertoire of action used nationally and transnationally to 
mobilise publics, the nature of the engagement with the state/internationalising state, 
and the debates thrown up within the campaign on how to achieve change.  
 
Transnational Repertoire:  
 
The aim was ambitious – to mobilise to the international level at which debt decisions 
are made (in the G7, Paris Club, IMF and World Bank). Transnational mobilisations are 
not easy to sustain as shown by the experience following the protests at the IMF/World 
Bank AGM in Berlin 1988:  
 
When we tried to do follow up with some people we had worked specifically 
with within church and NGO contexts in 1989, we had a very poor turnout. So 
the movement grew very rapidly up to 1988, but when the big highlight event 
was over it disappeared as quickly or faster than it had grown up. (Interviewee 
Germany No. 2) 
 
The dilemma of transnational mobilisation was resolved by developing a peti-
tion to be presented to the G7 in Cologne June 1999, the last G7 summit before the new 
millennium. While less dramatic than high-profile street mobilisations, the more routine 
petition aimed to broadly represent the people making the claim for debt cancellation – 
across debtor and creditor countries - and could be seen as a quasi-referendum in the 
absence of any formal democratic processes at international level. Contentious or carni-
val type events capture media attention, but while their focus may be on institutions of 
the debt nébuleuse (G7, World Bank, IMF), most participants come from the host coun-
try. As international summits take place disproportionately in northern countries (G7 
and Paris Club always; and most IMF and World Bank summits), this can lead to a situ-
ation where people in one place are speaking on behalf of people in distant places 
(Florini 2000). The petition overcame this divide, enabling people across the globe to 
participate The other major transnational repertoire was the human chain encircling 
global/regional summits, symbolising both the chains of debt which had to be broken, 
and the solidarity links between people which would bring this about. The British cam-
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paign became a transnational information hub and catalyst for action and employed 
people to liaise with campaigns in Africa and Latin America (Eurodad 1998). The Brit-
ish maintained a broad transnational repertoire, putting Jubilee 2000 on the map when it 
mobilised 70,000 people, who formed a 10 kilometre chain around the centre of Bir-
mingham for the G8 Summit 1998 (Eurodad 1999).  They promoted direct people to 
people contacts between British and German activists via local transnational links such 
as twin town arrangements, trade unions and churches, in order to strengthen the Ger-
man campaign (Jubilee 2000, 1998a). The 35,000 strong human chain at the G8 Summit 
in Cologne, with a further 15,000 mobilising in Stuttgart where a major Protestant 
church event coincided with the Cologne summit, and the announcement of a new debt 
deal (HIPC11) by the G7, maintained the Jubilee 2000 transnational profile. Following 
Cologne, the UK aim – bridging the national/transnational – was “to maintain pressure 
on the UK government but also to target the US and Japan more actively and to create a 
stir at the IMF and World Bank in September” (Jubilee 2000, 1999b). While Jubilee 
mobilised at the 2000 IMF and World Bank AGM in Prague, and the Genoa G7 Summit 
2001, the broad, loose anti-globalisation/global justice movement set in train at the 
WTO 1999 meeting in Seattle, had entered the arena. Jubilee 2000 was therefore one of 
a range of groups mobilising at these events, with many debt campaigns avoiding the 
more contentious actions organised.  
A number of methods were used to create a sense of global mobilisations which 
did not involve mass gatherings in one place. In the run up to the Cologne G7 Summit, a 
‘Global chain  Reaction’  was  proposed to build momentum with every action aimed to  
trigger a reaction or an event (Jubilee 2000, 1998a). The human chains at Birmingham 
and Cologne could not be reproduced at the G7 Summit Okinawa in 2000 – partly be-
cause US military bases in Okinawa were a stronger mobilising issue for Japanese activ-
ists than debt. A virtual human chain was promoted: ‘Let  G8  know  the  world  is  watch-
ing’, and over 600 summit watch events took place around world (Jubilee 2000, 2000a). 
 The emergence of the World Social Forum (WSF) in 2001 provided debt groups 
with a new transnational space within which to coordinate action/engage broader sectors 
with the debt issue. Jubilee South organised a Debt Tribunal at the WSF 2002 in which 
5,000 participated. Former chief investigator of the South African Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission was one of the judges, with banks, corporations, northern govern-
ments, IMF, World Bank, Export Credit Agencies and southern collaborators standing 
accused. The jury recognised that debt was unpayable, illegitimate, unjust and immoral 
(Jubilee South 2002b). 
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The other strong element provided by the British campaign was the engagement 
of celebrities and the entertainment industry. The rationale for this was:  
 
...in a world where membership organisations are generally on the decline it was 
clear that building a mass popular campaign would also mean securing coverage 
on mass media …..To reach an international mass audience, Jubilee 2000 was 
forced to work hard at courting the mass media's favourite partner: the enter-
tainment industry, and international celebrities. (Buxton 2002, p.4)  
 
Among celebrities involved were U2's Bono, musician Ryuichi Sakamoto in Japan and 
opera singer Pavarotti in Italy (Buxton 2004, p.11). Other well-known figures/groups 
involved  were  Youssou  N’dour,  Los  Kjarkas   (Bolivia), Muhammad Ali, and the Pope 
who met a delegation from Jubilee 2000 in September 1999. 
  
National level actions 
 
The transnational dimension was undergirded by a mosaic of national campaigns, held 
together by their commitment to debt cancellation and a limited common repertoire, ra-
ther than by formal transnational organisational structures. As well as the tried and test-
ed methods (popular education, street events/protests), national groups used spectacles, 
leveraged significant moments/events, and keyed off historical memories. In Sweden 
where a huge number of people sing in choirs, the campaign worked with an association 
of choirs to raise awareness. Jubilee Sweden supporters who sang their way to the G7 
Summit in Cologne became  known  as   the  ‘Singing  Swedes’  (Interviewee  Sweden). In 
Uganda and Zambia popular drama and radio programmes were major methods of rais-
ing awareness. Jubilee Uganda collected its highest number of signatures on Ugandan 
Martyr’s  Day when they organised a human chain at the shrine, as thousands of pilgrims 
from all round Uganda and beyond, visited (UDN no date). Brazil organised a Tribunal 
on debt in 1999, with about 2,000 participants from over 15 countries. This determined 
the debt to be unjust, called for a break with the IMF and a debt audit (Bassagio 2002). 
Norway’s   debt   campaign   also   organised   a   tribunal in   2001   on  Norway’s   illegitimate 
debt, led   by   the   head   of   Norway’s   Supreme Court, which concluded that this debt 
should be cancelled immediately and unconditionally. This was accepted by the Norwe-
gian government in 2006 (Abildnes 2007). In Britain where the debt campaign was 
linked to memories of the anti-slavery campaign, chains were a potent symbol with 
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breaking the chains events taking place across the country.17 Their generous 1953 debt 
deal continued to fuel the German campaign, and other campaigns were encouraged to 
leverage the German debt deal in their own countries on key anniversaries. Events were 
held outside German Embassies in Dublin and Oslo in 1998 on the 45th anniversary of 
the German deal (Eurodad 1998).  
Some campaigns used a plebiscite rather than a petition. In Spain, RCADE mo-
bilised 25,000 activists to carry out a debt plebiscite in 458 municipalities in which one 
million people voted. RCADE’s  popular  consultation  asked  three questions: did the par-
ticipant agree that  a) Spain should cancel debt; b) that savings should be used by people 
of poor countries for their development; c) that there should be a tribunal to investigate 
how powerful bodies in the north and south illegally enriched themselves with loans, 
and that these should be returned to communities (Vivas 2008, p.106). Activists hung 
themselves from the Arco del Triunfo and Sagrada Familia Cathedral in Barcelona and 
from the Torres Kio in Madrid to advertise the plebiscite which was timed to coincide 
with the 2000 general election. RCADE planned to set up stalls near polling stations but 
this was prohibited by the Electoral Commission, turning the plebiscite into an act of 
civil disobedience (Vivas 2008). In Brazil, following the tribunal mentioned above, over 
100,000 people took part in organising a vote on debt in 3,5000 municipalities, with 6.3 
million voting. Questions covered in the Brazilian plebescite were: should the govern-
ment maintain its agreement with the IMF; should they pay the debt without first having 
a public audit of the debt as is provided for in the Brazilian constitution; and should 
they continue to pay internal debt to speculators, using a large part of the budget for this 
(Bassagio 2002). In both Spain and Brazil well over 90% voted ‘yes’ to the questions 
put.   
Key events involving parts of the debt nébuleuse provided opportunities for mo-
bilisation and to get media coverage. UDN organised a massive media campaign when 
President Clinton visited Uganda in March 1998, with a view to ensuring debt was on 
the agenda of discussions between President Clinton, President Museveni and visiting 
African heads of state (UDN 1998b). The Guardian newspaper virtually joined Jubilee 
2000, providing substantial coverage in the run-up to the Birmingham Summit. Jubilee 
Scotland organised a break the chains event to coincide with a Commonwealth Heads of 
                                                 
17 Leeds: campaigners chained up the Mayor and his limousine; Macclesfield: a chain gang made giant 
cheque payable to richest countries; presented to their MP to cut up; Nottingham: chain gang marched 
across city led by town crier and chained the lions outside Council house; Manchester: stretcher bearers 
carried metal bed made from chains across town. (Jubilee 2000,1998) 
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Government meeting in Edinburgh (Jubilee 2000, 1997). FDC organised a human chain 
at the AGM of the Asian Development Bank (FDC 1999).  
The high level of activity, generated at local national and transnational levels, 
resulted in Jubilee 2000 receiving high recognition. In Zambia: 60% had heard of Jubi-
lee Zambia (Jubilee Zambia 2002); in Peru 40% of the populations had heard of Jubilee 
2000 (Jubilee 2000, 1999a)   and   in   Britain   50%   recognised   the   name   ‘Jubilee   2000’  
(Barrett 2000). 24 million signatures were collected globally from 166 countries – 2.9 
million in Britain, 1.8 million in Peru, 300,000 in Zambia, 521, 319 in France, 870,000 
in Ireland; 1,200,381 in Germany, 2, 005,895 in Bangladesh (Barrett 2000).  
The repertoire of action had a strong national basis, both in terms of where most 
mobilisation took place,  and in terms of the symbolism and cultural understandings 
used to mobilise the public. This diversity of national approaches was woven together 
by a limited but important transnational repertoire – significant among which was the 
petitionwhich directly linked the demands of the campaign to the debt nébuleuse, ena-
bling what could almost be seen as a global plebiscite on debt cancellation.  
 
Engagement: civil society and the state/internationalising state  
 
The high international profile achieved early on by Jubilee 2000 through its significant 
mobilising power and the breadth of the alliances underlying the campaigns had a mag-
netic attraction for political leaders. Many northern governments sought to capture for 
themselves some of the legitimacy of Jubilee 2000. French Minister of Finance, Strauss 
Kahn, received the French debt campaign, Annulons la Dette, a few days before the Co-
logne G7 Summit   “with great pomp” and echoed the rhetoric of the debt campaign 
(Lavignotte 1999). Meetings which took place between Ministry of Finance and French 
debt  campaigners  wouldn’t  have  happened  without  the  “power of Jubilee” (Interviewee 
France No. 2). Speaking at a Jubilee 2000 meeting in St. Paul’s  Cathedral  London, in 
March 1999, Chancellor of the British Exchequer Gordon Brown said:  
 
I come tonight not as chancellor but as a fellow marcher in the campaign for jus-
tice  for  the  poorest  of  world…let us as a world community cut the debt; cut it in 
2000 by 50 billion; to help do this, let us sell  IMF  gold…. Let us resolve to stand 
together and work together, churches, political leaders, people of Britain and 
from everywhere in the world. (Brown 1999)  
 
German government ministers acknowledged that Erlassjahr 2000, the German Jubilee 
Campaign, had been instrumental in the launch of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s  debt  
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initiative in January 1999 (Josselin 2007). The Under-Secretary of the Swedish Foreign 
Department (later a World Bank Vice President), accompanied Jubilee Sweden part of 
the way to the G7 Summit in Cologne, wearing the Jubilee Sweden t-shirt, and spoke at 
a mass meeting they organised on the way (Interviewee Sweden). Jubilee 2000 Uganda 
was launched by the wife of the President with 1,500 people in attendance, including 
cabinet ministers, government officials, religious leaders, MPs, NGO leaders, university 
and school students (UDN 1999).  According to the then U.S. Treasury Secretary, Larry 
Summers, they were grateful: 
 
.. to the many committed NGOs and others in the development community who 
have kept debt relief high on the international agenda this year and helped to 
generate the political will for action. (Callaghy 2002, p.44) 
 
 IMF former Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, noted: 
 
.. how fragile our collective commitments are, and how small the chances that 
they will be fulfilled without a universal mobilisation of public opinion, as has 
been the case with Jubilee 2000. (Callaghy 2002, p.44)  
 
 The World Bank claimed that Jubilee 2000 together with other groups: 
 
 ..worked closely with IFIs and industrial country governments to forge a con-
sensus for deeper, broader, faster debt relief for HIPCs. (World Bank 2000, 
p.187)  
 
These reactions from the debt nébuleuse demonstrate the power of mobilisation.  
Once Jubilee 2000 had won the argument across a wide range of civil societies transna-
tionally, key decision makers bowed to the imperative for a new policy on debt. They 
signalled this by appearing to align with Jubilee 2000, blurring the image of themselves 
as the obstacles to debt cancellation, and blurring the difference between the cancella-
tion called for by Jubilee 2000, and what they as decision makers were prepared to give.  
 
Engagement at national level 
 
As was stated above, the focus was mainly on action aimed at the state. In creditor 
countries, the issue was to hold governments publicly to account for the policies they 
pursued in the international arena, and for their national debt policies including their 
export credit lending. A major mechanism used in seeking accountability from govern-
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ments was strengthening the watchdog role of parliaments. Groups in France launched a 
campaign   calling   for   parliamentary   control   on  France’s   policy   in   the   IMF and World 
Bank  (Pour  l’an  2000, 1999). In Ireland, an amendment proposed by the debt campaign 
for an annual report to the Dáil on Ireland’s  involvement  in the IMF and World Bank, 
was  included  in  a  Bill  which  enabled  an  Irish  contribution  to  the  IMF’s  programme  in  
low income countries (DDCI 1999). The Austrian government agreed that the Sub- 
committee on Development would scrutinise Austrian policy towards the IFIs, with 
meetings to be held between NGOs, policy makers and MPs prior to IMF and World 
Bank meetings to define Austria’s   stance   (Eurodad 1997). For debt groups in debtor 
countries, action aimed at the state was also the priority. FDC’s Jubilee petition was di-
rected at the Philippine government, calling for the repeal of the law which allowed au-
tomatic appropriation of debt servicing from budgets. “We call upon the leaders and 
legislators of the Philippines to repeal Section 26(b) Book 6 of the Revised Administra-
tive Code of 1987”  (FDC  no  date  b). This law is based on a decree introduced by Mar-
cos in 1977. FDC leveraged their long standing relationships with Congress gaining the 
support of senators and house of representative members– with one representative filing 
a bill to repeal the law (FDC 1999). The Ugandan and Zambian campaigns directed two 
major concerns at their governments – that debt savings should benefit people at com-
munity level and that steps should be taken to prevent further crises, by putting the loan 
contraction process under democratic control. UDN got involved in monitoring spend-
ing at both national and district level and also launched the Anti Corruption Coalition 
(UDN1999, 2000a + b, 2002; Gariyo 1999; Kamuli PMC no date).  Zambia called for 
debt  cancellation  with  ‘conditionality-from-below’, arguing that civil society should be 
involved in monitoring how resources saved through debt reduction were used (Jubilee 
Zambia 2001b and 2003b; Henriot 1999). They also called for a constitutional amend-
ment that loans beyond a certain level had to be agreed by Parliament. While civil socie-
ty/state relations in Honduras and Nicaragua were adversarial, alliances emerged with 
parliamentary commissions and individual MPs and this started a call for new loans to 
be submitted to parliament before being agreed (Interviewee INGO Central America). 
Subsequently, debt groups across the south got involved with budget advocacy, for ex-
ample, UDN, Jubilee Peru and Honduran civil society groups. 
Institutional advocacy continued parallel to Jubilee 2000’s  mobilisations, with 
regular meetings with relevant ministries – Finance, Foreign Affairs, Development- Co-
operation, in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway and UK 
(Eurodad 1998-2003), and with meetings taking place with prime ministers in Sweden 
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and Britain (Eurodad 2000). In terms of lobbying the IMF and World Bank, much of 
this took place at national level with IMF/World Bank country representatives (Bel-
gium, Ireland, and Austria), but there was also considerable engagement with officials 
at IMF and World Bank annual meetings (Eurodad 1998-2003), and other discourse 
events.  
The high profile role of Jubilee 2000 UK as the transnational catalyst and the 
huge mobilisations in Britain – with local Jubilee 2000 groups active across the country 
- situated the campaign strongly vis-á-vis the government and parliament. In Westmin-
ster, an all-party group on debt was set up with 108 members, the biggest of such group-
ings at that time: 
 
The Group has its roots in the Jubilee 2000 campaign and was inspired by the 
overwhelming call from the public to cancel Third World Debt. It was set up by 
a group of concerned MPs to campaign for greater debt relief in Parliament. (UK 
All Party Report 2004, p.61)  
 
 The British tradition of reverse lobbying continued:  
 
 It was, look put pressure on the Japanese because we are trying to get this done 
inside the Bank and Fund, but the Japanese are blocking it so you ought to go 
to.., so we would then go to [Japanese debt campaigner] and say, you’re  blocked 
on this particular point; and will you raise that; and similarly with the Germans 
and French. (Interviewee UK No. 6) 
 
There is evidence that over time the civil society/state relationship went beyond the fair-
ly instrumental one of exchanges of information on blockages by other creditor coun-
tries. During the Make Poverty History (MPH) campaign 2004/5 there was: 
 
.. a  lot of toing and froing [between NGOs and the Treasury] .. there was a very 
interesting dynamic there. He [Gordon Brown] had seen the magic of Jubilee 
2000 and wanted to keep it going or replicate it - so that there would be a public 
outcry to the G8 in 2005. (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 2) 
 
The Chancellor urged activists   at   Labour’s   Scottish   Conference to join the MPH 
demonstration in Edinburgh (Socialist Newspaper 2005), and the Minister for Devel-
opment Cooperation participated in a MPH demonstration. This was seen as the gov-
ernment blurring the boundaries with civil society: 
 
 …implying   that   civil   society  had  more  power   than  government   and   that’s  not  
true.  “We’re  just  the  minister,  we  can’t  do  anything,  but  you  can”.  Even  when  it  
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is true, the Minister  can’t  get  all  the  churches  out  on  their  hind  legs,  it’s  still  not  
true. Civil  Society  doesn’t  have   its   hands  on   the   levers  of  power  and   they  do.  
….Gordon  Brown,  although he was sincere in many ways, he realised this was 
middle England and he wanted to have middle England on his side. And he 
wanted to be seen to be on the side of middle England. (Interviewee UK No. 6) 
. 
 
Given the propensity  of  the  chancellor  to  be  a  “suffocating ally” (Meyer 2007), it was 
important that civil society maintain their distance and also “constantly raise the game” 
pressing the chancellor for greater action. Otherwise there was a danger of losing their 
credibility (Interviewee UK No. 6).  
While the relationship between British organisations and the government were 
seen  as  the  ‘tightest’,  a  similar  relationship could also operate in other countries particu-
larly when there was convergence of interest. In Norway: 
 
 …at certain times Norway had incredible insider contact with the Minister and 
with officials, with officials playing a similar game as Gordon Brown... chatting 
about  the  campaign  …and  can  the  campaign  spread  that message to colleagues 
in other parts of Europe. (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 2) 
  
On the debtor country side, a complex nexus of relationships could also operate 
between debt campaigners, their governments and creditors. As stated above, among the 
objectives of debtor country campaigns were to get the debt cancelled, to make sure that 
savings which ensued were used for the benefit of the population and to prevent a recur-
rence of the debt crisis. Against this background, debt groups played a dual role of ally 
of and watchdog on governments. The interests of the debt campaign and government 
coincided on the urgent need for debt cancellation. At these times, debt campaigns were 
able to use their particular power as a civil society group to mediate between govern-
ment and creditors: 
 
 It was very clear at that time that ministers and their technocrats, we can’t  say  
this to donors, but you are able to say the same information. So they would come 
to us and say, can you please help us build an understanding on this particular 
issue on debt… We also had the numbers to put pressure on donors on the need 
for debt cancellation. On their own as government, they  didn’t  have  the  num-
bers, they had the authority and power to make decisions but they needed that 
pressure which only came from the people as organised by the debt campaign. 
(Interviewee Zambia) 
 
 In Uganda, senior finance officials attended UDN meetings and made presentations (In-
terviewee Uganda), and shared correspondence to the IMF and World Bank (see Chap-
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ter 6). The role of the UDN at  the  time  of  President  Clinton’s  visit  was  acknowledged 
by the Minister of Finance in a letter to the network:  
 
..domestic NGOs have played a unique role in mobilising public concern at 
home while coordinating their efforts with international NGOs abroad. Your 
supplement in the New Vision recently is testament to the impact this kind of ac-
tion can have and ensured that debt issues were brought to the attention of the 
public  prior  to  the  visit  of  Mr.  Clinton…. The contribution of organisations such 
as yours has therefore been of immense value. (UDN 1998b) 
 
 In Tanzania, NGOs were members of a Government Task Force which drafted a na-
tional strategy on debt. Following on from a proposal from Tanzanian Social and Eco-
nomic Trust (TASOET), a seminar was held for embassy officials in April 1999, in or-
der to increase diplomatic activity on economic issues, as Tanzania moved through the 
HIPC process (TASOET 1999a).  The seminar was opened by the President and NGO 
proposals on how government and NGOs could work together in lobbying on Tanza-
nia’s  debt, were accepted (TASOET 1999b). Subsequently meetings took place at Tan-
zanian embassies in creditor countries with debt groups to discuss progress on debt re-
duction for Tanzania, for example in Britain.  
The interests of debt campaigns and governments also clashed. While there was 
good exchange of information, there were also restricted areas. In Zambia one such area 
related to the debts of particular government ministries. Asking for information on this 
resulted in  “a cooling off from the Ministry, as these were considered sensitive issues” 
(Interviewee Zambia). There  were  also  differences  over  civil  society’s  watchdog  role. In 
2001 Jubilee Zambia became a member of an independent team monitoring the use by 
the government of resources released by debt reduction under HIPC. The establishment 
of the team was seen as the government agreeing to “cede part of its policy space and 
open its “wardrobes to outside scrutiny!” (Zulu Jones 2007, p.17). In 2003 the HIPC 
Monitoring team was dissolved, with the government arguing that there was duplication 
of efforts (Zulu Jones 2007).  
The relationship between debt groups and creditors, in particular the IMF and 
World Bank, was also multi-directional and shot through with coincidences of interest 
and conflict.  Entry by debt groups into monitoring processes on the use of debt savings 
was achieved largely through donor conditions: 
 
….that government must  consult  with  people  for  the  donors  to  do  their  part…  
because we were negotiating for debt reduction, we were also largely financed 
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by donors, that is what pushed these ministers to consult but at another level, on 
a personal level, they saw the rationale. (Interviewee Zambia) 
  
 But the debt groups did not see themselves as agents of the creditors when monitoring 
the use debt savings by their governments; for them the important thing was to reclaim 
power back into their state, that accountability should be to the public, not just to do-
nors:  
 
When you are talking about conditionality-from-below [a key demand of Jubilee 
Zambia]..  we  didn’t  want  government  to  account  only  to  donors  ,  reporting  to  
them, ensuring benchmarks were met. At community level government should 
be able to be account to people openly. (Interviewee Zambia) 
 
 Finally, while there may have been a coincidence of interest between debt groups and 
external creditors on the need for processes to ensure public money was well spent, 
there was huge divergence in terms of the substantial policies being promoted through 
adjustment programmes, now renamed Poverty Reduction Strategies. Major concerns 
for Jubilee Zambia were in relation to the privatisation programme (Jubilee Zambia 
2003b). Privatisation conditions attached to HIPC were causing disharmony leaving 
“Zambia with a political choice between keeping people happy or international institu-
tions happy” (All Party Parliamentary Group on Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. 2004, 
p.57). 
Campaigning is usually presented as operating in one direction, with groups - 
whether powerful industrial groups or civil society activist groups - pressing govern-
ment to adopt their proposals. A striking dimension of relations between civil society 
and the state/internationalising state which emerges from Jubilee 2000, however, is its 
two-way and multi-layered nature, with relationships shifting from consensual to adver-
sarial as gaps open up between civil society concerns and those of government, as was 
the case with Jubilee Zambia. It is not a simple case of civil society as weaker actors 
facing strong governments, but each holding different power in particular situations. 
Creditor and debtor governments sometimes sought Jubilee 2000 support in shifting 
other international actors (G8 countries, the World Bank) towards a position supported 
by both government and civil society. The danger in this, as demonstrated by the British 
case, is the blurring of boundaries between civil society and the state which may dam-
age civil society.  The tension created by the instability of the relationship, its tendency 
towards adversarial engagement in order to protect the perceived autonomy of civil so-
ciety, probably helps to limit this blurring.  
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Waxing and waning of political support  
 
The power of Jubilee was not permanent but rather waxed and waned – both in terms of 
institutionalised spaces for engagement, and government commitment to debt cancella-
tion. Institutionalised engagement took place in a number of countries – Spain, France, 
Zambia and Uganda, for example - but was short- lived in all except for Uganda, where 
UDN became embedded in a number of policy processes, including monitoring the 
Poverty Action Fund (PAF). This fund was set up by the Uganda government in 
1998/99 to mobilise resources from debt reduction for the social sectors. Monitoring 
meetings convened by the government involved international donors, civil society and 
the media (UDN 1999). In Spain, a sub-commission on debt was set up in the Spanish 
Senate in December 199 in which DEDE participated, but the sub-commission was dis-
solved after the 2000 elections (Vivas 2008). The absolute majority won by the Partido 
Popular (PP) in 2000 removed the need for political consensus, and the PP was not open 
to formal processes with civil society (Oliveres 2002).  Implementation of the debt law 
passed by a centre-left government in Italy slowed down following the election of a 
right-wing government under Berlusconi in 2001 (Gerbaudo and Pianta 2012). Alt-
hough engagement between civil society and government had not been an established 
practice in France, Platform Dette et Developpement achieved: 
 
 …almost institutional recognition by the Comité coopération développement 
(CCD) et le Haut Comité à la Coopération Internationale (HCCI), the formal 
spaces for cooperation between civil and political society. (Merkaert 2005) 
 
 This ended with the election of the UMP government in 2002 (Josselin 2007). In Zam-
bia, where the government had cooperated with civil society, the Ministry of Finance 
withdrew from active engagement with the debt movement once debt reduction was 
achieved. Geopolitical interests were the cause of the waxing of US support for debt 
cancellation in 2003, when cancellation of Iraq debt became a requirement to get the US 
Congress to agree funds for reconstruction in Iraq. Congress was unwilling to provide 
funds to Iraq in case some of this might be used to repay other creditors, especially G8 
countries  who  had  refused  to  join  the  ‘coalition  of   the  willing’   in its war against Iraq, 
such as France, and Germany. France took the position that they could not justify 
providing enormous debt reduction to Iraq, while refusing to do so for much poorer 
countries, and was backed by Germany. As a result, the US declared its support for 
100% multilateral debt cancellation for HIPCs (Helleiner and Cameron 2006).  Debt 
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reduction for Iraq was agreed in 2004, and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative for 
HIPCs was announced by the G8 in 2005.  
Government commitment to debt cancellation also waned. While German Chan-
cellor Gerhard Schroeder’s  policy shift  set  in  motion  the  debt  ‘norm  cascade’  in  January  
1999 (Yanacopulos 2004), by the 2000 G7 summit in Okinawa, he was reluctant to sup-
port more debt cancellation, and this hardening of position continued into later years. In 
France, debt was rarely mentioned by French political figures before 2001, but by Janu-
ary 2002 party leaders expressing support for debt cancellation ranged from the Nation-
al Front to the Socialist Party. By 2005, however, the French government was hostile to 
UK/US proposals for multilateral debt cancellation (Josselin 2007).  While the Irish 
government broke the debt nébuleuse consensus, launching a policy supporting total 
cancellation of IMF and World Bank to the HIPCs in July 2002, they took virtually no 
action to promote that policy (Dáil Éireann 2002).  
There appears to have been a definite relationship between left/centre-left gov-
ernments holding power and progress at national level on debt - in Italy, Spain, Germa-
ny, France, and Britain - suggesting greater space for civil society/state alliances at such 
times. The relationship should not be overstated, however, as, for example in Britain, 
conservative governments had already been very proactive on debt throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, and German SPD government support for debt cancellation was short- 
lived. UK and US support for 100% multilateral debt cancellation in 2005 can be seen 
as  a  mixture  of  the  continued  waxing  of  Gordon  Brown’s  support  for  Jubilee  2000, and 
new geopolitical issues which arose for the US from 2003, a historically specific event.  
 
Reflections on Modes of Engagement 
 
As the campaign spread widely across the south and north of the globe, involving vari-
ous cultures, historical and political contexts, Jubilee 2000 was finely balanced between 
different perspectives partially reflecting a south/north divide. Apart from issues dis-
cussed above, there were also differences on how to pursue debt cancellation. The de-
bate was between whether the important thing was to build Jubilee 2000 as a social 
movement over time, so that it could contest power rather than policy (Bendaña 2006), 
or whether the aim should be to maximise short-term gains through campaigning and 
lobbying tactics. The emergence of Jubilee South as an autonomous southern voice us-
ing a structural analysis reflected this debate on the degree of change sought and how 
this could be achieved.  
 200 
For Jubilee Peru the art was to combine mobilisation and engagement – with 
greater emphasis on mobilisations when governments were unresponsive:  
 
Jubilee Peru tried to always do technical work articulated with mobilisation. 
Without   dialogue  with   officials   and  without   proposals   we   aren’t   going   to   ad-
vance. (Interviewee Jubilee Peru)  
 
Different actors can play different roles as was the case in Spain with DEDE consisting 
of four Catholic bodies (Oliveres 2002), and RCADE, a   radical   citizens’   movement 
(Vivas 2008), taking very different approaches: 
 
There is an advantage in having different kinds of actors doing things which are 
somehow complementary to each other. And I think the role of social move-
ments [RCADE] is building this kind of anger, this kind of radical sense of in-
justice, and we can do this as NGOs in a different way and have more pragmatic, 
constructive proposals. (Interviewee Spain) 
 
How a mixed engagement/mobilisation approach operated was elaborated on by an Irish 
interviewee:  
 
There was this public support in a certain cohort of the population that was al-
ways  dogged,  a  bit  blunt  ‘I  am  everyman/woman and  this  is  what  I  think’. The 
ordinary person’s campaign, on the street or writing letters, meeting officials. I 
think maybe that was something that mobilised the government... they were 
aware  that  this  wasn’t  a  flash  in  the  pan.  .and then I think the good technical re-
lations with the debt policy people. (Interviewee Ireland No. 4) 
 
Insider/outsider alliances may emerge, as officials in Departments of Finance, World 
Bank and IMF are not monolithic but have people within: 
 
.. who are frustrated at the pace of change, about the policy line which was com-
ing  down  and  for  whom  sometimes  the  only  way  forward  is  to  ‘  call  on  external 
persons to  sound  alarm  bells’. This is done by discreetly building up trust with 
key organisations, for example Eurodad, and this is a reasonable role for Euro-
dad to play. (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 2) 
 
Some large NGOs have employees whose role it is to: 
 
 …build insider relationships. Getting too close to power means that 
groups…know more of the details of official debates, and that knowledge is 
power, but proximity to power can also be negative because it means that they 
are too much in sway of current realpolitik rather than the point view of people 
in groups which debt reduction is meant to help. So there is a danger of some 
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NGOs becoming an extension of the civil service rather than an extension of the 
activist base. (Interviewee Eurodad Coordinator No. 2)  
 
The danger of being transformed by power rather than transforming power has a cultur-
al as well as a political dimension:  
 
As NGOs became more professional they are employing people who ..spend 
time  at  committees  and  in  meetings….if  you put people together, over time, 
people internalise the discourse, the same language in policy circles.. how peo-
ple dress, behave in a certain way, and move from a radical to a polished policy 
person. (Interviewee Ireland No. 3)   
 
Lobbying  could  also  be  seen  as  having  more  prestige  than  mobilisation  “coming  back  to  
your office, saying you have seen the Prime Minister, rather than saying I met with a 
group of 5 young people who are organising…” (Interviewee Sweden), but this was 
balanced by the fact that these engagements with the state/internationalising state were 
unattractive to some activists:  “I  got  fed  up  with  these  closed  meetings  with IMF/World 
Bank/Finance,  they  were  so  dull” (ibid.). Significant cultural differences were perceived 
between north and south of Europe in approaches to the recruitment of people: 
…because   they  were   very   good   communicators,   good  organisers,   but   not   re-
cruited because they were politically engaged or they were activists in cam-
paigning. In France, Belgium, Spain the culture is people who are leading this 
type of coalition are more militant, more activist. (Interviewee Belgium No. 2)  
 
 
Engagement was seen as having a motivational impact on supporters, giving 
them “a sense that things are happening, people are listening to us; it  isn’t  only  that  we  
are right but we have influence” (Interviewee Spain). Access to decision makers also 
gave credibility to campaigning groups with their funders, and with the media (Inter-
viewee Ireland No. 5). Even from a conflictual perspective, while the long-term aim 
may  be  “to strengthen our power and weaken theirs”, but  “it is difficult to sustain mobi-
lisation without engagement and victories. The art is to judge when the time to engage 
is, and when to mobilise”  (Interviewee  Philippines/Jubilee  South). There were costs to 
engagement, however. Access is usually to the few:  “when the door is opened, there are 
a lot stuck behind the door, being excluded by the fact that the door is being opened” 
(Interviewee Ireland No. 5). While UDN was afforded significant access to monitor 
government policy, supporting the community based monitoring teams came at a high 
cost, putting:  
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...pressure on the financial, technical and material resources of UDN. Sustaining 
the interests of the communities in budget monitoring is another challenge. 
Since monitors are volunteers, some of them have either got compromised or 
abandoned the work whereas others have been bribed not to reveal monitored 
mal-practice. (UDN 2003, p.6) 
 
Further, the space achieved by UDN is  a  ‘donated  one’  - while some civil society inputs 
can be seen in government plans, endorsement by key donors is necessary before items 
are included. “Someone once joked that donors have become citizens of Uganda given 
their influence” (Kandyomunda 2004).  
The mobilisation/engagement debate is one which cuts across many social 
movements and campaigns. There are irreducible differences due to different political 
perspectives, involving different levels of change aimed at, different understandings of 
how change takes place, and also the fact that the debt problem impacted very different-
ly in the south. These differences could be modified by maintaining a sharper, unpre-
dictable edge; avoiding engagement   led  by  ‘polished  policy’  people; and pursuing en-
gagement in the public arena as far as possible, rather than behind the scenes lobbying. 
7.6 Conclusion  
Jubilee 2000 emerged as a new moment in debt campaigning, as a transnational 
social movement. Particularly significant was the degree of mobilisation – across a wide 
range of social sectors and a very wide geographic span, including a significant southern 
involvement. A further striking feature was that Jubilee 2000 was not a homogenous 
actor, but contained within itself conflicting analyses of the debt crisis, and the degree 
of change sought. This concluding section first assesses how Jubilee 2000 exercised 
power to bring about change through knowledge, geography and modes of engagement. 
This is followed by an assessment of what was achieved by Jubilee 2000. 
 
Exercising power to bring about change                      
  
Jubilee 2000’s   impact  on  debt  policy resulted primarily from their power of mobilisa-
tion, rather than the persuasiveness of their better argument, or their moral authority. 
The argument was won in the first instance with the public due to mobilisation rather 
than through persuasion via the myriad of engagements which took place with the 
state/internationalising state. The fact that the biblical basis of the message resonated 
with the cultural values (Christian) of major world leaders, however, made the argument 
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more persuasive to some decision makers. Among the individuals for whom the Chris-
tian message resonated were: Gordon Brown, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mayo 
2005); Michel Camdessus, IMF Managing Director 1987-2000 (Interviewee Ireland No. 
4); and Jesse Helms, Chair of the US Foreign Relations Committee (Busby 2007). It 
was, however, the wish to be associated with the legitimacy of the mobilised power of 
Jubilee which led political leaders to make new debt proposals.  
In terms of the geography of power, while Jubilee 2000 confirms the domestic 
embeddedness of transnational campaigning (Josselin 2007), the existence different na-
tional political and cultural contexts, do not provide the full explanation of the centrality 
of domestic action. Debt groups were attempting to pull states back from the non-
transparent debt nébuleuse, and to situate the struggle over debt within established na-
tional political processes. While the particular issues were different for debt groups in 
debtor and creditor countries, it is significant that the national focus was equally true for 
all.  
 The paradox is that parallel to its domestic embeddedness, Jubilee 2000 was a 
very high profile transnational campaign. Applying the explanations of the nation-
al/transnational interface provided by Dryzek (1999) and Drainville (2005b), neither is 
fully satisfactory. Dryzek’s  argument  that  the  lack  of  strong  institutionalisation  at  inter-
national level provides transnational civil society with greater discursive opportunities 
does not fit with the domestic embeddedness of   Jubilee.   Drainville’s   distinction   be-
tween national and transnational levels in relation to the presence or absence of social 
hegemony offers the potential for a deeper analysis of the different approaches possible 
based on a wider set of factors than institutional openness or discursive opportunities 
and most importantly how these interact. This distinction, however,  needs to be further 
developed.  
In  terms  of  the  south/north  interface,  Jubilee  2000  involved  ‘advocates  for’  those  
directly  affected  and  ‘activists  from’  those  directly  affected. Networks with this compo-
sition are seen as vulnerable to break down (Reitan 2007, Keck and Sikkink 1998).  
Tensions within Jubilee led to a reformulation of the relationship, with the establish-
ment of an autonomous Jubilee South. The emergence of Jubilee South challenged the 
second face of power in terms of opening up the agenda setting process (Bachrach and 
Baratz 1962), and resulted in illegitimate debt gaining a higher priority. As a result, 
some progress was achieved in terms of repudiation of illegitimate debt (Ecuador), can-
cellation of illegitimate debt (Norway), and breaking the taboo on illegitimate debt by 
placing it on the agenda of the debt nébuleuse, albeit not centre stage.  
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In relation to modes of engagement, the mobilisation versus engagement debate 
within Jubilee 2000 brings to the fore again the question of the relationship between 
civil society and the state/internationalising state. The relationships between Jubilee 
2000 and the state-internationalising state were different from those in the previous case 
study. Rather than relationships resulting largely from the emerging global norm of par-
ticipation as in the early part of the 1990s, in the case of Jubilee 2000, the legitimacy 
gained because of its mobilising power drew parts of the debt nébuleuse towards the 
debt campaign. Alliances which emerged can be seen as of convenience when there are 
overlapping or coinciding interests, or of conviction where there are shared beliefs. In 
terms of alliance of convenience, Evans (2000) and Friesen (2012) both of whom apply 
Polanyi’s   double  movement   to   transnational activism, highlight defensive reasons for 
why parts of the internationalising state might ally with global justice movements. Ev-
ans argues that if transnational economic elites want to ensure global governance pro-
tects global markets, “they may have no choice but to ally with groups that want to use 
global governance to institutionalise social rights, and improve well-being” (Evans 
2000, p.240). According to Friesen (2012), the WEF became advocates for debt cancel-
lation in the run up to the G8 in 2005 because they feared a backlash against global cap-
italism, but also because they believed this was the right thing to do. In this context, 
Friesen defines the WEF as part of a Polanyian double movement. Some muddying of 
the waters may be happening here. Polanyi’s  counter-movement was made up of very 
different social forces (landed class and working class), but both were threatened by the 
self-regulating market. Today this would probably translate into alliances of conven-
ience between non-globalising capital, manufacturing in particular, and civil society 
groups and social movements critical of current globalisation. We need to keep a dis-
tinction  between  Polanyi’s  counter-movement and  Gramsci’s  consensual  civil  society if 
both concepts are to maintain their analytical sharpness. Rather than see the WEF as 
part of a double movement as does Friesen, this research places this body as part of the 
internationalising state, playing a role as part of consensus-making civil society.  
Regarding alliances of conviction, as can be seen from Jubilee 2000, progress on 
debt at national level was more likely to happen under a left/centre-left than a right-
wing government. But even when there are shared values and beliefs, civil society and 
states have different logics. In Latin America, while there was ideological congruence 
with progressive governments over issues such as debt audits, difficulties arose in rela-
tion to government support for mining projects, which caused serious conflicts with in-
digenous people (Interviewee Jubilee Peru). In the UK, Gordon Brown became a 
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“smothering ally” (Meyer 2007) to MPH, to the consternation of NGOs who were in 
conflict with Labour over its neoliberal trade policies (Nash 2008, p.175). Civil society 
and the state/internationalising state are therefore in permanent tension with each other 
– with some parts of civil society engaging with decision makers and more radical ele-
ments acting as a rebalancing force, pulling the former groups towards more radical po-
sitions, as did Jubilee South. Reviewing a number of transnational campaigns including 
Jubilee 2000, Cox (2011, p.5) states that radical groups “have a strong record of trail-
blazing, shifting the political centre of gravity, and investing in controversial policy are-
as and making them safe over time”. Jubilee 2000 shows how radical positions can re-
balance movement towards new ‘good  sense’ and away from framings too closely with 
current ‘common sense’, which, while challenging decision makers on particular poli-
cies, can at the same time legitimise their power.  
 
Assessing Jubilee 2000  
There were a number of significant shifts in debt policy as a result of Jubilee 2000, 
namely the Cologne debt deal 1999, and the MDRI 2005 emanating from the debt 
nébuleuse. The former increased the amount of debt cancellation available, releasing 
money into government budgets. The MLDRI agreed to write of 100% of debt owed to 
the IMF, World Bank and African Development Bank by countries which had complet-
ed the HIPC process. This led to further debt reduction and the end of IMF programmes 
in countries such as Zambia. Shifts on illegitimate debt took place outside the central 
forces of the debt nébuleuse, as a result of action by Norway and Ecuador (Molina Vera 
2008; Abildnes 2007). The progress on illegitimate debt can be seen as fracturing the 
dominant paradigm which shapes the creditor/debtor relationship, resulting in cracks 
from which greater change may be leveraged (Holloway 2010). 
There were limitations to this change. While the moral arguments of Jubilee are 
seen as causing norm change (Friesen 2012, Yanacopulos 2004, Broome 2009), this was 
applied to increasing the amount of debt cancellation, but HIPC continued as a creditor 
dominated mechanism, with no acceptance of co-responsibility for the crisis or the need 
for a fair and independent procedure to deal with debt. Nor did debtor governments set 
up a debtor cartel to repudiate debt. Adjustment conditions attached to debt cancellation 
continued in place, and new social conditionality was introduced requiring governments 
to spend debt savings through Poverty Reduction Strategies developed together with 
civil society. This   fits   with   Sikkink’s   argument   that   the   degree   of   independence   of  
norms and power affects the possibility of changing international policy. Power and 
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norms are fused in the case of adjustment, which  can  be  seen  as  part  of  the  “new consti-
tutionalism” through which neoliberal policies are   “locked   in” into the future (Gill 
1998). This insulates dominant economic forces from democratic rule. In the case of 
debt, however, there is space to challenge the norm against cancellation.  
To what extent can these changes be attributed to debt campaigning, and to what 
extent were creditors driven by other interests? It seems indisputable that the shifts on 
illegitimate debt resulted from pressure from Jubilee 2000, as the issue was not even 
open to discussion until pressure was mounted by campaigners. The increase in debt 
cancellation at Cologne can also be attributed to Jubilee 2000, given that the debt issue 
was considered closed after HIPC was adopted in 1996, and the role of Jubilee 2000 in 
changing international debt policy was acknowledged by parts of the debt nébuleuse. 
The reasons for the adoption of the MDRI are more complex and it is difficult to disen-
tangle the relative contributions of the Jubilee 2000 element within MPH/Global Call to 
Action against Poverty, the continued support for debt cancellation by Chancellor Gor-
don Brown, and the geopolitical interests  of  the  US  in  relation  to  Iraq’s  debt.  The  key  
question is: to what extent did the high-profile for debt gained by Jubilee 2000 contrib-
ute to low-income country debt becoming an issue in the power struggle within the G7 
over  the  cancellation  of  Iraq’s  debt (Helleiner and Cameron 2006)? In a parallel situa-
tion, in 1991, there were overwhelming political reasons to write down Polish and 
Egyptian debt (Evans 1999, p.276).  In the case of Poland, the motivation was to sup-
port the free market reforms being implemented, and Egypt was rewarded for its support 
to the West in the Gulf War (Nduru 1991c). The G7 Communiqué in 1991 referring to 
Poland  and  Egypt’s  generous  debt  deals  stresses  that  these  were  exceptional  cases  (G7  
1991). Debt cancellation for Iraq, however, could not be treated as an exceptional case 
because of public awareness about the debt of low-income countries generated by debt 
campaigners. In this context, US support for the MDRI was a quid pro quo for G7 sup-
port for debt cancellation for Iraq.  
While J2000 partially demobilised at the end of 2000, many campaigns contin-
ued to operate and positioned themselves with, and contributed to, the development of 
the emerging anti-globalisation/global justice movement  and the WSF. Debt campaign-
ers were part of the mobilisation at the WTO in Seattle in 1999, the mobilisations in 
Prague 2000 (anti-IMF and World Bank) and in Genoa 2001 (anti-G7). The actual con-
tribution of Jubilee 2000 to the development of globalised resistance to neoliberalism 
needs a study in itself. 
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Conclusions 
 
Everything has been globalised except our consent. Democracy alone has been 
confined to the nation state. It stands at the national border, suitcase in hand 
without a passport. (Monbiot 2003, p.1) 
 
Monbiot’s  quote  above resonates with the quote from Beck at the start of this thesis re-
garding the lack of democracy and accountability in a globalising world. The absence of 
such formal global representational processes has not, as shown by this study, prevented 
human agency and ingenuity from finding ways to challenge governments and IGOs. 
The main findings of a study of one example of such human agency, transnational debt 
campaigning, are summarised below, followed by a more detailed discussion.  
Firstly, in terms of the nature of the power of transnational civil society, the 
study has expanded our understandings of the south/north relationship, a key fault-line 
in the common cause on which the power of transnational civil society is based. It has 
revealed this relationship as a dynamic one driven by solidarity and conflict, where 
southern groups’ challenges to northern dominance have reconfigured the relationship, 
adjusted the nature of the engagement and changed the agenda.  
Secondly, as regards the uses of knowledge, the study has shown that it is the 
power of mobilisation rather than the power of ideas which most impacted on decision 
makers. Further, rather than moral discourse being the dominant use of knowledge by 
debt campaigns, discourses situating the debt problem in the context of structural ine-
qualities were also used, both linked with moral discourse at times and submerged in 
more ambiguous discourses  of  ‘justice’ at other times when structural discourses could 
not be heard.  
Thirdly, using the concept of the internationalising state, the operation of trans-
national civil society across the national/international interface has been explained not 
just as the domestic embeddedness of transnational campaigning, but as a form of re-
sistance to the internationalising state, with debt campaigns seeking to rearticulate how 
states mediate between the international arena and domestic societies.   
Fourthly, the examination of the mechanisms through which debt campaigns en-
gaged with the state/internationalising state revealed how these two sectors can become 
interlinked. The ensuing blurring of boundaries is resisted by civil society determination 
to protect its self-identity as an independent autonomous sector and by the state wishing 
to protect its authority. This highlights the importance of taking into account civil socie-
ty’s own narrative of its autonomy and the continual rebalancing which takes place 
within civil society because of the interaction between more contentious and more con-
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sensual forces. In the context of the dominant explanation of social movements, politi-
cal opportunity structures, this study provides strong evidence that opportunities are 
created in the interaction between civil society campaigns and the 
state/internationalising state over time, rather than mainly appearing as factors external 
to civil society. 
The  understanding  of  power  used  bridges  between  Lukes’  (2005) understanding 
of  power  as  potential  and  Foucault’s (1980) insistence that studies of power should con-
centrate on the exercise of power. Power as potential was operationalised by debt cam-
paigns making common cause on the debt crisis and how to solve it, and this common 
cause was then leveraged through different discourses on debt, how debt campaigns op-
erated across the national/international interface and different modes of engagement 
with decision makers. The focus of the study is on the agency of transnational civil so-
ciety actors and how they create and exercise power, but agency always operates within 
a context, and the structural context highlighted in this study is the internationalising 
state. This involves a changing relationship between the national and international are-
nas and between the state and capital with state accountability reoriented externally. The 
contrast between the consensus making processes at international level and institutional 
political processes at national level provides a further element to this multilayered con-
cept. It is against and in interaction with this structural backdrop that transnational civil 
society campaigning for debt cancellation is analysed.  
Through leveraging the power of their common cause, debt movements contrib-
uted to changing debt policy over the course of the period studied, though they did not 
achieve all of their desired solutions. Changes fell far short of what was being sought by 
debt campaigns both in terms of the level of cancellation called for and in the power re-
lations in relation to debt including an end to IMF/World Bank conditionality and to 
creditor domination of the processes through which international debt policy was im-
plemented. Other than the 1999 Cologne debt deal, where the impact of Jubilee 2000 
can be seen as a dominant influence, there were other factors influencing the adoption 
of the various debt deals. Among the influences leading to the adoption of the 1988 To-
ronto Terms were civil society campaigning, competition between Britain and France 
over which would lead on initiatives in relation to Africa (Lawson 1992), and other ac-
tion such as that taken by the OAU. The stimulus for the 1989 Brady Bonds were upris-
ings in Caracas against debt-related austerity programmes giving rise to US security 
concerns at such serious  unrest   in   a   close  neighbour  and  general   ‘debt   fatigue’ in the 
international system after a decade of the debt crisis. The introduction of HIPC in 1996 
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resulted from pressure from a number of smaller European creditor countries as well as 
from debt campaigns. The 2005 MDRI again resulted from a complex interaction be-
tween past and contemporaneous debt campaigning and US policy priorities arising 
from its war with Iraq.  
Struggling for debt cancellation within and against the internationalising state: an 
overview  
Debt campaigns interacted with and were impacted on by a dramatically changing world 
order over the period covered in this study. The relationship, however, was neither a 
simple adversarial one, nor can civil society be seen as an integral part of global gov-
ernmentality (Foucault 2008), nor as part of consensus making civil society (Gramsci 
1971). Not only did the relationship differ over different periods of world order, but 
there was a dynamic within civil society which continually rebalanced the relationship 
between those who were engaging deeply with the debt nébuleuse and those seeking to 
shift debt campaigning towards more radical positions. As the neoliberal counter-
revolution gathered speed during the 1980s, some civil society groups resisted, holding 
on to radical discourses such as the NIEO, liberation theology and continuing solidarity 
with revolutionary governments and struggles. When it became clear that a major shift 
in world order was underway, while some debt groups still had their hopes for a differ-
ent world, they became more pragmatic, looking for incremental change rather than 
transformation. With the emergence of the global norm of civil society participation, 
many debt groups became deeply engaged with the debt nébuleuse. During this period 
debt campaigning came close to a Foucauldian understanding   of   civil   society   as   “the 
correlate of a political technology of government”   (Foucault 2008, p.296). Working 
from their position as relatively autonomous civil society, campaigns formed alliances 
with progressive debt nébuleuse insiders in order to solve the debt crisis. This relation-
ship was balanced, however, by other forces within civil society who maintained an an-
ti-systemic discourse on debt and did not get deeply enmeshed in the debt nébuleuse. 
Consensual and adversarial elements within civil society were not parallel forces, but 
cooperated from time to time and through this, created rebalancing spaces which re-
centred consensual debt groups within a broader spectrum of civil society.  
Triumphant neoliberalism began to fracture as early as 1994 due to a cycle of fi-
nancial crises and challenges from social movements nationally and transnationally. Ra-
ther than emerging as a response to these strains in world order, however, Jubilee 2000 
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created a new opportunity to mobilise public support through leveraging the symbolism 
of the millennium and achieving a high international profile. Through its success in 
popularising the debt issue, Jubilee 2000 shifted the centre of gravity from the power of 
the global norm of participation emanating from the debt nébuleuse to the power of 
public mobilisation. Rather than debt groups being pulled towards engagement with the 
debt nébuleuse, political leaders were drawn to associate themselves with the legitimacy 
arising from the huge public support generated by Jubilee 2000. As in the previous 
phase of campaigning, Jubilee 2000 was not homogeneous, but contained both consen-
sual and anti-systemic elements. The interaction – and sometimes clashes – between 
these different positions rebalanced debt campaigning towards a more radical position 
which framed debt as illegitimate and created a fracture in the power relations on debt 
by succeeding in getting some illegitimate debt cancelled.   
Creating power, exercising power   
While few debt campaigners could have envisaged the long journey which lay ahead as 
they took up the debt issue in the 1980s, the ability to create and maintain common 
cause over the long terms was central to how they actualised power as potential. This 
involved negotiating different political, cultural and historical contexts and the power 
relations which resulted from the fact that campaigns were based in countries positioned 
differently within the internationalising state. While Northern NGOs were criticised for 
their over focus on short-term success (Interviewee Italy; Interviewee Uganda; Jubilee 
Zambia 2003), many of them maintained their involvement over the period albeit that 
their support ebbed and flowed. It is significant that, other than in the case of the Debt 
Treaty Movement, there was no effort to set up an overarching transnational structure 
beyond regional networks such as Afrodad, Eurodad, and Latindadd. Even in the case of 
Jubilee 2000 with its wide geographic reach, members opted to operate through hori-
zontal communication channels rather than set up an international secretariat (Buxton 
2002). The value of this loose, decentred form is that it can recede and regenerate itself 
and can also absorb tensions and conflicts. Unlike political parties with centralised or-
ganisational structures, and manifestoes demanding consensus, the horizontal form of 
the network structure was seen as facilitative, enabling people to work together without 
spending a lot of time making agreements and resolving differences. A weakness was 
the inability of the network structure to deal with inequalities between members, partic-
ularly those which were a reflection of the structural inequalities generated from outside 
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the network, and therefore the south/north interface became a particular fault line. Over 
the case study period, there were two efforts to set up structured south/north working, 
through Fondad in the 1980s and Jubilee 2000 from the late 1990s. Both of these efforts 
foundered on issues of leadership and decision making with northern groups seen as 
dominant, reflecting their more powerful position of their states within the international-
ising state.  
Turning to the exercise of power, the questions asked in relation to the geogra-
phy of power were: how did debt groups operate across the national/international inter-
face; did they focus on their states or bypass the state; and were their strategies affected 
by how their respective countries are integrated into the internationalising state? The 
findings in relation to these questions were very clear. The focus of campaigning across 
the three case study periods was primarily on changing policies of national govern-
ments. This applied to all campaigns, irrespective  of  their  country’s  position  within  the  
internationalising state and also irrespective of ideological positions. The importance of 
this finding is not so much that it confirms the domestic embeddedness of transnational 
campaigning (Josselin 2007; Tarrow 2005), but that while contesting international poli-
cy on debt, campaigns were also contesting the national/international interface by seek-
ing to rearticulate their governments away from the internationalising state consensus 
and towards accountability to their citizens. The demands made by campaigns on gov-
ernments, however, did vary in relation to their positions within the internationalising 
state. For debtor country campaigns, the focus was on changing national policy in rela-
tion  to  the  country’s debt problem. FDC called for repeal of the law enabling automatic 
appropriation of debt servicing from the budget and Jubilee Guayaquil pressed the Ec-
uadorian government not to repay illegitimate debt. Campaigns from creditor countries 
weakly positioned within the internationalising state pressed their governments to break 
the international consensus, for example, Ireland on funding ESAF and Norway on ille-
gitimate debt. Campaign groups in G7 countries where the national and international 
arenas were fused could press their governments and the debt nébuleuse simultaneously, 
as   in   the   case   of  Oxfam’s   1986   campaign  when   they   pressed the British government 
both as national government and as a member of the G7, IMF and World Bank (Clark 
1986). Campaign groups, therefore, chose to operate mostly within the formal process-
es/social hegemony at national level (Drainville 2005a) rather than dedicate themselves 
to the discourse opportunities available at transnational level (Dryzek 1999).  
Discourses were key to mobilising the public and to challenging decision mak-
ers. The questions for this research were to what extent did debt campaigns a) engage in 
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contestation on the technical understandings of the debt nébuleuse; b) frame the debt 
issue to resonate with cultural understandings; and c) introduce alternative counter-
discourses? Underpinning these questions is another question, who was the main cam-
paign target; the public, elected decision makers, or the technical experts of the debt 
nébuleuse? While  debt  movements  are  best  known  publicly  for  their  ‘moral  discourse’  
(Broome 2009; Busby 2007; Yanacopolus 2004; Grenier 2003), structural, technical and 
moral discourses were all used. During the 1980s the debt problem was presented as a 
symptom of unequal south/north relations and linked to calls for a NIEO. When con-
junctural conditions at the beginning of the 1990s placed structural discourses outside of 
the neoliberal ‘truth regime’,   so that those discourses could not be heard even as oppo-
sitional positions, technical analysis became a strong part of transnational civil society’s 
approach. During the Jubilee 2000 campaign, there was a particular intermingling of 
moral and structural critiques, but the power of mobilisation rather than the power of 
their moral discourse was what impacted on decision makers. This shifts the emphasis 
away from the power of ideas, based on the attractiveness of the norms promoted, and 
towards power based in the legitimacy gained because of the levels of mobilisation 
which those ideas generated. Winning the argument at this broader public level enabled 
more radical discourses on illegitimate debt to be (partially) heard by the debt nébule-
use.  
Modes of engagement also shifted over the decades from adversarial action 
against austerity in debtor countries, against banks in creditor countries, and against in-
ternationalising state summits in the 1980s to more consensual engagement in the early 
1990s, followed by a complex mixture of mobilisation and institutional advocacy by 
Jubilee 2000. An examination of the long struggle for debt cancellation reveals the in-
terlinked nature of the relationships between civil society and the 
state/internationalising state which lies behind this shifting repertoire of action.  It was 
not a case of an autonomous normative civil society, as conceptualised in liberal theory, 
leveraging political opportunities, as claimed in social movement theory, but through 
continual contestation over time campaigners generated the opportunities and relations 
with the state/internationalising state which contributed to policy change. While key 
events are cited as political opportunities for debt campaigns, for example, the appoint-
ment of James Wolfensohn as President of the World Bank in 1995 and the election of a 
Labour government in the UK in 1997, their support for debt cancellation was not an 
external factor introduced by these new actors, but was generated by past and contem-
poraneous campaigning. Nor was the relationship between civil society and the 
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state/internationalising state one way. Debtor country governments sought debt cam-
paigns’ support   in   putting   pressure   on   the   country’s   creditors, while creditor govern-
ments used their relationship with debt campaigns to seek to influence oppositional 
governments.  Progress  was  also  made  on  national  debt  policy  in  the  context  of  ‘allianc-
es  of   conviction’ with left-wing governments in Europe and in Latin America. In the 
Philippines FDC was able to leverage links with government members who came from 
the progressive movement (Encarnacion Tadem 2009, p.228). It was, however, the in-
teraction of the mobilising power of debt campaigns with the ‘alliances  of  conviction’ 
between debt movements and governments which was a key factor. Left-wing govern-
ments choose from the myriad of issues being promoted by civil society the ones with 
which they will engage most positively, and their decisions are likely to be influenced 
by the degree of public support for a particular issue.  Given civil society’s strong self-
identity as an autonomous sector, there are fears that too close relations with the 
state/internationalising state will lead to a blurring of boundaries. Those interviewed 
during this study, for example, generally rejected the term ‘alliance’  as  describing  their  
relationships with governments; even when there was a degree of consensus. While 
state and civil society may not be as autonomous of each other as civil society narratives 
suggest, both sectors operate within different logics and exercise different forms of 
power. While the state has the authority to make decisions, civil society has the power 
of mobilisation. There are continual tensions with civil society groups seeking to evade 
the blurring of boundaries with the state-internationalising state by reaffirming their au-
tonomy while seeking to maintain and extend access achieved. In contrast, states may 
be happy to blur boundaries when they seek to associate themselves with the legitimacy 
of mobilised civil society, but maintain their authority to reset these boundaries.  
Further questions in relation to the power of transnational civil society 
There are a number of further questions raised by this study relating to the two research 
questions. The question in relation to the source of power is what does this study reveal 
about the south/north relationship, key to the creation of transnational common cause? 
In terms of the exercise of power, a key question is what level of challenge did the debt 
campaigns pose to the internationalising state?  
This thesis demonstrates that the south/north relationship was a dynamic one 
driven by the continual interaction of solidarity and conflict in an effort to escape the 
impact of the inequalities of the internationalising state. This process meant that power 
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differences were continually challenged, and new solidarities were developed in an ef-
fort to address these inequalities, leading to new contradictions. Difficulties were not 
only due to power differentials between the south and north, as these existed also within 
the north between G7 and non-G7 countries, for example, but were also due to the dif-
ferent mechanisms through which southern states were restructured within the interna-
tionalising state. These differences were reflected back into transnational civil society 
along the south /north interface, and in the case of debt, structural inequalities created a 
stark divide between creditor and debtor countries. Tensions arising from these differ-
ences related to both northern dominance within debt campaigning, but also to the lev-
ers of power which could be operated by northern groups within the internationalising 
state. Conditionality was a key disciplining tool of the debt nébuleuse and a major area 
of contention within transnational debt movements. Some northern groups advocated 
‘positive  conditionality’   in  order   to  pressure   southern  governments   to  direct   resources  
towards marginalised people, while southern groups resisted the redirection of state ac-
countability outwards towards the debt nébuleuse. 
A number of the processes which promote or maintain the unequal south/north 
relationship were highlighted by this study. There is the fundamental difficulty in main-
taining networks made up of participants who are directly affected by the problem 
(debt) and participants motivated by altruism, as highlighted in chapter 1. This difficulty 
was confirmed in this study, with both coordinated south/north networks Fondad and 
Jubilee 2000 fracturing along the south/north fault line. There were a range of issues in 
relation to how campaigns were designed and how they operated, which contributed to 
the emergence of these fractures. An underlying question is: to whose strengths did the 
campaigns play, to the celebrity/media-dominated northern arena or to the greater mobi-
lisation potential, knowledge and experience of groups in the south? In terms of under-
standings of the debt crisis used, where did these resonate most? While the concept of 
illegitimate debt was a strong mobilising force in the south, human development fram-
ings which resonated better with northern decision makers and media dominated cam-
paigning in the 1990s. Northern NGOs tended to assume leadership and were therefore 
better able to leverage the power of their greater access to powerful decision makers, 
international media and celebrities and to design campaigns to fit with their own organi-
sational need for short-term success. There was also the ambiguous role of funding of 
southern groups by northern NGOs. While funding was a form of solidarity, it could 
also operate as a form control. As pointed out by Buxton (2002) and Keet (2000), both 
of whom were involved in debt campaigning, in the UK and South Africa respectively, 
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northern NGO donors could chose to support groups most closely aligned with their 
own perspectives and so strengthen an NGOs’  overall  power  position  within  debt cam-
paigns. A further issue was the tendency of northern groups to claim the universal – 
their  campaigns  were  ‘international’  while  southern  campaigns  were  defined  as  ‘south-
ern’.   
While some theorists identify action to be taken by northern groups as the way 
to rebalance inequalities between south and north within civil society (de Senillosa 
1998, Katz 2006), debt movements point to the importance of southern agency in the 
relationship. It   was   southern   groups’   initiative   in   setting   up   an   autonomous   southern  
movement, Jubilee South, which helped rebalance the relationship within Jubilee 2000. 
This rebalancing took place through a contestation of the ‘second face of power’,  chal-
lenging northern-dominated design and framing of campaigns and how decisions were 
made. This led to a reconfiguration of power within debt movements, with different 
forms of south/north engagement, greater emphasis on southern priorities (illegitimate 
debt) and dispersed leadership.  
Looking to the future of the south/north relations within transnational civil so-
ciety common cause, a number of questions can be raised following on from this study. 
One question is whether the south/north relationship will continue to evolve through a 
process of struggle, as occurred within debt movements, or to what extent will the rela-
tionship change with the reconfiguration of world power, as countries like India and 
Brazil are now members of the G20? A further question is the extent to which southern 
groups are now able to represent themselves directly to international decision makers, 
rather than relying on northern advocacy, given the wider access to information and 
communication technologies. 
Looking more deeply into the power of transnational civil society, the question 
arises to what extent debt campaigns have posed a transformatory challenge to dominant 
neoliberalism. This question translates broadly into the familiar dichotomy of re-
form/revolution. Reforms are changes which can be contained within current power re-
lations and which may reinforce the system by alleviating some of the strains which, if 
left to fester, could lead to deeper fractures. Revolutionary change brings about funda-
mental change to existing power relations. Given the remarkable survival capacity of 
capitalism illustrated by its long history compared to the seventy-odd years that com-
munism survived, established categories of the 19th and early 20th centuries (revolution 
and reform) have lost their sharp definitions. Further, as highlighted by Gramsci, trans-
formatory strategies do not necessarily involve a full frontal attack on dominant power, 
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but   rather   a   long   struggle   to   change   current   public   understandings   into   a   new   ‘good  
sense’. For such a struggle to be maintained, milestones are needed on the way, many of 
which will coincide with reformist single-issue demands such as debt cancellation, with 
interim victories boosting the motivation for struggle. Judging whether movements or 
campaigns reinforce or challenge the system is often a politically charged question and 
unleashes power struggles between activists. Foucault highlights how contentious these 
distinctions can be for left-wing movements, pointing to the difference between “the cri-
tique of reformism as a political practice and the critique of a political practice on the 
grounds that it may give rise to a reform”, pointing out that a critique of a strategy on 
the grounds that it may give rise to a reform “is frequent in left-wing groups and its em-
ployment is part of the mechanisms of micro-terrorism by which they have often oper-
ated”  (Foucault 1980, p.143). Such power struggles do not assist in helping answer the 
question how well we can at this time read what are likely to be, in the longer term, sys-
tem-supporting and system-challenging elements, given that there are no longer any 
revolutionary certainties (Holloway 2005). The degree to which theorists of anti-
systemic challenges have recourse to Gramscian and Polanyian explanations suggests 
that our thinking on this issue may be over influenced by categories which need to be 
rethought.  
Further, there is an ethical as well as a political dimension to the question of re-
form and revolution: which takes priority, a long struggle to challenge the system or 
tackling the immediate and serious threats to people’s welfare and their very survival? 
This is the context within which the question of the level of challenge of transnational 
debt campaigns is set. 
Overall, although they contained radical elements, debt campaigns did not pose 
a fundamental challenge to the system, but neither were they an uncritical part of apolit-
ical global problem-solving. Rather, they created fractures in the dominant system by 
how they operated across the national/international interface, rearticulating the relation-
ship between states and the internationalising state, through their counter-discourses and 
in their contribution to the emergence of and participation in the wider anti-
globalisation movement.  
In terms of operating across the national/international interface, the priority giv-
en to national decision makers has emerged strongly in this research. Rather than accept 
the shrinkage of space for contestation at national level due to economic globalisation, 
debt groups sought to enlarge this space by pushing issues of debt and adjustment into 
the national public arena, pressing parliaments to take responsibility to monitor gov-
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ernments’  involvement  in  the  debt  nébuleuse (creditor countries) or for accepting lend-
ing from the debt nébuleuse (debtor countries). Debt campaigning can therefore be seen 
as posing a challenge to the internationalisation of the state, seeking to shift government 
accountability back to citizens through instituting   ‘conditionality   from   below’. This 
contributed to a politicisation of international policy on debt, highlighting the unequal 
power relations within which the crisis was generated and dealt with. Part of this pro-
cess involved revealing the unaccountable operation and lack of transparency of the in-
stitutions of the debt nébuleuse, the IMF and G7 in particular.  
The emphasis on the moral discourse of debt campaigns conceals their underly-
ing structural dimensions. A striking finding of this study is how structural and moral 
discourses were interlinked, raising questions as to whether they can be totally separat-
ed. The meshing of moral and structural discourses in the 1980s can be seen from the 
strong moral discourse at the debt conference convened by Castro in 1985 (Osorio 
1987). Later in the 1990s, the Religious Working Group (1997) included moral and 
structural elements in their critique. While   Jubilee   South’s   discourse  was   based   on   a  
strong structural critique, they did not distance themselves from the religious basis of 
Jubilee, but rather identified aspects which resonated with their analysis (Jubilee South 
1999). In this context it can be argued that, in the face of the closure of discourse space 
in the early 1990s, the structural discourses of the 1980s were partly submerged in mor-
al discourse with the emphasis on looser concepts of justice rather than on unequal 
power relations. Arguments about the illegitimacy of debt while containing a moral di-
mension – it  was  ‘wrong’  to  reclaim  debt  which  had  not  benefited  people – also strongly 
challenged the power relations of debt by shifting responsibility to the creditors.  
The final question to be explored in this section is the extent to which debt cam-
paigns can be seen as part of the anti-globalisation movement/global social justice 
movements. Single-issue campaigns tend to be examined in the literature separately 
from the broader multi-issue movements. As highlighted in Chapter 1, however, Ben-
nett (2005) brings together these two forms of activism, arguing that while there are ma-
jor differences and tensions between them, they operate within overlapping networks. 
As pointed out by Reitan (2007), Jubilee 2000 contained elements of both forms of ac-
tivism, bridging the two approaches, with both forms involved in the World Social Fo-
rum, and as can be seen from chapter 7, Jubilee South contributed a counter-systemic 
understanding of debt through activities on illegitimate debt. But the link between 
transnational debt groups and mobilisations against neoliberal globalisation did not start 
with Jubilee 2000. Over the course of its history, debt campaigns were part of the 
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emerging anti-globalisation/global social justice movements taking part in contentious 
protests against debt nébuleuse summits from the 1980s onwards.  
 The activities of debt movements identified above are best described as fractur-
ing neoliberalism, in  line  with  Holloway’s  (2010)  method  of  the  crack, rather than being 
part of an organised counter-systemic challenge. These cracks may, of course, over 
time, join up and present such a challenge.  
 
 
.  
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Afterword 
While this study covers the period up to 2005, debt campaigning continues today, with 
new campaigns emerging e.g. across Europe to contest how the debt crisis on that con-
tinent is being dealt with and new south /north linkages are developing in the context of 
this major redrawing of the line between debtor and creditor countries. Rather than seek 
to create the passport to enable democracy to travel, an elected world parliament as pos-
ited by Monbiot (2003), being in the debtor role, whether in a northern or southern 
country, highlights the fragility of sovereignty, and creates new hierarchies within the 
internationalising state. This is illustrated by the emergence of the debtor PIGS (Portu-
gal, Ireland, Greece, Spain) of Europe. This may enable new transnational solidarities 
based  on  ‘communities  of  fate’  rather  than  altruism  to  emerge. A quote from an Aborig-
inal woman addressed to people coming to offer solidarity expresses the importance of 
this distinction:  
If you have come here to help me, 
You are wasting your time 
But if you have come because 
Your liberation is bound up with mine 
Then let us work together (quoted in Holloway 2010, p. 271). 
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